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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Subsidies and other forms of state aid to firms can be an important in-
strument in the toolkit of politicians in order to pursue their objectives,
while the regulation of state aid can put significant constraints on govern-
ments’ decision-making (de Cecco, 2013). European state aid control,
in particular, is concerned with maintaining competition among firms
without distortion by state interventions (Kerber, 1998). Yet, state aid
control not only protects competition among firms, but is at the same
time also an instrument to conduct industrial policy (Go´mez-Barroso
and Feijo´o, 2012). In order to fully understand the possible eﬀects of
state aid and to design an optimal regulatory design, it is crucial to
disentangle the various processes concurrently at work and to consider
them against the backdrop of the institutions in which they take place.
Modern societies are characterized by delegation. Citizens elect rep-
resentatives to act on their behalf. Shareholders of a firm hire managers
to take care of the day-to-day business. In many occasions, but especially
in times of crisis, these agents get together and strike deals. Governments
might pledge tax cuts or subsidies if the managers agree to build a man-
ufacturing plant within the state’s jurisdiction. Governments might also
want to rescue an ailing firm and save jobs.
The normative question whether governments should be allowed to
do that is non-trivial and has been the subject of debate for decades.
However, much of this literature has to be re-discussed in the light of
24
2 Introduction
the agency problems involved. Politicians as well as managers have to
be analyzed as self-interested actors. This means that managers might
demand subsidies and use them in a way that is against the interest of the
firm’s owners, e.g. to follow their hubris and empire building strategies
or to gain access to cash-flow which could be diverted into their own
pockets. Conversely, politicians, trapped in a race between jurisdictions
and acting in their own interest, might end up handing out subsidies or
bailing out firms although this is not desirable from a welfare point of
view. Importantly, most of the decisions take place in a setting of risk
and fundamental uncertainty. All this can lead to unwanted eﬀects.
Subsidies to firms, be they relocation incentive packages or bailouts,
have been debated from diﬀerent angles and under diﬀerent legal regimes.
The European Union discusses the topic from the perspective of com-
petition law and favors an approach enforcing a level-playing field be-
tween firms. The United States, on the other hand, believes more in
inter-jurisdictional competition while the criticism of this regime, mostly
voiced by NGOs, revolves around the concern of what is polemically
called “corporate welfare” (Slivinski, 2007). In other words, the Euro-
pean literature discusses state aid as an economic order, whereas the
American literature focuses more on the contracting problems and the
rent-seeking aspects. Both worlds can learn from each other, and com-
bining those views is the goal of this book.
The financial crisis has led to a surge in bailouts and subsidies. Some
industries, foremost the banking sector in the U.S. and Europe, have
been de facto nationalized. Without discussing each case in detail, it is
nevertheless crucial to understand the political processes involved and
the redistributions taking place. While subsidies to firms can contribute
to the stability of a financial or industrial system and can be justified
in the presence of market failures (e.g. under-investment in research
and development or training), they also bear the risk of questionable
redistribution. For instance, a majority with strong preferences for a
good produced by a firm receiving state aids could redistribute income
from a minority with weak preferences for said good by levying a tax
and using these funds to lower the price of the good.
A jurisdiction might for instance invest in big infrastructure works
(such as expanding their highways or airports) – infrastructure works
that only increase welfare if any firm actually decides to relocate to this
25
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jurisdiction. Similarly, jurisdictions might have to pay out subsidies to
other firms or reduce their tax base below the desired tax rate solely to
build up a reputation as an attractive location, even though those other
firms either never threatened to leave or would have come anyway.
Furthermore, decisions are made under uncertainty. Politicians seek-
ing investments have only limited information about firms. They do not
know the firms’ cost functions and do not know to what degree subsidies
and other state aids account for in their decision on relocation or shut-
down. It is also not always known how quickly a firm that has gone into
bankruptcy or left the market will be replaced.
As a result of the agency problems involved, obsolete and possibly
harmful industries might be kept alive and public funds might end up
in the pockets of corrupt politicians, lobbying groups, and ill-monitored
firm managers.
The literature on subsidies implicitly conceives state aid as always
beneficial to the aid-receiving firm. However, the picture changes once
agency problems are assumed between the managers and owners of the
firm. In this case, subsidies may not only run counter to the desired re-
sult of the aid grantor, but also to the interests of firm owners. Managers
may divert subsidies into their own pockets, thereby reducing the value
of the firm. With separation of ownership and control, self-interested
managers acquire state aid not necessarily in the interest of the firm’s
shareholders (but instead for empire building, for example) or refuse sub-
sidies to avoid the terms and conditions that they come with. This leads
to two questions. Firstly, how should shareholders set up the corporate
governance structure of the firm? Keeping managers at arm’s length
gives the latter the discretion to engage in tax-avoiding and rent-seeking
activities, but also enables them to accrue more private benefits at the
shareholders’ expense. Secondly, what does this mean for regulatory
bodies? Since shareholders are subject to costly coordination and con-
tracting problems, any regulation of subsidies (e.g. European state aid
control) should take corporate governance issues into account. Again,
risk and uncertainty play a role. The shareholders, giving the managers
some degree of discretion, do not know exactly how they will act and
how much of the income they will report accurately.
In summary, this book pinnacles around three paramount concepts:
• Inter-jurisdictional competition, that is, a race between various
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levels of government for jobs and firm location,
• Delegation, that is, politicians and corporate executives acting in
their own interest or the interest of lobbying groups, and
• Decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
It proposes a view that reconsiders European state aid control as an
economic order in light of the potential contracting problems involved.
1.1 The law and economics of state aid (con-
trol)
As Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) point out, there is something
highly peculiar about state aid control. Unlike competition law, where
the public authorities intervene in the decisions taken by private firms in
order to protect competition, state aid regulation establishes an author-
ity or mechanism that intervenes in spending decisions taken by other
public authorities. Law and economics of state aid control is therefore
concerned with the behavior of the state, and not necessarily the behav-
ior of the private actors. In matters relating to the granting of subsidies
to firms, the government is not a black box anymore. In fact, what is
subject to analysis is the competition between several governments which
may or may not be subject to another government that controls their ac-
tions and interactions. While the government is sometimes understood
as a possibly benevolent social planner, the participation of governments
in competitions for capital can be seen as a wasteful process.
Paradoxes arise also when we look at which areas of the world cur-
rently implement some sort of state aid control. Interestingly, the U.S.
federal government would be the top candidate for interventions against
its federal entities - given the high degree of interdependence between the
state level and the federal level, the federal government has a stronger
levy (for instance, and this has happened in the past, the federal gov-
ernment could threaten to withdraw federal highway funds if certain
policy demands are not met, such as raising the drinking age to 21 years
(Thomas, 2000)). We rather observe something diﬀerent: the region with
the most sophisticated state aid rules is the European Union, a structure
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of independent states with a very weak supranational component (the
European Commission).
All those decisions take place in full knowledge of the fact that nowa-
days there are no closed economies anymore. Jurisdictions, whether they
want it or not, are engaged in an at least regional, but often even world-
wide competition for capital. Their decisions can also produce externali-
ties on other jurisdictions. The topic is relevant at the international level,
but also within states, and especially in federal states1–an institutional
setting home to nearly half of the world’s population in 28 countries
(Anderson, 2010).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the nexus of competition among firms and
among jurisdictions. Competition among firms is regulated by com-
petition policy at the lower level of jurisdiction2. At the same time,
the jurisdictions are in a competition themselves. The regulation of this
competition would then be done by a higher level of government, as it
is the case in Europe.
1.2 The state as a firm
After reiterating the notion of a double competition (between firms and
between jurisdictions), this book will temporarily abandon the paradigm
of ensuring a “level playing field” (Kerber, 2011) and instead introduce
an approach in which the state’s function is primarily to maximize the
utility of its citizens. Its role thus is much more than just enforcing
private contracts and providing order. As such, the state actively en-
gages in a market as an “agent” in order to maximize the utility of its
“principals.” The relations between the state and its citizens could then
be compared to those between a firm and its stakeholders (shareholders
1What exactly constitutes a federal state is debatable. The following definition
shall apply: “Federalism is a constitutionally established system with at least two
orders of government each of which has some genuine autonomy from the other. The
governments at each level are primarily accountable to their respective electorates.”
(Anderson, 2010, p. 1)
2In some legal systems, competition among firms can also be regulated by a higher
level of government if the market spans several jurisdictions. The intertwined system
of European competition law and EU member states’ competition laws is an example.
Similarly, in the United States, the Sherman Act and individual state antitrust laws
allocate the regulation of competition to the state and to the federal level.
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Figure 1.1: The inter-jurisdictional and inter-firm competition perspec-
tive on state aid
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and workers). This view has previously been formulated for instance in
Auster and Silver (1979) in their book entitled “The State as a Firm”.
The angle from which this book tries to approach the topic of state
aid regulation is one in which the focus is not only on the potential ex-
ternalities produced, but rather on the utility-maximizing behavior of
the state and the competition between jurisdictions. One of the con-
texts is the European common market, which prohibits state aids. The
EU’s approach to state aids is also an important starting point for other
aspects of EU economic policy, such as the ongoing process of tax har-
monization (Besley and Seabright, 1999) – by the way an example of an
area in which some claim that competition is not functioning properly
(Sinn, 1990). This European approach will be compared to the approach
taken by the United States and at the international level.
The goal is to find determinants – economic and institutional – to
explain the state-aid-granting behavior of governments and to infer re-
quirements for a supra-jurisdictional regulation of competition. To sum
up, it can be said that the regulation of state aid never involves only
one collective decision. Because of a worldwide tendency to abolish
trade barriers and to create customs unions or even more integrated
regional/continental arrangements, the number of actors and also the
number of decisions to be made is strongly increasing. As the experi-
ence shows, there are severe problems of coordination, information, and
decision-making. As Sykes (2010) points out, the topic is highly com-
plex and economies are deeply interwoven, which is why it is virtually
impossible to find universal answers in a purely static analysis.
1.3 Methodology
It is probably safe to say that government subsidies for private businesses
are ubiquitous around the world. And yet, the legal frameworks under
which they take place vary considerably. Three of those frameworks, for
their form and substance, are especially noteworthy. First, there is the
United States federal system mostly characterized by a ”laissez-faire”
approach. Secondly, there is the highly convoluted European Union
State aid control mechanism. Thirdly, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) features detailed but weakly enforced trade and subsidy rules
(Sykes, 2010).
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What is noteworthy about this observation is that – despite the fact
that these three systems have been strongly interwoven for a consider-
able amount of time – there are no signs of any convergence of legal
systems (ibid.). The obvious explanation therefore is that identifying
optimal rules is – to say the least – very controversial and subject to
an ongoing debate, to which this dissertation tries to contribute. This
lack of cohesion and coherence is not only observed between systems,
but even within.
Recent research hence argues in favor of a more dynamic approach.
Instead of trying to identify an optimal rule, the spot (or more specifi-
cally: criticism) should rather be on changes in those rules (Sykes, 2010).
In an ideal world, it would be possible to compare a setting with a
certain kind of regulation (e.g. state aid control) to a setting without
this regulation. But, in matters of state aid, what is the baseline that
regulation should be measured against? Demsetz (1969) warned of what
he called the nirvana fallacy :
“The view that now pervades much public policy economics
implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal
norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement.
This nirvana approach diﬀers considerably from a compara-
tive institution approach in which the relevant choice is be-
tween alternative real institutional arrangements. In prac-
tice, those who adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover
discrepancies between the ideal and the real and if discrepan-
cies are found, they deduce that the real is ineﬃcient. Users
of the comparative institution approach attempt to assess
which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best
able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this
approach may use an ideal norm to provide standards from
which divergences are assessed for all practical alternatives
of interest and select as eﬃcient that alternative which seems
most likely to minimize the divergence” (Demsetz, 1969, p.
1, emphasis in the original, one footnote omitted).
Applying a nirvana viewpoint would require being able to characterize
either a world with perfect state aid control, or one in which the state
does not interfere with the economy. Obviously, neither is realistically
possible.
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Given the broadness of the field, many diﬀerent approaches can be
chosen to address the research questions. Empirical industrial organi-
zation allows to assess the eﬀects of subsidies empirically at the firm-
level. Much of the literature uses strategic trade theory as a framework
for analyzing the welfare eﬀects and the governments’ incentives (e.g.
G#lowicka, 2008). Political economics allows to focus more narrowly on
the institutional setting and the political, non-market processes.
The academic debate on the subject can be classified into five strands
of literature (Martin and Valbonesi, 2006b):
• the strategic trade policy literature,
• the tax or regulatory competition literature,
• the rent-seeking approach,
• the two primarily policy-oriented literatures on state action under
U.S. anti-trust policy and on
• the corresponding literature on EU state aid control.
State aid control exists since the 1950s (with its establishment in
the early European Economic Community)–albeit to diﬀerent degrees
of enforcement. Therefore, the field of research is not new. But with
increasing economic integration and globalization, new fields of research
have opened up. This dissertation will focus on the decision-making
processes–a topic that allows for methodological innovation, such as the
use of empirical, quantitative methods, and that requires referring re-
peatedly to the existing branches of the literature. In the field of state
aid, there have not been many endeavors to find insights from formal
models. Seminal models were written by David R. Collie who approaches
the topic from a strategic trade position (see section 3.1.2.2 in chapter
3 for a review). Other models focus less on the eﬃciency aspect of state
aids, but more at the political, public choice aspects.
The methodological scope will also go beyond law and economics.
As Kassim and Lyons (2013) notes, political science can and should
contribute as well. State aid has been a blind spot for several social
sciences: “... political scientists have typically regarded the EU’s state
aid policy as too technical, legal scholars often do not regard the state
aid rules as part of competition law, and while economists have examined
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the justifications for industrial policy, they have only recently considered
the regulation of state aid to be worthy of serious interest” (Kassim and
Lyons, 2013, p. 2). State aid control as a subject that has not gotten
much attention by political scientists (Franchino, 2005), even though it
touches upon a large variety of policy areas.
A methodological foundation is provided, inter alia, by public choice.
“Public choice is a perspective on politics that emerges from an extension
and application of the tools and methods of the economist to collective
or nonmarket decision-making” (Buchanan, 1989, p. 13). In order to do
so, he adds, a particular approach to economics is required. He intro-
duces the distinction between the “catallactic” approach and the more
familiar homo oeconomicus postulate on human behavior. The catal-
laxy perspective to politics models politics on the exchange paradigm as
opposed to the politics-as-power perspective. While in reality politics
always includes a component of power and is not just about voluntary
exchange, it is up to political scientists, not economists to deliberate on
this. Eventually, the constitutional perspective “emerges naturally from
the politics-as-exchange paradigm” (ibid., p. 18). Politics is therein seen
as a game and abandons the view of benevolent dictators who use their
powers in some “public interest.” The public choice perspective is then
extended by the concept of the homo oeconomicus. The economic the-
ory of politics, which derives from individual utility-maximizing choice
behavior, is relatively recent. The task of such a theory is to apply
a “great discovery” (Buchanan, 1989, p. 20) of classical economics to
politics: “that individuals acting in pursuit of their own interests may
unintentionally generate results that serve the overall ‘social’ interest,
given the appropriate framework of laws and institutions.” (ibid.) Thus,
public choosers (voters, politicians, bureaucrats, etc.) should be mod-
eled as utility maximizers. This economic theory of politics emerges as
the combination of the politics-as-exchange paradigm with the postu-
late about human behavior. The constitutional challenge, as Buchanan
(1989) puts it, becomes “one of constructing and designing framework
institutions or rules that will, to the maximum extent possible, limit the
exercise of such interest in exploitative ways and direct such interest to
furtherance of the general interest.”
As hinted at already above, constitutional economics looks at the
choice within constraints, but, unlike “pure” economics, it also addresses
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the choice of constraints. Given the popularity of game-metaphors in
economics, Kerber and Vanberg (2001) condense it to the statement
that “people cannot only advance their own interests by seeking to play
a given game better, but also by seeking to play a better game” (Kerber
and Vanberg, 2001, p. 51, emphasis in original). It follows the distinc-
tion established by Hayek (1969) between the order of rules and the order
of actions. By applying the concept of the gains from trade to constitu-
tional choice, the question is thus “how people can realize mutual gains
from voluntary cooperation” (ibid.). The combination of the economic
constitution and the order of actions build the economic system.
Vanberg (1997) describes the legitimate duty of the constitutional
and economic scholar or advisor if voter-citizens have needs that are
critical of full-fledged competition. He or she cannot simply argue in
favor of the economic advantages of a competitive system without taking
into account said preferences. The task can only be to lay out the various
institutional arrangements that would be able to accommodate for such
preferences, their functioning and the loss in goods they would entail.
Weighing the various advantages and disadvantages and choosing an
order, nevertheless, shall remain up to the judgement of the voter-citizen.
1.4 The research questions
The over-arching question in the literature on state aids is: What is the
optimal legal rule or set of restrictions concerning the granting of state
subsidies to private businesses? Since those subsidies are awarded by
public jurisdictions, the legal rule applies either to the constitution or
to the legal entity at a higher level, either within a federal system, in
an international setting or in a sui generis setting such as the European
Union. Generally speaking, the question is whether subsidies should
be allowed at all. An immediate consequence of this question is the
necessity to determine a legal rule that answers the following: What
exactly constitutes a subsidy? There is a wide literature addressing
those questions with very diﬀerent results. The legal regimes in place,
notably the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
and EU State Aid Law, define state aid to firms prima facie in a similar
way, but with substantial diﬀerences in the details. While a general
answer to the main question might never be found unambiguously, it is
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Figure 1.2: The principal-agent perspective on state aid.
possible to conceive new angles of approaching it. The issues of defining
state aid, what kinds of state aid should be prohibited, and how the
process should be regulated will be a recurring theme throughout this
book.
The principal endeavor of this dissertation is to better understand
the behavior of all actors involved in the state aid game. The idea is
to further develop the view of the competition for capital and for state
aid by applying the principal-agent perspective. First, diﬀerent actors
within jurisdictions have diﬀerent interests when it comes to subsidizing
firms. Similarly, diﬀerent stakeholders within firms might have diﬀer-
ent interests when it comes to acquiring state aids for the firm. The
main tool to understand political processes within jurisdictions is public
choice, while firm behavior can be analyzed using agency-approaches.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the principal-agent perspective on state aid.
While inter-jurisdictional competition and inter-firm competition still
take place, this perspective abandons the monolithic view of the state
and the firm. Instead, firms are seen as a nexus of stakeholders, of
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which the separation of ownership and control is the most important
feature. Similarly, the aid-granting entity is an institution controlled by
politicians who were put in charge by the citizens of the jurisdiction.
This research design allows to do two things. First, it gives an ex-
planation why rules are the way they are and what the problems in
changing them will be. It would allow to better characterize firms that
receive subsidies and to explain why they were chosen. How do state aid
patterns diﬀer between, say, the United States and the European Union?
What are institutional, political determinants aﬀecting the propensity
to find an agreement?
Secondly, the aim is to learn something about the optimal design
of rules. Those rules might come at diﬀerent levels of government and
might in some cases only have the character of mutual agreements.
1.5 Structure of this book
The steps to be taken are the following. Chapter 2 gives an overview
of the rules currently in place in diﬀerent parts of the world and re-
lates them to each other. Chapter 3 will re-iterate the debates regarding
the competition between jurisdictions and between firms. Chapter 4
critically assesses past state aid decisions and highlights some inherent
problems. Chapter 5 is about opening the black boxes. It will look at
the public choice of state aid – the political decisions involved – and also
discuss the role of intermediaries in the negotiations between firms and
governments. Chapter 6 focuses on the firm side of state aid and elab-
orates on the corporate governance issues at stake. Chapter 7 looks at
the implications from this analysis, what it means for designing state aid
rules, and the possible conflicts of interest. Finally, chapter 8 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
Diﬀerent approaches towards
the regulation of subsidies
Law and economics is probably the most interesting when we observe
variety among the legal solutions to the problem at hand – an indicator
of the fact that remedying it is non-trivial and controversial. And in-
deed how federal structures or regional groupings deal with competition
between the various levels of government diﬀers. The regimes currently
in place almost constitute a continuum.
The following chapter reviews a couple of them. First, it will summa-
rize the rules in place in the EU, then secondly the American approach,
and thirdly the Canadian system as an example of an in-between ap-
proach. This task is important not only for the learning benefits inher-
ent to comparative legal research, but also because of their relevance for
regulation at the worldwide, that is, WTO level, which will be discussed
fourth. How state aids are treated at the national or regional grouping
level eventually aﬀects the working of the larger global system.
2.1 The European Union
The European Union’s approach is one of strict regulation. It is mainly
led by considerations of market and political integration and cohesion.
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The main concern is – just like in European competition law – the pre-
vention of distortions of competition. The European state aid control
regime is based on Articles 107 to 109 TFEU (formerly 87 to 89 TEC)
and the various guidelines issued by the European Commission.
This regime and its developments (most interestingly: the more eco-
nomic approach) are the subject of a host of publications (see e.g. Hau-
cap and Schwalbe (2011) for a recent review; an exhaustive law and
economics analysis of state aid law can be found in Nicolaides (2008)).
The following section gives a synopsis of the rules in place, the preva-
lence of state aid in Europe, and the current reform proposals.
2.1.1 Legal basis
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lays out
the framework for European State Aid Law.
Under the section “Aids granted by States”, article 107 first for-
mulates the prohibition of state aids in principle: “Save as otherwise
provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production
of certain goods shall, in so far as it aﬀects trade between Member States,
be incompatible with the internal market.” (Article 107(1))
It secondly briefly lists under which circumstances state aids shall or
may be permissible (see section 2.1.3 of this chapter).
Article 108 empowers the European Commission (EC) to keep under
constant review all state aid systems in place in the member states as
well as to enforce the ban on certain kinds of state aids. In addition,
it gives the European Council the discretion to unanimously decide to
grant exceptions to the state aid rules under exceptional circumstances
and upon application by a member state. The member states are obliged
to notify the Commission about any plans to grant aid.
Article 109 gives the European Council the right to – on proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament –
make any appropriate regulations for the application of Articles 107 and
108 and to determine the conditions in which the notification require-
ment shall apply and the categories of aid exempted from this procedure.
As a result, the EU has enacted a number of guidelines for diﬀerent kinds
of aids.
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There are two more sections in the TFEU that are relevant to the
subject at hand. First, aiding domestic firms through preferential tax
treatment is not permissible. Article 110 stipulates that no EU mem-
ber state “shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other
Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that im-
posed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. Furthermore,
no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States
any internal taxation of such a nature as to aﬀord indirect protection
to other products.” Secondly, Art. 106 provides for a special treatment
of services of general economic interest (SGEIs), which are exempt from
state aid rules under certain conditions (see again section 2.1.3 of this
chapter).
2.1.2 Definition of State Aid
European Law speaks of “State Aids to Undertakings.” This is a very
broad term encompassing more than just subsidies paid out to firms.
First, it includes “any aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources in any form whatsoever” (Article 107 TFEU). Secondly, the
term “undertaking” as used in said article 107 is not a synonym for
“firm” since undertakings can also refer to non-commercial market par-
ticipants. The landmark case defining the term “undertaking” is Case
C-41/90 (Klaus Ho¨fner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH) in which
the ECJ ruled that the word undertaking encompass “every entity en-
gaged in an economic activity” (para 21). As such, a public hospital,
or - as in the Macrotron case - an employment agency would be consid-
ered an undertaking, but not necessarily as a firm. Eventually, the ECJ
had to clarify some issues. While Macrotron subjected all undertakings
to European competition law (i.e., what is now articles 101 and 102),
the famous Altmark judgement (C-280/00, 24.7.03) stipulated that, if
certain conditions are met, compensation for the provision of services of
general interest does not amount to state aid. Thus, in state aid con-
texts, the term “undertaking” would usually not include hospitals and
employment agencies.
Taking articles 107 and 108 as starting points, the Commission and
the European Court developed a legal definition of what constitutes state
aid based on the following four criteria (Haucap and Schwalbe, 2011).
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a. First, there needs to be some kind of transfer of government funds (be
they direct or indirect). A transfer of government funds takes also
place if the government is willing to forego certain revenues, such as
in the cases of tax cuts or exemptions from certain fees. In particular,
this means that regulation favoring certain firms, but which does not
cost the state money, is not state aid. This constitutes a diﬀerence
to WTO law (Ehlermann and Goyette, 2006) and applies for instance
to some schemes that promote electricity generation from renewable
energy sources, such as feed-in tariﬀs obliging network operators to
pay higher prices for electricity generated from solar energy (see ibid.,
and case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, [2001]
ECR I-2099).
b. Secondly, this transfer of funds must confer an economic advantage
upon a firm which it would not have gained otherwise. This means
that a government can legitimately transfer money to firms for in-
stance through a tender, as long as the state is not paying an excessive
price for the contract. The idea is to allow government consumption
as long as market prices are being paid.
c. Thirdly, transfers have to benefit specific firms in order to constitute
state aid. For instance, if a government invests in infrastructure in a
certain region in order to improve the region’s competitiveness, thus
benefiting all businesses equally, then this is not considered state aid.
d. Finally, the transfer must have an eﬀect on competition and trade be-
tween two or more member states. The minimum amount of state aid
at which the Commission considers it worthwhile to evaluate the pos-
sibly distortionary eﬀect on competition is e 200.000 (the so-called
“de minimis” rule). If the transfer does not aﬀect undertakings in
other EU member states (e.g. because it is a subsidy for local ser-
vices), then it is unobjectionable. An interesting case is when an aid
does not aﬀect other EU member states, but only non-member states.
Theoretically, this kind of transfer would be legal, although in prac-
tice these kinds of arguments have rarely been successful (Quigley and
Collings, 2003). The State Aid Action Plan (SAAP) of 2005 intro-
duced the so-called “refined economic approach”, which implemented
both economic and legal analyses as the basis for the Commission’s
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decisions in their investigations of state aid cases (see also section
2.1.6).
If those four criteria are met, then there is state aid. But not all
state aids are banned. Article 107, paragraph 3 lists exceptions from
the general ban on state aid. In addition, article 108, paragraph 2,
authorizes the European Council to determine types of state aid that
are compatible with the EC treaty (upon request of a member state and
acting unanimously).
It is also important to note that Article 107 only addresses state aid
that “aﬀects trade between Member States”, meaning it applies only
to aid that negatively aﬀects trade among EU countries, but not be-
tween the EU and third countries. This explains why large subsidies
for e.g. plane manufacturer Airbus are possible – its only competitor is
U.S.-based Boeing (and to a lesser degree regional plane manufactures
in Brazil, Canada, and Russia). Since European state aid rules pose a
potential disadvantage for European firms vis-a`-vis non-European firms,
the EU endeavors to export its state aid rules to third countries (see
section 7.3.6). EU state aid rules therefore also apply to the EFTA
member states Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Asso-
ciation agreements with the accession candidate countries Macedonia,
Serbia, and Turkey include provisions on state aid and public procure-
ment, and so do the agreements with the associated countries Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro (Blauberger and Kra¨mer, 2013).
2.1.3 Exceptions
There are three categories for exemptions from the ban on state aid: re-
gional, horizontal, and sectoral aid. Article 107, paragraph 2, considers
the following “compatible with the internal market” (that is, permitted):
aid having a social character granted to individuals, aid alleviating the
damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, and aid
to areas of Germany aﬀected by the German division1. In paragraph 3,
the article states aids that may be considered to be compatible with the
internal market: regional aid to areas with serious underemployment
1This point was enacted before the German reunification and thus was meant to
apply to Western German areas mainly along the boarder to the German Democratic
Republic.
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or low development, aid to help accomplish “an important project of
common European interest” or to “remedy a serious disturbance in the
economy of a Member State”, aid to develop certain economic activities
or certain economic areas, aid to promote culture and heritage conserva-
tion (all of those points always under the condition that the aid do not
adversely aﬀect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest).
Although not of interest to this book, it has to be noted that Art. 42
TFEU establishes the prevalence of the common agricultural policy over
competition and state aid rules. Art. 93 and 96 TFEU establish special
state aid rules for the transport sector. An important field in which state
aids are treated diﬀerently are so-called services of general economic
interest (SGEI). Art. 106 TFEU states that undertakings are subject
to competition and state aid rules only “in so far as the application of
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the
particular tasks assigned to them”.
On 24 July 2003, the European Court of Justice delivered the land-
mark Altmark judgement, in which it held that public service compen-
sation does not constitute State aid when all of four conditions are met:
1. “The recipient undertaking must actually have public service obli-
gations to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined.”
2. “The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calcu-
lated must be established in advance in an objective and transpar-
ent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which
may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertak-
ings.”
3. “The compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all
or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obli-
gations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable
profit for discharging those obligations. Compliance with such a
condition is essential to ensure that the recipient undertaking is not
given any advantage which distorts or threatens to distort compe-
tition by strengthening that undertaking’s competitive position.”
4. “Where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obliga-
tions, in a specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procure-
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ment procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer
capable of providing those services at the least cost to the com-
munity, the level of compensation needed must be determined on
the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking,
well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to
be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would
have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the
obligations.”2
If at least one of these four conditions is not met, then the public
service compensation will be examined according to the state aid rules.
In December 2011 the EC issued a new set of rules pertaining to
SGEIs increasing the de minimis threshold, altering the block exemption
rules, and modifying the general framework of state aid rules regarding
SGEIs.
2.1.4 Enforcement
European State Aid rules are generally enforced by the European Com-
mission (EC). The EC acts in a double role, namely as the prosecutor as
well as the judge of first instance of sorts. The Commission’s decisions
can be appealed to the European Court of Justice. As the designated
regulator, it also issued a set of guidelines which set out certain amounts
of permissible state aids for various situations (for a detailed description,
see the appendices in Nicolaides et al., 2005). The procedural rules for
the EU assessment of state aids are proscribed in “Council Regulation
(EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Article 93 [now Art. 108 TFEU, PCH] of the EC Treaty”.
This regulation has been amended after the accession of new member
states.
Once an EU member state has plans to grant aid to an undertaking,
it has to notify the Commission in due time and include all necessary
information to enable the EC to adequately assess the case.
After the member state has duly notified the Commission about the
intended aid scheme, the EC conducts a preliminary investigation in
2Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungsprsidium Magdeburg v
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH
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accordance with Art. 108 TFEU. This preliminary investigation must be
completed within two months after the notification. If it finds cause for
concern, it can open formal in-depth investigations and make a decision
based upon its findings. During this process, the member state can
amend its aid proposal (this can e.g. be done as a result of informal
negotiations between the EC and the aid-granting government). The
Commission can make its decision contingent on the fulfillment of certain
conditions.
Sometimes, EU member states fail to notify the Commission. If the
EC receives information about such an unreported aid (e.g. through a
complaint by a competitor) within ten years of the awarding of the aid,
the Commission may open investigations on its own. if the aid is found
to be unlawful, the consequence can be an injunction or the order to
recover the unlawful state aid. There is no punishment in the case of
unlawful aid, other than an injunction or its recovery (it is then returned
to the aid-granting entity). Furthermore, the member states have to
deliver annual reports on all existing aid schemes. The Commission also
has the power to conduct on-site visits to ensure the compliance with
the rules. After the decision is rendered, the Court of Justice of the
European Union has the role of enforcing the Commission’s decision in
case the member state does not comply.
2.1.5 Quantifying European state aid
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition moni-
tors state aid in the EU and publishes data on a regular basis. According
to the 2009 state aid scoreboard3, the European Union member states
spent a total of e 73.2 billion or 0.62% of GDP (excluding crisis measures
and railways) on state aid. When crisis measures are included, then the
total amount is 427.4 billion or 3.62% of GDP. The last years’ finan-
cial and economic crisis heavily distorts the data. When crisis measures
are excluded, then the countries’ percentages of GDP spent on state aid
vary from 0.26% in the United Kingdom to 2.15% in Bulgaria. Before
the crisis, there was a general trends towards less state aid. In 1992, the
EU-15 spent 1.1% of GDP, which fell to 0.6% by the end of the decade
and jumped from 0.5% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2008 with the onset of the
3Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid
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financial crisis.
In 2010, European Union member states granted a total of around
e 73.7 billion of non-crisis aid, equivalent to 0.6% of EU GDP. So-
called crisis-related measures such as aids granted to the financial sec-
tor through recapitalization and impaired asset measures amounted to
e 121.3 billion or 1% of EU GDP. The 0.6% of EU GDP given to non-
crisis aid can be broken down into e 61 billion or 0.5% given to industry
and services, e 10.3 billion or 0.08% to agriculture (on top of agriculture
subsidies paid for directly by the EU budget), e 0.18 billion or 0.001% to
fisheries, and e 3.2 billion or 0.02% given to the transport sector. Fur-
thermore (though aggregated through a diﬀerent concept than the other
aids and therefore not included in the total), EU member states paid
e 27.2 billion or 0.2% of EU GDP to railways . Distinction among aids
can also be made by type. 85% of all state aid to industry and services
was granted under horizontal objectives: 24.3% of total aid to industry
and services as regional development aid, 23.7% for environmental pro-
tection, and 17.4% for research, development and innovation (R&D&I).
Sectoral aid, which includes rescue and restructuring aid, make up the
remaining 15% of total aid to industry and services.
Before granting state aid and implementing the measures taken, EU
member states have to notify the European Commission (EC) and await
the outcome of the Commission’s investigation. If the states fail to do
so, the state aid is considered unlawful. In the 2000-2010 period, the EC
took 980 decisions on unlawful aid. The decisions were negative in 22%
of the cases, leading to the requirement to recover the unlawful state aid,
and in 3% of unlawful aid cares, conditions were attached to the decision.
Among duly notified state aids, the EC’s intervention rate is only one
tenth of the intervention rate in unlawful aids (European Commission,
2011). It should also be noted though that in some more problematic
cases there are informal negotiations taking place beforehand between
member states and the Commission.
2.1.6 Conclusion and current reform processes
The European state aid control mechanism has constantly evolved in the
past decades. Most recently, the EC’s State Aid Action Plan of 2005 laid
out a roadmap for state aid reform for the years 2005-2009. The motto
and title of the plan was “less and better targeted state aid” (probably
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not coincidentally mirroring the OECD’s contemporary call for “less but
better regulation”). This reform also included a consultation process
and led to simplified rules and more block exemption regulations (the
so-called de minimis rule).
In May 2012, the European Commission once more initiated a reform
program. Its objectives are to “(a) foster growth in a strengthened, dy-
namic and competitive internal market”, (b) “focus enforcement on cases
with the biggest impact on the internal market”, and (c) “streamlined
rules and faster decisions”(European Commission, 2012).
The context of these objectives is clearly the economic crisis and the
current need for both growth-enhancing policies and budget consolida-
tion.
In its policy paper, the Commission’s proposals include:
• “To identify common principles for assessing the compatibility of
aid with the internal market, across various guidelines and frame-
works”
• “To revise, streamline and possibly consolidate State aid guidelines
to make them consistent with those common principles (first, the
guidelines on Regional Aid, Research & Development & Innova-
tion, Environmental aid, Risk Capital and Broadband; followed by
other guidelines)”
• “To revise the Block Exemption Regulation and the Council En-
abling Regulation (and, possibly, the de minimis Regulation)”
• “To clarify and better explain the notion of State aid”
• “To modernize the Procedural Regulation with regard to complaint-
handling and market information tools” (ibid.)
As of the time of writing, many new state aid guidelines (e.g. regard-
ing regional aid, R&D&I, or aviation) and regulations (e.g. general block
exemption regulations, de minimis regulations, are at the consultation
or post-consultation stage.
So far, this chapter considered the European Union as a monolithic
block with a clear stance on state aid control. This view if not very accu-
rate. Indeed, diﬀerent agencies in Brussels might actually have diﬀerent
policy objectives and understandings of the need for state aid control.
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The agency responsible for EU state aid control is the European
Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition’s state aid division.
This again underlines that European state aid control is primarily an
exercise in competition law. At the same time, there are other DGs,
which – even though not enforcing state aid law – operate in settings
where states hand out money to firms. These might be, for instance
DG Agriculture and Rural Development, DG Education and Culture,
DG Mobility and Transport, and others. The policy goals of these DGs
might diverge. Even though all DGs are bound by the laws of the EU
Treaties, for instance, DG Mobility and Transport, primarily pursuing
objectives of improved transport infrastructure, might favor a more lax
stance towards aid to transportation companies than DG Competition,
which is primarily concerned about distortions of competition.
2.2 The United States
At first glance, the United States does virtually not have a regulatory
regime for public subsidies to firms. There are some provisions, such as
that some federal funds may not be used to engage in pirating (that is,
one state subsidizing a firm so that it relocates from another state) and
also some states prohibit their local governments from this behavior.
European State Aid Law is a sub-field of European Competition Law
(it shares the same chapter with the anti-trust provisions and the rules
against tax discrimination), but the American functional equivalent to
European Competition Law, namely the Sherman Act, merely deals with
anti-competitive behavior of private parties, applies only to interstate
commerce and does not address the individual states. In this view,
competition is threatened only by the acts of private actors, and not by
government interventions. In various cases, such as City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), courts (the
Supreme Court in the mentioned case) ruled that local governments are
basically exempt from antitrust regulation4.
Of course, the American legal system must not be discussed solely on
the basis of statutory laws, but the analysis also has to take into account
4In Columbia v. Omni it also ruled that political activity of a firm in order to
achieve favorable regulation harming the competitor(s) is not subject to liability due
to the Sherman Act.
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the common law. Indeed, some (Wood, 2007) argue that the landmark
case Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc5 was – at least before it came to the
Supreme Court – a move to rein in state aids in the United States un-
der the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Yet, the Supreme Court
“never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies,”6 mainly
because individual taxpayers do not have the standing to challenge gov-
ernmental expenditures7 (see e.g. Sykes, 2010).
Just as the legal regimes in place around the world and the (un-
fortunately ill-connected) literature discussing them varies, so does the
vocabulary used. The American literature uses diﬀerent terms than the
European Union. The term “state aid” rather refers to aids to indi-
viduals, such as university scholarships. Aids given to firms (the term
“undertaking” is not common in the U.S. in this context) are usually
referred to either as “subsidies”, or the broader term “(business) incen-
tives”. The equivalent of rescue aid in Europe is often simply called
“bail-out.”
2.2.1 The role of the Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution enumerates the powers of
Congress, thus allocating certain authority to the federal level. Clause
3 of said section, known as the Commerce Clause, authorizes Congress
to “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The primary impetus behind
the interstate commerce clause and allocating this power to the federal
government were the tariﬀ wars among the various states waged in the
eighteenth century. Its goal is to assure the free flow of commerce in the
newly created national market. Both Congress and the Supreme Court
repeatedly interpreted the clause as a mandate to prevent any state mea-
sures with the goal of constraining interstate commerce (Enrich, 2006).
The Commerce Clause bans discrimination against out-of-state firms
though, but applies rather to matters of discriminatory taxation and not
to direct subsidies.
5386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part and remanded on other grounds,
126 S.Ct. 1854 (2006)
6Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 589 (1997)
7DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006)
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2.2.2 The dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause primarily refers to the powers of Congress and
as such falls into the realm of federal law. But this is not the whole
story. In fact, there is the established doctrine of the so-called “dormant”
or “negative” commerce clause which establishes that the clause also
applies to the several states. This principle goes back to the middle of
the 19th century, when the Supreme Court established that some state
rules oﬀend the Commerce Clause even when there is no conflicting act
of Congress (Sykes, 2010). In Cooley v. Board of Wardens8, it took
a middle ground position between the view that the Commerce Clause
precluded any state regulation of interstate commerce and the view that
States could regulate without restrictions in fields in which Congress
had not acted. In the earlier so-called Passenger Cases9, the Supreme
Court had asserted that it is the exclusive power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.
When Ohio awarded tax credits against the Ohio motor fuel sales
tax for ethanol to in-state producers or producers from states that gave
reciprocal benefits to Ohio companies, the Supreme Court re-iterated
the rule as follows10:
“It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not
only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce
among the States, but also directly limits the power of the
States to discriminate against interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 441 U. S. 326 (1979);
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 336 U.
S. 534-535 (1949); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876).
This ”negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits
economic protectionism – that is, regulatory measures de-
signed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 468 U. S. 270-273 (1984); H. P. Hood &
Sons, supra, at 336 U. S. 532-533; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.
S. 434, 100 U. S. 443 (1880). Thus, state statutes that clearly
8Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)
9Smith v. Turner; Norris v. Boston, 48 U.S. 283 (1849)
10New Energy Co. v. Limbach , 486 U.S. 269 (1988)
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discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck
down, see, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.
S. 941 (1982); Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447
U. S. 27 (1980); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349
(1951), unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by
a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism, see, e.g.,
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986).”
Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled this tax credit unconstitu-
tional. In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public
Service Commission11, it had to address the constitutionality of a $100
flat fee imposed by Michigan on trucks engaged in intrastate commerce.
With regard to the Commerce Clause it emphasized:
“Our Constitution ‘was framed upon the theory that the peo-
ples of the several states must sink or swim together.’ Bald-
win v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935). Thus,
this Court has consistently held that the Constitution’s ex-
press grant to Congress of the power to ‘regulate Commerce
... among the several States,’ Art. I, §8, cl. 3, contains ‘a fur-
ther, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce
Clause,’ Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jeﬀerson Lines, Inc., 514
U. S. 175, 179 (1995), that ‘create[s] an area of trade free from
interference by the States,’ Boston Stock Exchange v. State
Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 (1977) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This negative command prevents a State
from ‘jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole’ by
‘plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders
that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.’
Jeﬀerson Lines, supra, at 180.”
The Court voted unanimously in favor of the Michigan Public Service
Commission. The dormant commerce clause did not, Justice Stephen
Breyer wrote, ban such a “neutral” and “locally focused fee.” The rea-
son is that it does not “facially discriminate against interstate or out-
of-state activities or enterprises” since the fee applies to all intrastate
transactions “applies evenhandedly to all carriers that make domestic
11545 U.S. 429, 125 S.Ct. 2419, 2422-23 (2005)
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journeys. It does not reflect an eﬀort to tax activity that takes place, in
whole or in part, outside the State.”
This finding of the Supreme Court is conceptually not so far from
the European ban on aids “aﬀecting trade between member states”
(which, given its importance as concept, can henceforth be abbreviated
as ATBMS, as in Bergeron (2001)). As Wood (2007, p.7) points out,
“if the logic behind the rules prohibiting discrimination and burden ons
interstate commerce were carried through in the remainder of U.S. law
in this field, U.S. law might not look too diﬀerent from the law that
exists in Europe”. But there is a lack of consistency in the Supreme
Court’s holdings. It did not object certain State programs intended to
foster business activities by means of subsidies, but rejected some State
programs which tried to achieve the same goal by means of tax incentives
(Hellerstein and Coenen, 1996; Wood, 2007).
2.2.3 The Massachusetts tax on milk
The case West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy is a landmark case with
regard to subsidies12. It is also noteworthy that in its final ruling, the
Supreme Court stated that the constitutionality of subsidies is yet unde-
cided, but that they are usually not in conflict with the negative Com-
merce Clause:
“We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of
subsidies, and we need not do so now. We have, however,
noted that ‘[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does
not ordinarily run afoul’ of the negative Commerce Clause.
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278
(1988); see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.
S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In addition,
it is undisputed that States may try to attract business by
creating an environment conducive to economic activity, as
by maintaining good roads, sound public education, or low
taxes. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S.,
at 271; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869,
876878 (1985).”
12West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)
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This statement summarizes the state of aﬀairs in the United States.
The case concerning the Massachusetts tax on milk – and the controversy
it stirred among the judges – is a good example of the ongoing policy
debate which has not yet reached a clear result. It is also worth reading
for its application of economic thinking to legal rules.
In the early 1990s, the price of milk plummeted in Massachusetts. As
a measure to protect its dairy farmers, the Massachusetts Department of
Food and Agriculture imposed a tax on all raw milk sold by milk dealers
to retailers in Massachusetts. The revenue of this tax was then given as
a direct subsidy to in-state dairy farmers. The overwhelming majority
of the milk was produced out of state and the in-state farmers received
a portion of that revenue based on their contribution to the state’s total
production of milk.
Two milk dealers negatively aﬀected by the tax then brought it to
court (after first refusing payment, they were seeking an injunction
against enforcement of the order based on its alleged violation of the
Commerce Clause).
The case first went to the Superior Court of Suﬀolk County which de-
nied relief and as a result of which the dealer’s licenses got conditionally
revoked. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concurred with
the lower court, finding that the benefits of the tax to the state’s dairy
industry outweighed the incidental burden on interstate commerce. Yet,
when the case came to the Supreme Court, it was ruled unconstitutional:
“Its avowed purpose and its undisputed eﬀect are to enable
higher cost Massachusetts dairy farmers to compete with
lower cost dairy farmers in other States. The ‘premium pay-
ments’ are eﬀectively a tax which makes milk produced out of
State more expensive. Although the tax also applies to milk
produced in Massachusetts, its eﬀect on Massachusetts pro-
ducers is entirely (indeed more than) oﬀset by the subsidy
provided exclusively to Massachusetts dairy farmers. Like
an ordinary tariﬀ, the tax is thus eﬀectively imposed only
on out-of-state products. The pricing order thus allows Mas-
sachusetts dairy farmers who produce at higher cost to sell
at or below the price charged by lower cost out-of-state pro-
ducers [Footnote giving a numerical example omitted, PH].
If there were no federal minimum prices for milk, out-of-state
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producers might still be able to retain their market share by
lowering their prices. Nevertheless, out-of-staters’ ability to
remain competitive by lowering their prices would not im-
munize a discriminatory measure. New Energy Co. of Ind.
v. Limbach, 486 U. S., at 275. In this case, because the Fed-
eral Government sets minimum prices, out-of-state producers
may not even have the option of reducing prices in order to
retain market share. The Massachusetts pricing order thus
will almost certainly ‘cause local goods to constitute a larger
share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a
smaller share, of the total sales in the market.’ Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 126, n. 16 (1978).
In fact, this eﬀect was the motive behind the promulgation
of the pricing order. This eﬀect renders the program uncon-
stitutional, because it, like a tariﬀ, ‘neutraliz[es] advantages
belonging to the place of origin.’ Baldwin, 294 U. S., at
527.”13 [Footnotes omitted]
The case caused some controversy within the Supreme Court. The
majority opinion (written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg) argued that the milk tax and subsidy
scheme was tantamount to a tariﬀ imposed on out-of-state producers.
Justice Scalia concurred but disagreed with the reasoning of the court
(and was joined therein by Justice Thomas). He saw the judgement in
line with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but disagreed with
the reasoning of Stevens et al. He develops two criteria at least one of
which has to be met in order to have the dormant commerce clause en-
forced against state law: (a) there has to be facial discrimination against
interstate commerce, or (b) the measure is indistinguishable from a law
previously held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The criterion
met in this case was criterion (b), in his opinion. In his opinion, the
Court takes too negative a view on subsidies in general though, and
excessively expands the law.
Justice Scalia discusses four possible tools enabling a state to produce
the economic eﬀect that Massachusetts has produced:
1. a discriminatory tax upon the industry, imposing a higher liability
13West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)
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on out-of-state members than on their in-state competitors
2. a tax upon the industry that is nondiscriminatory in its assessment,
but that has an “exemption” or ”credit” for in-state members
3. a nondiscriminatory tax upon the industry, the revenues from
which are placed into a segregated fund, which fund is disbursed
as “rebates” or “subsidies” to in-state members of the industry
4. with or without nondiscriminatory taxation of the industry, a sub-
sidy for the in-state members of the industry, funded from the
State’s general revenues
Cases one and two, Scalia argues, have been deemed unconstitutional
for long. Case three is the setting of the Massachusetts milk tax. Case
four would be an extension of existing jurisprudence and in Scalia’s view
has already been rules constitutional in previous cases14. The diﬀerence
between scenario 2 and scenario 3 is minimal - in the third case, money is
first taken from the favored in-state firm and then returned afterwards,
while it is not levied in the first place in case two. It therefore has to
be rejected in order to be in line with Supreme Court case law. As
for the diﬀerence between method 3 and method 4, the crucial point
is the existence of discriminatory taxation. Scalia would consequently
allow state subsidies to its domestic industries as long as they are being
funded from a general revenue fund filled up by nondiscriminatory taxes.
And here, Scalia makes a public choice argument: “A State is less likely
to maintain a subsidy when its citizens perceive that the money (in the
general fund) is available for any number of competing, nonprotectionist,
purposes.” This is part of his analysis, but not his legal argument (see
also Chief Justice Rehnquist’s similar view below).
Two justices – Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice Blackmun –
dissented. Similarly to Scalia, Rehnquist takes the public choice aspect
into account.
“Consistent with precedent, the Court observes: “A pure
subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local busi-
ness.” Ante, at 199. And the Court correctly recognizes that
14He refers to Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 809810 (1976)
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[n]ondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at is-
sue here, are generally upheld” due to the deference normally
accorded to a State’s political process in passing legislation
in light of various competing interest groups. Ante, at 200,
citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S.
456, 473, n. 17 (1981), and Raymond Motor Transp., Inc.
v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429, 444, n. 18 (1978). But the Court
strikes down this method of state subsidization because the
nondiscriminatory tax levied against all milk dealers is cou-
pled with a subsidy to milk producers. Ante, at 200-201.
The Court does this because of its view that the method
of imposing the tax and subsidy distorts the State’s politi-
cal process: The dairy farmers, who would otherwise lobby
against the tax, have been mollified by the subsidy. Ibid.
But as the Court itself points out, there are still at least two
strong interest groups opposed to the milk orderconsumers
and milk dealers. More importantly, nothing in the dormant
Commerce Clause suggests that the fate of state regulation
should turn upon the particular lawful manner in which the
state subsidy is enacted or promulgated. Analysis of interest
group participation in the political process may serve many
useful purposes, but serving as a basis for interpreting the
dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.”
Additionally, he makes a regulatory competition argument familiar
to the law and economics discipline by citing the famous former member
of the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis15:
“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a sin-
gle courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”
15New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932), cited in West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)
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Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist mulls the divergence between poli-
cies chosen by Congress and the court-imposed policy. “The wisdom
of a messianic insistence on a grim sink-or-swim policy of laissez-faire
economics would be debatable had Congress chosen to enact it; but
Congress has done nothing of the kind. It is the Court which has im-
posed the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which
bodes ill for the values of federalism which have long animated our con-
stitutional jurisprudence.”16
2.2.4 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach
The Supreme Court has previously held that direct subsidies to in-state
industry are constitutional. In the case of New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach (which has been referred to in the Supreme Court judgements
above), the Supreme Court at the same time held Ohio’s discriminatory
tax on ethanol unconstitutional, but approved Indiana’s new scheme.
In this new subsidy scheme, Indiana had replaced its tax exemption on
ethanol with a direct subsidy to Indiana ethanol producers.
The Supreme Court explained:
“It has not escaped our notice that the appellant here, which
is eligible to receive a cash subsidy under Indiana’s program
for in-state ethanol producers, is the potential beneficiary of
a scheme no less discriminatory than the one that it attacks,
and no less eﬀective in conferring a commercial advantage
over out-of-state competitors. To believe the Indiana scheme
is valid, however, is not to believe that the Ohio scheme must
be valid as well. The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all
state action designed to give its residents an advantage in
the marketplace, but only action of that description in con-
nection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce.
Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily
run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-
of-state manufacturers does. Of course, even if the Indiana
subsidy were invalid, retaliatory violation of the Commerce
Clause by Ohio would not be acceptable. See Cottrell, 424
U.S., at 379-380, 96 S.Ct., at 931-932.”
16West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, p. 217
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2.2.5 The market participant exception to the Com-
merce Clause
There are other cases in which the Supreme Court upheld subsidies or
even proposed subsidies as a remedy to otherwise unconstitutional be-
havior, such as e.g. certain regulatory obligations (Wood, 2007). In
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.17, the State of Maryland subsidized
the car wrecking industry. At the same time, it imposed very high docu-
mentation requirements on out-of-state vehicle demolishers, thereby ex-
cluding them from the subsidy. By ruling that the in-state firms received
an advantage stemming from “market forces, including that exerted by
money from the State” (Hughes v. Alexandria at 805-810), the case is
associated with introducing the so-called “market participant” excep-
tion (Wood, 2007). Contrasting it to previous cases, the Supreme Court
found that in the case of Maryland’s subsidy, the state did not seek to
impede interstate commerce. Instead, it entered the market itself to bid
up the price. Yet, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit a state from
doing so, that is, to participate in the market and exercise “the right to
favor its own citizens over others”18.
There are two more cases in which the Supreme Court reaﬃrmed this
principle, namely Reeves, Inc. v. Stake19 and White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, Inc.20 (Wood, 2007).
2.2.6 The legal standing of taxpayers: DaimlerChrysler
v. Cuno
In the late 1990s, DaimlerChrysler was looking for a location for its
new plant worth $1.2 billion and expected to create several thousand
new jobs. A local coalition surround the City of Toledo, Ohio, provided
an incentive package of around $280 million in tax benefits (a 10-year
property tax exemption and an investment tax credit). This was legal
according to Ohio state law (in fact, Ohio law lays out a framework
as to the extent municipalities can hand out incentive packages). This
17Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)
18Hughes v. Alexandria at 806
19Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
20White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204
(1983)
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Development Agreement was challenged by Charlotte Cuno, an Ohio
resident, and seventeen other citizens. Their claim was that the sub-
sidy violated the Commerce Clause. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio first heard the case, but found no im-
permissible discrimination. It therefore dismissed the case. The case
went on to the Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit, which ruled that
the tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. The reason was that it
coerced businesses already subject to Ohio’s franchise tax to expand
locally rather than out-of-state, at the expense of interstate commerce.
Cuno argued that the tax credit would hinder the free flow of investment
across the country. The municipality countered that tax incentives are
lawful “as long as they do not penalize out-of-state economic activity”21.
The municipality and the court agreed that “the only State tax credits
and exemptions prohibited by the Commerce Clause were (1) those that
function like a tariﬀ, and (2) those that penalize out-of-state economic
activity by relying on both the taxpayer’s in-state and out-of-state ac-
tivities to determine the taxpayer’s eﬀective tax rate”(Wood, 2007, p.
6). Yet, the Sixth Circuit sided with Cuno et al. The reason was that –
although economically speaking a tax benefit is the same as a the equiv-
alently reduced tax burden – according to Supreme Court jurisprudence
(e.g. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach) there is a distinction
between tax credits and subsidies. The court did not find any coercion
with regard to the property tax exemption and therefore did not rule it
unlawful as the tax credit was directly linked to the use of the property.
Through a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court got involved in this case.
Unfortunately though, the Supreme Court, again, did not squarely con-
front the constitutionality of subsidies. In fact, the Court ruled that the
plaintiﬀs actually had no legal standing in this case: previous Supreme
Court decisions that federal taxpayers cannot sue against a particular
expenditure of use of federal funds also apply equally to state taxpayers.
This doctrine follows from Article III of the Constitution and its case or
controversy requirement, which is far beyond the scope of this book. In
order for the Supreme Court to answer the question substantially, the
plaintiﬀ would have had to be a disadvantaged out-of-state firm or an
out-of-state municipality able to show an actual injury (Wood, 2007).
While the Supreme Court was deciding DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno,
21DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno at 745
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Wake County Superior Court Judge Robert Hobgood dismissed a law-
suit challenging a state and local incentive package worth $279 million
granted to Dell Inc. in order to build a manufacturing plant in Forsyth
County, North Carolina, again because the plaintiﬀs were not able to
show that they suﬀered direct harm. The appeal was dismissed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in 200822.
2.2.7 Enforcement of state aid agreements and rules
Since there is no central authority monitoring the legality of state aids
in the United States, the issue of enforcing the promises made by the
recipient of the aid looks diﬀerently. Wood (2013) identifies four means
how state and local governments make their state aid deals enforceable.
First, governments can require upfront exactions in exchange for cer-
tain aids, such as changing the zoning rule. E.g. a skyscraper might be
allowed to exceed the height ordinance if, in exchange, it provides for a
pedestrian walkway or a public plaza.
Secondly, the contracts can include claw-back provisions. With these
provisions, governments can take back the aids granted to the firm if
the latter does not fulfill its promises (such as creating a pre-determined
amount of jobs). American NGOs continuously point out that this is
often not the case in the U.S. (see also chapter 4 for reports on the sit-
uation in Europe). In a recent study, Mattera et al. (2012) show that
90% of the development programs they examined (worth a total of $70
billion) require companies receiving subsidies to report to state govern-
ment agencies on job creation or other outcomes. Yet in 31 percent of
those programs (spread throughout 35 states), this reported data is not
independently verified by an agency. Around 75% of the programs con-
tained a penalty provision of some kind, including recapture of benefits
already provided and the recalibration or termination of future subsi-
dies. Around 17% of programs are performance-based, that is, the firm
does not receive benefits until it has satisfied the requirements of the
program. This means that, all in all, 8% of these programs come with
little or no recourse against firms failing to fulfill their job creation and
other promises. Furthermore, in almost half of the programs with claw-
22http://www.wcsr.com/news/nc-supreme-court-upholds-victory-for-dell-in-
incentives-case
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back provisions, it is up to the discretion of the aid-granting government
whether it wants to actually make use of them. It is very uncommon for
development agencies to disclose whether such enforcement took place.
Thirdly, firms can enter agreements not only directly with the lo-
cal government, but also with the community at large through so-called
community benefit agreements (CBA). For instance, a firm can enter a
CBA with the local labor union (promising certain minimum wages), em-
brace labor peace agreements, pledge to build environmentally friendly,
or adopt local-favoring hiring practices in exchange for political sup-
port (Schragger, 2009). This happened for example with Wal-Mart in
Chicago (Wood, 2013).
Fourthly, local governments might use extra-contractual judicial tools.
They may attempt to prevent a firm from relocating by making use of
eminent domain. For instance, a sports23 team which received subsidies
but now threatens to leave to a diﬀerent city might be declared a pub-
lic asset. These attempts are usually not successful though (mainly for
5th Amendment reasons, that is, the right to just compensation in the
case of government takings). Another, even less useful tool is to seek
promissory estoppel, that is, using a court to force a firm to keep its
promise. This method only works if the government can show that there
was a suﬃciently concrete promise. In Charter Township of Ypsilanti v.
23Sports teams are notorious recipients of subsidies in the United States. This
seems to have much to do with the fact that National Football League and Ma-
jor League Baseball teams can be quite mobile and threaten to relocate. For in-
stance, very recently, Cobb County in Georgia announced that it would spend
$400 million (with an additional $200 to be borne by the team itself) to build a
new stadium for the Atlanta Braves, a team originally founded in Boston, which
first moved to Milwaukee and then to Atlanta (see Atlanta Journal-Constitution
of 11 November 2013, http://www.ajc.com/weblogs/political-insider/2013/nov/
11/atlanta-braves-moving-cobb-county/). The governor of Minnesota, Mark Day-
ton, was recently quoted as saying “I’m not one to defend the economics of pro-
fessional sports ... Any deal you make in that world doesn’t make sense from
the way the rest of us look at it.” after handing out $500 million to the
Vikings, a privately-held football team, without any disclosure requirements (see The
Atlantic, October 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/
how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/. It has been estimated that 70 percent of
the capital cost of NFL stadiums has been provided by taxpayers, not the owners
of the teams (ibid.). The 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act and Public Law 89-800 of
1966 basically exempt the NFL from provisions against price collusion (with regard
to negotiating TV broadcasting agreements).
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General Motors Corp.24, the question was whether General Motors was
obliged via promissory estoppel to continue production at a plant in the
Charter Township of Ypsilanti, Michigan, after seeking and obtaining
tax abatements, which had the intention to incentivize General Motors
to remain in the township. The Michigan Court of Appeal found that
General Motors had used “hyperbole and puﬀery” when it sought state
aids, but that this did not constitute a promise.
It almost comes without saying that sometimes criminal law can come
into play. Rules against felonious misconduct and fraud can be relevant
in some extreme cases when public oﬃcials wrongfully transfer funds
from the state to private firms.
2.2.8 Prevalence
Gathering data on subsidies handed out by U.S. jurisdictions proves to be
rather cumbersome. As there is no federal monitoring body, research has
to rely on third-part aggregations delivered mostly by anti-“corporate
welfare” NGOs. More than a decade ago, Thomas (2000) estimated – for
the first time in the U.S. – the total cost of subsidies of around $50 billion.
More recent estimates seem to indicate that some states indeed spend
several hundreds of millions of dollars on individual subsidy programs.
How states subsidize firms varies from state to state. According to
Mattera et al. (2010), the main types of state subsidies are:
1. corporate income tax credits,
2. designated enterprise zones featuring multiple tax breaks,
3. sales tax exemptions,
4. cash grants,
5. low-cost capital financing and loan guarantees,
6. reimbursement for worker training expenses.
In addition, local governments also hand out subsidies, often bundled
with state subsidies:
24Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 201 Mich. App. 128,
506 N.W.2d 556 (1993)
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1. property tax abatements,
2. tax increment financing,
3. sales tax rebates,
4. infrastructure improvements,
5. land parceling or land write-downs .
Since taxes are allocated to diﬀerent levels of government in the
United States than in Europe, the instruments used vary (they also do
so between European countries). For instance, in the U.S., the corpo-
rate tax is levied at the state level, while the property tax and sales tax
are apportioned to the localities. By comparison, the value-added tax
is allocated to the national governments in European countries and har-
monized at the EU-level (EU countries are free to set their VAT rates,
but are limited in using reduced VAT rates, thereby rendering it diﬃcult
to aid specific sectors or firms using this instrument).
2.2.9 Conclusion on the legal status of subsidies
Subsidies are generally permitted in the United States. From an eco-
nomic point of view, the Supreme Court is contradictory when it pro-
hibits discriminatory taxes but permits subsidies with the same economic
eﬀect. By applying the market participant exception to the Commerce
Clause, private and public firms are not treated equally as it is done in
Article 107 of the TFEU and the other State Aid provisions in Europe.
While the EU has an administrative body charged with enforcing
state aid rules, the enforcement in the U.S. is exclusively private through
court litigation on the basis of the Commerce Clause. Wood (2007) notes
that the courts, in construing the constitution, tend to be cautious in
restricting state power and that therefore an agency (which might be
Federal Trade Commission or a new agency in the Department of Com-
merce) might have greater flexibility and might address those issues in
a more economically rational way than has been possible at the consti-
tutional level. The problem with private litigation is also the question
of proper standing in order to actually be able to sue. Currently, the
plaintiﬀ has to be injured more than the general public which is con-
cerned about the proper use of tax money. Furthermore, the Eleventh
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution25 grants immunity to States. Pri-
vate parties cannot sue a State without its consent, but can only sue the
responsible State oﬃcial (in his oﬃcial capacity) for injunctive relief.
Since damages cannot be collected from states, there is a judgement
proof problem involved (that is, the public oﬃcial cannot realistically
compensate for the harm done by the state aid).
The application of the Commerce Clause and the distinction between
taxation and subsidies is subject to academic legal debate. Zelinsky
(1998) criticizes the Supreme Court’s endeavor to apply generalized rules
and advocates case-by-case decisions. In Zelinsky (2002) he argues that
the times has come to abandon the dormant Commerce Clause pro-
hibition on discriminatory taxes. The idea is that this would shift the
controversy from the courts to Congress and would therefore restore pol-
itics and doctrinal coherence to the Commerce Clause. Denning (2007)
counters that this would mean the end of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine itself. Much is still left to decide: “courts must clearly distin-
guish between discrimination of the sort that the Framers [of the U.S.
Constitution] sought to eliminate and healthy competition among states”
(Denning, 2006, p. 174). Hellerstein and Coenen (1996) observe that the
distinction between discriminatory taxation and subsidies resonates with
that they consider “the law’s deep regard for considerations of form”
(Hellerstein and Coenen, 1996, p. 793) and that the distinction may
“grow out of the same ‘cautionary function’ that helps explain many
rules that require use of specified formal structures to achieve legally
enforceable results in the private-law context” (ibid.).
2.3 Canada
Canada’s system is very similar to the United States’. It is included as
an example here though because in some aspects it lies in between the
U.S. and the EU. While aids to firms are generally unregulated at the
federal level, they are regulated at the provincial level of government.
The ten provinces were able to come up with and sustain a “Code of
Conduct on Incentives” (CoC) regarding pirating (or poaching, as it is
25“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
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commonly referred to in Canada). This code is an annex (608.3) to the
1994 Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) and bans provincial subsidies
to induce the relocation of existing facilities from one provence to another
Thomas (2011). The Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) is an agreement
signed by the First Ministers of the Canadian provinces (all except the
North Canadian province Nunavut) that came into force in 1995. As
its preamble states, the purpose of the AIT is, among others, to reduce
and eliminate, to the extent possible, barriers to the free movement of
persons, goods, services, and investment within Canada and to establish
an open, eﬃcient, and stable domestic market; promote equal economic
opportunity for Canadians; enhance the competitiveness of Canadian
business; promote sustainable and environmentally sound development;
consult on matters related to internal trade; recognize the diverse social,
cultural and economic characteristics of the provinces (Preamble to the
AIT, p. 1).
Article 608 (Incentives) of the AIT stipulates that “no Party shall,
in the provision of incentives to enterprises located in its territory, dis-
criminate against an enterprise on the basis that: (a) the enterprise is
owned or controlled by an investor of another Party; or (b) the head of-
fice of the enterprise is located in the territory of another Party.” (AIT,
p. 69). It also says that nothing in the AIT “shall be construed to re-
quire a Party to provide incentives for activities undertaken outside its
territory” (AIT, p. 70) and that the CoC applies to the parties of the
agreement.
The CoC itself applies to incentives provided to enterprises (actual
wording of the CoC) by any signatory province or any entity acting on
its behalf. The provinces are explicitly banned from advising municipal-
ities or regional development authorities to circumvent the intent and
provisions of the code. The word “incentive” is defined widely and en-
compasses all sorts of subsidies and grants, discriminatory taxes specific
to one firm, and “any form of income or price support that results di-
rectly or indirectly in a draw on the public purse” (CoC, p. 82). All
incentives that lead to the relocation of a firm from one province to an-
other, unless the province can show that the firm might have moved out
of Canada (e.g. because it might receive incentives from a U.S. state).
It is noteworthy that this rule applies only to existing operations. The
signatories of the CoC also pledge not to give incentives to firms with
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the intention to enable these firms to win contracts in another province
by undercutting competitors from other provinces.
The purpose of the CoC is not to eliminate incentives altogether. In
fact, the provinces even “aﬃrm that economic development within their
territories may include the provision of incentives” and “acknowledge
that certain incentives may harm the economic interests of other Par-
ties”. Nevertheless, the provinces “shall take into account the economic
interests of other Parties in developing and applying their incentive mea-
sures” (all citations in this paragraph: AIT, p. 82 and 83).
There are also some weaker provisions (“shall endeavour”) to re-
strict state aids support economically non-viable firm operations that
harm another province’s firms, state aids that increases capacity in ail-
ing industry sectors, and “excessive” subsidies (this term is not defined
in further detail). Furthermore, the provinces are asked not to engage
in “bidding wars” (AIT, p. 83).
There are two provisions that increase transparency. For one, provinces
can inquire with other provinces on specific incentive programs that that
might be inconsistent with the ban. Secondly, the Working Group on In-
vestment is asked to prepare an annual report summarizing the incentive
programs in place, as well as the total amounts of incentives handed out
to firms. This also includes subsidies granted by the federal government
of Canada. This report requirement applies only to cash grants of more
than $500,000 and loans, loan guarantees or equity injections of more
than $1,000,000.
Recent research finds that the incidence of “poaching” and the size
of relocated facilities have indeed declined with the introduction of the
CoC even though significant instances of poaching remain. Interestingly,
this reduction is not due to the eﬀects of the CoC, but rather to changes
in provincial governments (Thomas, 2011).
Since the CoC only covers relocation subsidies, the approach taken
seems to follow Axelrod (1984): cooperation can be promoted by dividing
a problem into smaller pieces, which allows parties to verify that the
others are cooperating while not exposing themselves to excessive risk.
66
44 Diﬀerent approaches towards the regulation of subsidies
2.4 The WTO
Based upon the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), the
World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed in 1995, accompanied
by two new agreements: the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Agriculture26. The text of
the GATT (last amended in 1994) is still in eﬀect, but now under the
auspices of the WTO.
The WTO is an interesting case as it combines fully sovereign nations
(even more so than the EU) and merges the above-mentioned systems.
The existence of WTO rules puts into perspective the claim above that
there is almost no state aid regulation in the United States. Due to the
stringent rules at the EU level, the WTO rules only have limited impact
on European countries. It has a reporting requirement and authorizes
so-called countervailing duties, but does not define the terms well (Sykes,
2010).
2.4.1 Definition of subsidy
A subsidy exists if there is a financial contribution by a government or
any public body within the territory of a WTO member state (i.e., loan,
loan guarantee, grant, equity infusion, tax credit, provision of goods
other than infrastructure, purchase of goods, indirect transfers through
a funding mechanism), or there is any form of income or price support
in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and if a benefit is thereby
conferred. As in European State Aid Law, the subsidy has to be spe-
cific in order to be deemed problematic. In principle, the criterium of
specificity is wider at the WTO level than in EU State Aid Law. It not
only applies to subsidies for specific individual companies, but also to
industry-specific and even regionally specific subsidies. Yet, through its
extensive case law, the EU has developed a more precise definition of
specificity (Sykes, 2010).
Most importantly though, the GATT, on which the WTO is based,
exclusively applies to the trade of goods. Rules regarding the interna-
tional trade of services are found in the General Agreement on Trade in
26This thesis mostly ignores matters of agriculture as the issues at hand in this
area are of a relatively special nature.
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Services (GATS). Article XV GATS establishes a very weak anti-subsidy
mechanism, which only advocates negotiations between WTO member
states:
“1. Members recognize that, in certain circumstances, sub-
sidies may have distortive eﬀects on trade in services. Mem-
bers shall enter into negotiations with a view to developing
the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-
distortive eﬀects. The negotiations shall also address the
appropriateness of countervailing procedures. Such negotia-
tions shall recognize the role of subsidies in relation to the
development programmes of developing countries and take
into account the needs of Members, particularly developing
country Members, for flexibility in this area. For the pur-
pose of such negotiations, Members shall exchange informa-
tion concerning all subsidies related to trade in services that
they provide to their domestic service suppliers.
2. Any Member which considers that it is adversely aﬀected
by a subsidy of another Member may request consultations
with that Member on such matters. Such requests shall be
accorded sympathetic consideration.”
2.4.2 Prohibition
New and unanticipated subsidies are prohibited. The classification of
subsidies works with a system of three classes: green, yellow, and red
light. “Red” subsidies are prohibited and refer mainly to export subsidies
(especially agriculture) and import-substitution subsidies. A subsidy is
prohibited if it is “contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one
of several other conditions, upon export performance” (Art. 3(a), SCM)
or “contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
the use of domestic over imported goods” (Art. 3(b), SCM).
“Yellow” subsidies are actionable through countervailing duties at the
national level or through the WTO dispute settlement procedure if they
cause adverse eﬀects and are de jure or de facto specific. A subsidy may
not cause adverse eﬀects to the interests of other WTO member states,
which is the case if (a) there is injury to the domestic industry of another
state, (b) the subsidy would nullify or impair benefits accruing directly or
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indirectly to other WTO member states under GATT 1994, in particular
the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; or (c)
serious prejudice (or threat thereof) to the interests of another member
state (Art. 5, SCM).
Non-actionable (“green”) subsidies were those included in the tran-
sitional provisions and allowed some specific measures. This class which
was introduced only on an experimental basis has been discontinued.
2.4.3 Remedies
Remedies against subsidies are only available if a WTO member state
(that is, not a private party such as a competing firm) starts a procedure
against the aid-granting state. The case is then heard by the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB), which can seek assistance by the Permanent
Group of Experts (PGE). If the PGE comes to the conclusion that the
subsidy in question is indeed prohibited, then it will recommend to the
subsidizing state that it withdraw its support without delay. If, after
a possible appeal, the subsidizing state continues its practice, then the
complaining state can enact appropriate measures.
If it is determined that a certain state aid subsidizes imports, causes
injury to a domestic industry and that there is a link between the sub-
sidized imports and the injury, then a member state may impose coun-
tervailing measures.
An aspect that this is quite particular to the WTO rules is that
countervailing measures can also be taken if the eﬀects of subsidized
imports from more than one member state cumulate (Art. 15, SCM). In
European State Aid Law the adverse eﬀects are calculated for a specific
measure. Yet, an EU member state could be suﬀering from the combined
eﬀects of various state aid measures in diﬀerent other member states.
2.4.4 How do WTO rules relate to and aﬀect the EU
and the U.S.?
As mentioned earlier, the regulation of subsidies in the U.S. has to be
seen in light of the WTO rules. Per se, the rules indeed prohibit certain
subsidies. What limits this restriction though is that subsidies are only
actionable if they subsidize exports and injure domestic producers in
the importing country. Furthermore, the fact that the only remedy are
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countervailing duties makes it sometimes impossible to other countries
to take action against American subsidies. This also explains why the
EU needs its own state aid law, as tariﬀs between EU member states are
strictly prohibited and against the spirit of European integration. Art.
110 TFEU restricts discriminatory taxes and Art. 112 TFEU prohibits
countervailing duties between EU member states.
At first it might seem that the WTO system is of no concern to the
EU as the latter already implements a strict subsidy control regime. In
spite of this, the EU “has been one of the primary targets of countries
challenging foreign subsidies before the WTO and of countervailing duty
measures” (Ehlermann and Goyette, 2006, p. 695). The reason for
this paradox – one would expect the EU as the organization with the
more ambitious goals and higher level of integration to be the primary
source for state aid prohibition – lies in the details of how subsidies
are defined. Unlike WTO law, European state aid law only applies
to measures that cost the government money (for instance, regulations
that force private regional electricity suppliers to buy from producers
of electricity from renewable energy sources do not place a financial
burden on the government, yet they are measures to aid certain firms27).
On the other hand, it seems that the concept of specificity is applied
similarly in both legal systems. It also has to be noted that Article
107 only prohibits aid that aﬀects trade between Member States and
therefore does not apply to aid that might not aﬀect other EU firms, but
international trade (e.g. subsidies to Airbus do not aﬀect trade between
Member States as there is no direct competitor to Airbus in the EU).
The main diﬀerence though lies in the procedure. First, the notification
requirement at the WTO is only poorly enforced, and challenges by
other governments are inconsistent, since states will only take action
against a subsidy once the aﬀected private parties successfully lobbied
their government to do so. The EU has a pre-authorization procedure.
There are some exemptions that can apply and possibly run counter to
the SCM agreement (Ehlermann and Goyette, 2006)
All in all, the WTO defines subsidies relatively similarly to the EU.
Since there are some exceptions to European State Aid rules that do not
exist in the SCM (e.g. so-called launch aid), the EU can nevertheless
27See for instance Case C-379/98 PreussenElektraAG v. Schleswag AG, [2001]
ECR I-2009
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be subject to retaliation against certain subsidies, especially when it is
the EU itself which is handing out subsidies (the state aid rules only
apply to the member states, but not to the EU as an institution). For
almost ten years now, the continuous dispute between the European
plane manufacture Airbus and its American competitor Boeing has kept
the WTO busy.
The enforcement of WTO rules lacks some teeth though. While at
the EU level, state aids are assessed without any action of any other
parties and the decision can include the repayment of the subsidy, such
a measure is very uncommon at the WTO level (Slocock, 2007). The
opacity of incentive programs makes it diﬃcult to observe for competitors
whether a firm has received aids. Additionally, the enforcement takes
place exclusively at the national level. A firm which feels disadvantaged
by subsidies of another country first has to convince its own government
to take action and cannot complain to the WTO directly. Yet, this
government will balance the interest of this disadvantaged firm against
other political considerations before countering the subsidies. Slocock
(2007) notes that it is commonplace in the EU that complaints about
certain state aids come from within the accused EU member state.
Damro (2013) sketches a private-interest theory of the interaction
between EU state aid policy and the WTO instruments against subsi-
dies. Once a state aid measures inhibits market access, non-European
countries can respond by making use of the WTO’s Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures Agreement or bring the matter before the organi-
zation’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). At this stage, the de-
cision becomes politically charged and the interactions confrontational.
“The EU is very much involved in these interactions as one of the most
active users and primary targets of such measures” (Damro, 2013, p.
160). Private interests lead to the imposition of countervailing duties
(CVDs) against foreign subsidies. Firms and the EU prefer CVDs due
to their likelihood of satisfying domestic interests, higher speed, greater
ease, and because they are perceived as a better remedy against past
subsidies. Firms in the EU can also be in favor of the foreign subsidy
(e.g. because they are suppliers to the subsidized non-European firm),
in which case they will oppose a dispute settlement procedure. Dispute
settlements are preferred over CVD if the private interests aﬀected by
the subsidy operate in global markets – for instance, Airbus has an in-
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terest to prevent subsidies to Boeing, while CVDs would only protect
Airbus from Boeing in the European market and not in, say, the Asian
market (Damro, 2013).
2.5 Other regimes
Some other, albeit informal, arrangements can be found – within coun-
tries and internationally through regional and/or international organi-
zations.
The OECD’s Arrangement on Oﬃcially Supported Export Credits is
– even called that way on oﬃcial documents – a “Gentlemen’s Agree-
ment” reducing subsidies related to said credits. The current partici-
pants in this arrangement are Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea,
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.
It aims at providing a level playing field in the sense that competition
is based on the price and quality of the exported goods as opposed to
the financial terms provided. It applies to all “oﬃcial support provided
by or on behalf of a government for export of goods and/or services,
including financial leases, which have a repayment term of two years or
more” (Art. 5 OECD AOSEC)
The arrangement is based on the export credit consensus among some
OECD member countries of 1976 and was formalized in 1978. Its main
achievement is to place limitations on the terms and conditions of oﬃ-
cially supported export credits, by for instance setting minimum interest
rates, risk fees and maximum repayment terms, as well as on the provi-
sion of tied aid. “It includes procedures for prior notification, consulta-
tion, information exchange and review for export credit oﬀers that are
exceptions to or derogations of the rules as well as tied aid oﬀers.”28
EU Regulation No. 1233/2011 makes it mandatory for EU coun-
tries to apply the OECD arrangement. Council decisions 73/391/EEC
and 76/641/EEC establish a system that harmonizes the export credit
system within the EU. Intra-EU export credits are, of course, prohibited.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) has come up with
a set of non-binding investment principles. Similar eﬀorts have been
made in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
28http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/arrangement.htm
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Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM). There is also a 1971 An-
dean Model Treaty calling for harmonization of fiscal policies and harmo-
nization of taxes on foreign investments. The eﬀects of these agreements
are rather limited though. To assess them, a diﬀerence should be made
between agreements aiming at harmonization of incentive policies and
those aiming at reduction of inter-jurisdictional competition for FDI.
The EU approach, for instance, is one that eﬀectively curbed state aids,
but did not harmonize the policies themselves. Harmonization leads to
more transparent policies, which might reduce competition Guisinger
(1995).
Finally, it should also be noted that both the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have taken anti-subsidy stances in the
past.
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CHAPTER 3
Competition between firms and
between jurisdictions
Should governments be allowed to hand out state aids? If yes, to what
extent? Can the various legal rules in place be justified economically?
Why and under what circumstances should state aid to firms be prohib-
ited? This chapter reviews the literature on the rationales for state aid
control.
The literature on state aids is divided into three main views, which
build a continuum. Some argue that there shall be a “level playing field,”
meaning that states must not interfere with the competition between
firms and not engage in a competition for those firms. The opposite
view has a more positive view of the Tiebout model and emphasizes
the benefits of inter-jurisdictional competition – given that people can
always “vote with their feet” if they do not like their jurisdiction’s deci-
sions. The middle ground between these views is one that believes that
“well-structured incentives can produce beneficial regional economic de-
velopment” (Markusen, 2007, p. viii).
At first glance, the answer to the questions formulated earlier that
suggests itself is that countries with their natural diﬀerences in endow-
ment should enter into a competition undistorted by the state’s interven-
tions. Under the condition that there is free trade, the total welfare of
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all participants is maximized following the theorem of comparative ad-
vantages. Firms should be located in the place that provides the optimal
endowment in resources needed for the production of the good or service.
Then, only the presence of market failures justifies granting state aids
(see e.g. Meiklejohn, 1999; Trebilcock and Howse, 2005, p. 282).
The European State Aid Control mechanism currently in place re-
flects this view. As seen in the previous chapter, Article 107 of the
Treaty on the Function of the European Union stipulates a ban on state
aids, which can be relaxed under certain circumstances by the European
Commission.
Whether there are suﬃcient economic grounds to deviate from the
general prohibition in a particular case can be discussed from a variety
of perspectives. The most important streams of literature in that regard
are institutional/constitutional economics (e.g. Kerber, 1998), strategic
trade policy (e.g. Besley and Seabright, 1999; Brander, 1987), and in-
dustrial economics (e.g. Fingleton, 2001; Fingleton et al., 1999). While
institutional/constitutional economics is mainly concerned with the com-
petition order as a whole, the theory of strategic trade and industrial
economics focus more on the eﬃciency of state aids with regard to spe-
cific industries and firms. One could also say that the two latter ap-
proaches are more instrumental than the one of institutional economics.
In the end, all perspectives try to assess whether a certain market failure
shall be considered serious enough in order to justify state aids.
While the above-mentioned theoretical approaches could be consid-
ered mainly critical of state aids and justify state aids only in case of a
market failure, the approach emphasizing the inter-jurisdictional compe-
tition taking place takes a more relaxed stance. In that view, state aids
might considered an integral part of the location factors of a country or
jurisdiction, just as the level of education or the tax system (Bhagwati,
1997; Trebilcock and Howse, 2005, p. 284). State aids then create the
specific comparative advantage of a country, which powers the trade to
the mutual benefit. This in no way whatsoever precludes the necessity
for a supra-jurisdictional state aid control since such a system can help
prevent subsidy races between jurisdictions. But in this view, state aids
can also be justified without the presence of a specific market failure.
This leads to the view that state aid control be a part of the compe-
tition order for the competition between jurisdictions in order to enter
75
3.1 Competition between firms 53
a welfare-creating competition (see Kerber (1998) for a more detailed
description).
One can thus split the economic analysis of state aid (control) into an
analysis from the perspective of competition between firms and into an
analysis from the perspective of inter-jurisdictional competition. Sub-
sidies can come in diﬀerent variants and in diﬀerent market settings.
Depending on those circumstances, their eﬀects will vary. Legal inter-
vention may be justified if there is an externality or other kind of market
failure produced. This externality must be more than a simple trans-
fer – it must produce an ineﬃciency. This chapter explains that there
is indeed a debate as to whether there is an externality and comes to
the conclusion that this is not an easy question to answer – and that
therefore the views about the possible legal remedies diﬀer.
3.1 Competition between firms
The economic analysis of state aid control can draw from several fields,
which each aﬀect the competition between firms. Public economics an-
alyzes the purpose and eﬀectiveness of state intervention in the national
economy. It explains why national governments resort to state aids in
order to intervene in the economy, but ignores the aspect of inter jur-
isdictional competition. Competition economics focuses specifically on
competition, and international or strategic trade theory studies the ef-
fects of state aids in an international setting (Friederiszick et al., 2007).
Diﬀerent views on the eﬃciency and market eﬀects of state aids are
expressed in all views.
3.1.1 A remedy against market failures
The public economics view has a social welfare function as its starting
point and tries to maximize it. Using the two fundamental theorems of
welfare economics, namely that (i) competitive markets tend toward an
eﬃcient allocation of resources, and (ii) of all possible Pareto-eﬃcient
outcomes, any particular one can be achieved by enacting lump-sum
wealth redistribution, the welfare elements can be split into aspects of
eﬃciency stemming from the first theorem and aspects of equity relating
to the second theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
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A state aid is eﬃciency-increasing when the total welfare increases
more than what the measure costs. This can indeed be the case in
the presence of market failures. The literature typically identifies four
types: externalities, public goods, information asymmetries, and market
power (Ledyard, 2008). These market failures can be addressed by state
aid in various forms. Meiklejohn (1999) even lists nine types that are
relevant to state aid: public goods, merit goods, increasing returns to
scale, externalities, imperfect or asymmetric information, institutional
rigidities, imperfect factor mobility, frictional problems of adjustment to
changes in markets, subsidization of foreign competitors.
Negative externalities are present when there are environmental ef-
fects of which the costs are not taken into account by the producers.
The typical case of positive externalities is investment in research and
development. Since other firms can profit from the innovations produced
by the firm investing in R&D, there is a diﬀerence between the private
benefits from R&D expenses and the social gain. The state then has
to intervene in such a way that all externalities are internalized. This
means that the state either has to punish producers of negative exter-
nalities, or subsidize compliance. State aids for R&D are necessary to
ensure the appropriate level of innovation.
When an undertaking cannot exclude anybody from consuming the
good it produces, as it is the case with so-called public goods, the mar-
ket for this good will fail as well. Goods such as national defense or
certain services of general economic interest, can therefore only be sup-
plied through state intervention.
The information available is not always the same to all market partic-
ipants. For instance, providers of finance cannot easily assess the quality
of a company demanding loans or equity. As shown by Akerlof (1970),
quality uncertainty can lead to market failure. As a result, state aids
to firms might be justified in order to facilitate their entrance to the
market.
If, for some reason, a firm has achieved notable market power, then
this failure of competition is a cause for concern. While state aids can
contribute to generating market power (that is, by giving an undue ad-
vantage to a firm), they can also facilitate market entry and thereby
improve competition in the market.
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3.1.1.1 Pro-competitive state aids
Assume a setting in which there are two firms in Bertrand competition.
For some reason, one of the two firms gets into turmoil. In this case, a
subsidy to this firm might be welfare-enhancing if the deadweight loss of
taxation is smaller than the deadweight loss caused by the market power
of the other firm if that firm becomes a monopolist after the troubled
firm’s exit. To illustrate this scenario, consider the following model.
3.1.1.2 A short model of pro-competitive subsidies
General Motors filed for bankruptcy and subsequently for Chapter 11
reorganization in June 2009 at the apogee of the financial and economic
crisis - the fourth-largest such filing in U.S. history. In order to do so
orderly (and thereby stay in business), it had previously received $13.4
million from TARP funds. Furthermore it received loans and guarantees
worth tens of billions of U.S. dollars from various European and Amer-
ican governments. Thanks to those bailouts, the company was able to
continue its operations and gained a position in 2010 from where it was
able to repay some of the loans (see also section 6.3.3).
This short model formalizes the trade-oﬀ between letting an impor-
tant company fail and suﬀering the burden of taxation necessary in or-
der to finance the government intervention. It thus merges the standard
model of Bertrand competition with the model of excess burden of tax-
ation on the labor market.
The main result is that state aid is eﬃcient if the dead-weight loss
arising from less competition (because GM failed) is larger than the
dead-weight loss (or excess burden) caused by the new tax.
The setup is as follows. For reasons of simplification and without
loss of generality, I consider a market for cars with two firms in Bertrand
competition: firm 1, for better clarity henceforth called GM, and firm 2,
which shall be called Toyota1. There are 1+T+N periods.
In the first period (“pre-crisis”, p), GM and Toyota both produce
at marginal cost, entailing no profits for either firm and generating the
maximum possible consumer surplus. Price and quantity are pp and qp.
The indirect demand function is P = a− bqp.
1The fact that Toyota is Japanese has no eﬀect in this model but could have in
an extension of the model.
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The second period is the beginning of the crisis. The quantities here
are always given per year, but the crisis might actually take longer: it
lasts T periods. Depending on the government action, there are two
diﬀerent outcomes2.
If there is no intervention, then Toyota is a monopolist (thus the
index m) for the whole duration of the crisis. It sets the price equal to
its marginal revenue, with the usual result: pm > pp and qm < qp.
The total dead-weight loss is thus 12 (pm − pp)(qp − qm)T .
If the government rescues GM, then it stays in business during the
crisis. The outcome is thus the same as in the pre-crisis period.
The only eﬀect is on another market. I assume that the government
needs to finance itself through a new income tax.
The labor market is characterized by labor demand LD = α − βPL
(L being labor) and a labor supply LS = δPL. In equilibrium, without
the tax, P = αβ+δ .
Because the government can still make use of financial services, it
can take up a loan and repay later. Thus, the tax needs not be levied
only in the first period of the crisis, but can be split over X periods.
With the tax τ , the new supply function3 is LS = δPL − τ and the
equilibrium then is: P = α+τβ+δ . The total tax revenue is τ(δ
α+τ
β+δ − τ)X,
that is the per-unit tax times the equilibrium quantity times X periods.
The excess burden of taxation is one half of τ times the diﬀerence in
quantities4. The diﬀerence in quantities is δ( αβ+δ − α+τβ+δ ) + τ . Thus the
total excess burden is 12τ(δ(
α
β+δ − α+τβ+δ ) + τ).
While letting GM crash allows Toyota to earn monopoly profits, this
situation is nevertheless only temporary. Once the crisis is over, some
other firm will take the place of GM and engage in competition with
the monopolist. This assumption is fair given that the pre-crisis market
did not favor any natural monopolies (at least not in this model) and
given that it is implicitly assumed here that GM leaves the market not
for endogenous reasons, but because it was suddenly and for exogenous
2Since the government only mitigates the eﬀects of the crisis and does not address
the actual market failure, the government action has no eﬀect on the length of the
crisis.
3The new supply function has the same slope as the old one but is shifted upwards,
that is, supply has decreased.
4Graphically, it is the triangle built by (i) the old equilibrium point, (ii) the new
equilibrium point, (iii) the point on the old supply curve at the new quantity
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reasons not able to engage in market activities (e.g., it needed a loan
and did not receive it due to the failure of the financial market).
If the government chooses an X larger than T, then there will be an
excess burden for (X − T ) periods after the crisis.
In order to achieve the second-best solution (first best would be no
state aid and no monopoly profits, but this is not achievable in this
model), the government has to decide whether it prefers a monopoly or
taxation.
It will choose state aid if the total monopoly dead-weight loss is
larger than the total excess burden from taxation. More precisely, the
tax revenue necessary to save GM must be such that the resulting excess
burden is lower than the dead-weight loss.
Let A¯ be the required amount of state aid (given exogenously). Given
A¯, the optimal tax rate τ can be calculated. The calculation of this tax
rate is less trivial than it seems and needs further assumptions if we allow
the tax to be levied throughout several periods. A high tax during one
period leads to more total distortion than a low tax during two periods
with the same total tax revenue. The choice of X could be considered
to be determined by political considerations as well as availabilities of
very long term loans on the financial markets. If X is set to one, then
the problem becomes easier. Solving for τ as a function of A¯ gives the
following results (the tax revenue function is quadratic and therefore can
be equal to A¯ at two points - any reasonable government would chose
the lower tax rate of the two, of course)5:
5The result of equation 3.1.3 can be obtained by solving the tax revenue equation
for τ : τ(δ α+τβ+δ − τ) = A¯
The maximum income tax revenue that the government can levy is given by the
first derivative of the tax revenue function.
τ(δ
α+ τ
β + δ
− τ) (3.1.1)
This gives the following first-order condition:
αδ
β + δ
+
2δ
β + δ
τ − 2τ = 0 (3.1.2)
Solving for τ : τ = αδ2β
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τ1 =
α+
√
α2 − 4A¯β(β+δ)δ2
2βδ
(3.1.3)
and
τ2 =
α−
√
α2 − 4A¯β(β+δ)δ2
2βδ
(3.1.4)
In this case, state aid is legitimate if:
1
2
(pm−pp)(qp−qm)T > 12τ(A¯)
(
δ(
α
β + δ
− α+ τ(A¯)
β + δ
)
+τ(A¯)) (3.1.5)
Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) generally bans aids to firms. The situation described in the
model is an example of a state aid where an exception might be legit-
imate. The question is thus: if a country is willing to bear the excess
burden of taxation, then why should it not use the revenues from the
tax to enforce pro-competitive measures?
This model emphasizes the possible pro-competitive eﬀect of state
subsidies to firms. Here, the main motivation is to avoid a monopoly
by levying a tax of which the proceedings are given to a competitive
firm that is unable to enter the market. Depending on the costs of this
subsidy (as expressed by the excess burden), this policy can be eﬃciency-
enhancing or not.
Some more aspects could be included. For instance, a “patriotic”
U.S. government might not take Toyota’s monopoly profit into account
and thus be more prone to give state aid. The main setup, that is, GM
failing directly because of the financial crisis is historically inaccurate.
The model would capture the events better if it looked at the demand-
side of the problem. It also ignores that the GM crisis was also solved
thanks to contributions and joint eﬀorts of employees, suppliers, car
dealers, and others - all of which being indicators that GM might just
not have been competitive enough for the market (and thus should have
gone bankrupt in order to be replaced by a more eﬃcient firm).
The setup using 1+T+N periods might at first glance complicate
things unnecessarily. In a possible extension, this “feature” might come
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handy to relate the problem to legal requirements such as that state aid
be targeted and only temporary (an important EU requirement).
This model oﬀers only a partial equilibrium analysis in the sense that
it does not address the actual market failure. Here, the connection to
the law becomes interesting. For instance, EU law on state aid requires
answering the question whether a diﬀerent policy measure remedying
the market failure would have produced a less distortive eﬀect6.
3.1.1.3 Distribution arguments
Apart from the eﬃciency arguments, governments might want to hand
out subsidies to achieve distributional aims. This is usually the case
with aids to individuals (e.g. housing benefits, welfare payments, etc.),
but is also of importance for aids to firms. The paramount mechanism
to achieve redistribution by means of state aids to firms is regional aid,
which, according to EU data, accounts for about a quarter of all state
aids7. The problem with these redistribution measures is that they are
hard to achieve without causing a loss of eﬃciency. Friederiszick et al.
(2007) emphasize that the price of state aids to improve living standards
in disadvantaged regions is the distortion of competition in product mar-
kets. That is, they can cause, rather than remedy, market failures. The
cost of taxation and the negative incentive eﬀects on the subsidized re-
gion (the moral hazard caused by the availability of subsidies) add to
this problem. By moving funds towards the periphery, the advantages
of agglomeration economies are not used to the full8.
Whether redistribution between regions may in some cases lead to an
increase in eﬃciency is subject to debate. Besley and Seabright (1999)
looked at the relationship between eﬃciency and equity in the regional
aid context. In their model, the relocation of a firm to another region
can give benefits to other firms in that region. These benefits are not
taken into account by the relocating firm. From an eﬃciency point of
view, the region where these spillovers will be highest should obtain the
6See for instance the State Aid Action Plan
7EU State Aid Scoreboard 2012
8“Agglomeration economies” is a term from urban economics describing the bene-
fits firms acquire from locating close to each other. In that case, the costs of produc-
tion can decrease, because there could be several competing suppliers, they attract
highly-skilled labor, or because there are knowledge spillovers between firms (see e.g.
Strange (2008), O’Flaherty (2005)).
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investment. An auction among regions would be the optimal way of
achieving this. Yet, since some regions are resource-constrained, richer
regions will outbid the poorer ones, independently of whether the richer
regions will reap more from the relocation than the poorer ones. Through
redistribution, the eﬃciency of the process can be improved.
Graph 3.1 shows the eﬃciency and the equity rationale for a situation
where a state aid aﬀects the wealth of two distinct groups in a society
(e.g. geographical entities, social groups, etc.).
Payo group B
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 
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Eciency rationale (Pareto improvement)
Equity rationale (redistribution)
Figure 3.1: Eﬃciency and equity rationales
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3.1.2 State aids as a cause of market failure
3.1.2.1 Strategic trade literature
The literature on strategic trade theory looks at policies taken by coun-
tries with the aim of influencing the outcome of competition between
firms in an international oligopoly. The policy instruments investigated
are usually import tariﬀs and quotas, as well as subsidies for exports,
investment, or research and development. An important result is the
presence of prisoner’s dilemmas, which justify the existence of trade
agreements in order to rein in the use of policy interventions (Spencer
and Brander, 2008).
Much of the strategic trade literature emphasized the importance
of governmental non-intervention. Subsidizing exports meant that the
exporting country is paying for the importing country’s consumption.
These subsidies, in a certain way a form of altruism, were considered
unproblematic, although not beneficial to the subsidizing country - on
the other hand, tariﬀs on imports were the policy which would benefit a
country more than subsidizing its exports.
In Brander and Spencer (1981), Spencer and Brander (1983), and
Krugman (1984) national governments help domestic firms expand mar-
ket shares in profitable geographical areas. In Basevi (1970), Frenkel
(1971), and Pursell and Snape (1973), a domestic monopolist benefits
from exporting and being subsidized. Bhagwati (1971) looks at the ques-
tion from the angle of the potential distortions, of which imperfect com-
petition is a kind.
With the advent of the so-called new trade theory, Brander and
Spencer (1985) established the view that export subsidies can be benefi-
cial to the subsidizing country. Although the subsidy moves the terms of
trade against it, its welfare can increase if the price exceeds the marginal
cost of exports (assuming imperfect competition). The export subsidy is
a means to shift the profits from one country’s firm to another country’s
firm. As a consequence, countries might want to enter into agreements
not to make use of subsidies.
Martin and Valbonesi (2006a) describe how market integration leads
to more state aid. In their Cournot oligopoly setting with one firm per
country, firms face fixed costs and constant marginal costs. Based on
this, it is possible to derive the equilibrium number of firms (the eﬃcient
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number is such that the firms’ revenues exactly cover their costs). It is
then possible to show that market integration, which prevents firms from
price-discriminating by country, leads to a lower equilibrium number. In
order to maintain the revenues from their respective national firm and
reap the profits from selling the firm’s products in other countries as
well. In total, there is a welfare loss because the number of firms in the
market is ineﬃcient.
3.1.2.2 Distortion of competition
Subsidies can distort competition between firms. If a firm receives subsi-
dies from the government, it has an advantage over its competitors and
will thus accrue market power. The eﬃciency loss encompasses three
aspects: first, there is the dead-weight loss of taxation (because the gov-
ernment has to levy taxes to finance the subsidy), second there is the
opportunity cost of those monies, and third there is the dead-weight loss
due to the firm’s market power.
When a firm receives a subsidy from a government, it can more easily
increase the quantity of goods oﬀered or decrease the price it charges.
At first – and for the moment only considering a static model9 –, this
is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, subsidies might only increase
the firm’s profit without aﬀecting prices and quantities. In this case,
the state aid is simply a transfer from the government to the firm with
no loss in eﬃciency, no adverse eﬀect on the competitive process, and
therefore not requiring legal intervention.
A firm choses the quantity it produces by equating marginal cost with
marginal revenue. If the state aid aﬀects either one of them, then there
is an eﬀect on market prices and quantities. This “artificial competitive
advantage” (Zampetti, 1995) is considered the core of the distortion of
“the normal competitive process” (ibid.).
In a Cournot duopoly of two firms A and B with constant marginal
costs (cA and cB) and a demand function P = a − b(qA + qB), the
two equilibrium quantities with no subsidies will be qA = a−2cA+cB3b and
qB = a−2cB+cA3b . The total quantity produced isQ = qA+qB =
2a−cA−cB
3b
and the price is P = a− 2a−cA−cB3 .
9“Static model” means that we look at the eﬃciency eﬀects without taking into
account the long-run changes in players’ behavior.
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If a state now awards a subsidy to, say, firm A which, say, reduces
its marginal cost by s, then the new equilibrium quantities will be qA =
a−2cA+2s+cB
3b and qB =
a−2cB+cA−s
3b and the total quantity produced
is Q = qA + qB = 2a−cA−cB+s3b and the price is P = a − 2a−cA−cB+s3 .
Thus, the total quantity is higher and the price is lower. The eﬃciency
gain in this market is positive. It can be shown that it is equal to
sqsA +
(
P s+P
2 − cB
)
(Qs − Q), where superscript s designates values of
variables after the introduction of the subsidy.
The cost of this subsidy to the awarding government is qAs. The true
cost of this subsidy to society is equal to the dead-weight loss of taxation
incurred through the funding of the subsidy. Only if the eﬃciency gain
in the duopoly is higher than the dead-weight loss of taxation, then
the state aid is eﬃciency-enhancing. Whether this is actually the case
depends on a variety of factors, mostly about the manner in which the
government is able to fund the subsidy. In fact, there is a distortion of
competition, but it is not necessarily detrimental to the market or to
society as a whole.
The insight from this brief model is that the concept of “distortion
of competition” might need a more dynamic approach in order to under-
stand why subsidies and the ensuing distortions of competition produce
eﬃciency losses in the market for goods (and not only dead-weight loss
of taxation).
David Collie produced a series of articles which analyze state aids in
oligopolistic settings, with sometimes ambiguous results with regard to
the need for supra-jurisdictional state aid control.
Collie (2000) analyzes the eﬀects of banning state aid in an inte-
grated market in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. In this model, there
is one firm in every member state and state aids are financed by a dis-
tortionary tax, causing a trade-oﬀ between the dead-weight loss of the
oligopolistic market structure and the dead-weight loss of taxation. With
some values for the opportunity cost of the tax, some member states will
give subsidies and therefore a European prohibition of state aids will be
eﬃciency-enhancing.
Collie (2002) expands the analysis to a market structure of either a
Cournot or a Bertrand oligopoly in an integrated (European) market.
His results are that with suﬃciently close substitutes, a ban on state
aids might increase aggregate welfare (depending on the opportunity
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cost of the tax revenue used for the state aid), whereas with suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated products, it may decrease aggregate welfare.
Yet, the aspect of remedying market failures is not missing in Collie’s
series of papers. In Collie (2005), he notes the importance of exempting
funding for research and development from the prohibition of state aid if
the technological spillovers are large enough to outweigh the dead-weight
loss of taxation.
Møllgaard (2003) analyzes the competitive eﬀects of state aid in an
oligopolistic setting, in which firms first invest in vertical product inno-
vation and then compete in a diﬀerentiated Bertrand fashion. In this
model, state aid might harm competitors even when not aﬀecting pricing
directly. The reason is that the recipient – profiting from a lower capital
cost (and not of a decreased marginal cost as other models assume) –
ends up in a dominant position.
Garcia and Neven (2005) analyze how state aid aﬀects and distorts
competition and trade within and across jurisdictions. They define dis-
tortion as the eﬀect on the competitors’ profits. Their model is notewor-
thy for comparing diﬀerent kinds of state aids, namely subsidies aﬀecting
(a) marginal cost, (b) entry, and (c) quality. In order to quantify distor-
tions, they check which market characteristics might be robust indicators
of the magnitude of the distortions. The results are the following: “(i) it
appears that concentration is a fairly robust indicator; (ii) A high degree
of substitution across diﬀerentiated products is not a robust indicator of
the magnitude of the distortions. Its eﬀect depends on the type of state
intervention; (iii) The substitution among domestic products may have
opposite eﬀects respectively on domestic and foreign firms. In particu-
lar, when the market is not concentrated and state aid takes the form of
a production subsidy, a stronger substitution among domestic products
will reduce the distortions felt by the foreign firm (but increase that felt
by domestic rivals); Finally, (iv) the paper demonstrates that the impact
of selective State aid on market prices and competitors can depend on
the particular characteristics of the market” (ibid., p. 1).
Katsoulacos (2005) discusses specifically state aid to foster research
and development and proposes a methodology for the economic assess-
ment of its eﬀects.
Jegers and Buts (2011) build a model analyzing the competition ef-
fects of state aid in the case of perfect competition and for a Bertrand-
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Nash duopoly. They show that in the case of perfect competition, the
eﬀect of a state aid depends on certain market characteristics, such as
size and cost structure as well as on the amount of the subsidy. In the
case of a Bertrand-Nash duopoly, subsidies lead to a more competitive
market. The conclusion from this is that there should be a case-by-
case analysis by a supranational authority investigating the eﬀects on
competition.
Using a sample of 13,000 Belgian firms, Buts and Jegers (2013b)
and Jegers and Buts (2012) show that the firms that receive state aids
see their market share increase. This eﬀect is only visible after two
years. This means that, despite the Treaty’s aim to prevent distortions
of competition, the current state aid control regime is not eﬀective in
achieving this goal.
London Economics (2004) measured the eﬀect of rescue and restruc-
turing aid on international competitiveness. They draw a rather positive
picture (for the recipient firms): their results suggest that firms which
receive state aids end up increasing their market shares as well as their
fixed assets.
To summarize preliminarily, subsidies can have anti-, but also pro-
competitive eﬀects. Thus, state aid control needs to incorporate a degree
of diﬀerentiation in its prohibition of subsidies.
3.1.2.3 Fairness considerations
As sketched above, a distortion of competition might only be a set of
transfers between a government, a state aid recipient and its competitor
or competitors. Banning state aids in this situation is then only done out
of motives of fairness. I.e., it is considered “unfair” that firm A receives
an advantage and firm B does not. “The notion of ’fair’ competition is
the evocative, more voiced than explained, mantra of lobbying industries
seeking protection. The problems come when it is necessary to give
some substance to this idea and make it operational. In this respect,
the concepts of ‘normal’ or ‘workable’ competition combine realism with
a solid anchorage to theory. Most importantly, they give full meaning
to a discipline that should counteract the negative eﬀects of subsidies
on (normal) competition, and not protect less eﬃcient operators from
(normal) competition” (Rubini, 2009, p. 384, emphasis in the original).
What remains unanswered is why a state aid is considered to be giv-
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ing a firm an “artificial competitive advantage” (Zampetti, 1995) while
it is not considered “unfair” that some firms, e.g. due to their location,
have better access to natural resources or to skilled labor (which in itself
is often also a result of government policy). If a firm receives subsidies
and its competitors do not, then maybe this firm is simply better at
reaping benefits than others – why should it not be rewarded for that?
In some views on inter-jurisdictional competition, state aids are indeed
considered an integral part of the jurisdiction’s characteristics.
Maybe the answer for that lies in the rent-seeking literature: we
simply do not want firms to waste resources in order to attract rents
and to lure governments into wasting their taxpayers’ money. At an
international level, the answer might be that countries simply do not
consider appropriate to harm other countries’ firms. There could also be
policy objectives such as avoiding “unfair” competition between rich and
poor countries (Rubini, 2009), given that it is easier for rich countries to
fund subsidies.
None of these arguments, nonetheless, are in line with the consider-
ations usually done in law and economics. Unless, of course, we gear
our perspective towards a more dynamic approach, which adds more
stages to the strategic decisions involved - asset specificity can be the
paramount variable determining lobbying activities.
3.1.3 A special case: bailouts
Some of the literature on state aids (for an overview, see e.g. G#lowicka
(2008)) revolves around public support of firms in distress. The main
issue, of course, is the moral hazard involved: if a firm can count on
being bailed out, then it has lower incentives to be eﬃcient and might
take higher, non-necessary risks, an aspect to be discussed in in detail
in chapter 6. G#lowicka (2008) also reports and finds some empirical
results: Bailouts delay exit instead of preventing it. In the first four
years, 29.3% of bailed-out firms leave the market. Governments favor
state-owned firms even though they do not outperform private firms.
The choice whether rescue aid or rather restructuring aid is granted is
endogenous. Higher market shares lead to higher expectation of bailouts
(as reflected by ratings of banks).
As for the political economy, there are some interesting institutional
results reported in G#lowicka (2008). Over 90% of variation in allocation
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of state aid to manufacturing in the EU, so the claim, can be explained
by political variables.
So should governments bail out firms to save jobs? In standard mod-
els with homogeneous goods and a mostly uncharacteristic workforce,
the answer is clearly no. Because of the eﬃciency loss due to taxa-
tion, a bailout would be a costly way to save a firm which would easily
have been replaced by another one. The reason why states nevertheless
frequently recur to bailing out ailing firms thus lies in the political con-
siderations involved - chapter 5 will therefore review the public choice
involved in these kinds of decisions. From the inter-jurisdictional point
of view, what matters are the externalities. For instance, the relative
size of countries then is a relevant variable (ibid.). In typical models of
a “home” firm and a competing “foreign” firm, there are also eﬀects on
third countries.
Job market rigidity can be an argument in favor of bailouts. If the
workers of a bankrupt firm cannot reenter the productive process quickly,
the loss of welfare due to unemployment might be higher than the cost
of the bailout. But what if the failing firm employs highly specialized
workers who would not find a job elsewhere? And what about the capital
investments which might be lost if the firm goes bankrupt? The degree
of asset specificity, a concept studied inter alia by Oliver Williamson
(1975; 1985), plays a role in the assessment of the eﬃciency eﬀects of
a bailout. Furthermore, job market rigidities (that is, how diﬃcult it
easy for the job market to adjust to a new equilibrium), determine the
amount of loss of eﬃciency.
The crucial point about bailouts is that, on the one hand, according
to economic theory, ineﬃcient, non-competitive firms should leave the
market. But, on the other hand, depending on the characteristics of the
firm, the adjustment costs might be high, that is, the costs of moving a
productive factor (be it specially trained labor or custom-made machin-
ery) from one economic activity to another. European state aid control
has traditionally taken a lenient stance towards rescue and restructuring
(R&R) aid, considering them as rather unproblematic. The Community
Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Diﬃ-
culty (2004/C 244/02) are the relevant document. It asserts that “the
exit of ineﬃcient firms is a normal part of the operation of the market.
It cannot be the norm that a company which gets into diﬃculties is res-
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cued by the State. Aid for rescue and restructuring operations has given
rise to some of the most controversial State aid cases in the past and is
among the most distortive types of State aid. Hence, the general prin-
ciple of the prohibition of State aid as laid down in the Treaty should
remain the rule and derogation from that rule should be limited” (para
4). It defines a firm in diﬃculty as a firm which “is unable, whether
through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its
owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which, without outside
intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it
to going out of business in the short or medium term” (para 9).
Yet, the guidelines explicitly reinforce the previously established ‘one
time, last time’ principle. According to this principle, a firm may not
receive any additional rescue or restructuring aid during a uniform pe-
riod of ten years. This rule does not apply though when restructuring
aid follows the awarding of rescue aid as part of a single restructuring
procedure.The guidelines also set a cap on the state contribution to the
restructuring costs. Large firms have to come up with 50% of the costs
on their own, medium-sized firms with 40%, and small firms with 25%.
In other words, the rules make it more diﬃcult to rescue a large firm
than a small firm. The reasoning is that with large firms being rescued,
the distortionary eﬀects on competition are higher. It does not answer
the question why saving small firms would be less of a waste of taxpay-
ers’ money than saving a large firm from an eﬃciency point of view (in
relative terms).
While prima facie some arguments could be made in favor of this ap-
proach, the public choice view developed in the following chapter draws
an even more diﬀerentiated picture.
The financial and economic crisis has had a significant impact as to
how R&R aids were dealt with. The “Temporary Community frame-
work for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current
financial and economic crisis” (notice 2009/C 16/01) allowed EU mem-
ber states to award a maximum flat-rate aid of e 500,000 per company
during the first two years to help companies overcome the current dif-
ficulties, state guarantees for loans accompanied by a premium reduc-
tion, subsidized loans, in particular for the production of green products
(meeting environmental protection standards early or going beyond such
standards), and aid in the form of risk capital, which may be up to e 2.5
91
3.1 Competition between firms 69
million per SME and per year (instead of the previous limit of e 1.5
million) provided that at least 30% (instead of the previous 50%) of the
investment costs are met by private investors.
The “Communication from the Commission on the application of
State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in
the context of the current global financial crisis” of (2008/C 270/02) clar-
ified the application of state aid rules to emergency measures aimed to
oﬀset losses due to the financial crisis. It stated that public intervention
should be decided at national level within a coordinated framework and
on the basis of a certain number of European Union common principles
(para 2).
3.1.4 The openness and integration of the economy
In an open economy, subsidies to firms might give them a competitive ad-
vantage over foreign firms. Thereby the domestic firm’s profits increase
to the detriment of the foreign firms (and of domestic competitors if they
do not receive the same subsidy). If the increase in profits outweigh the
costs of the subsidy (assuming that the profits stay within the home
country), then the subsidy is welfare-enhancing for the home coun-
try. This is the core of the prisoner’s dilemma: foreign countries now
have a big incentive to give a subsidy to their firms. Eventually, there is
no gain in eﬃciency, but there are the costs of the subsidies that remain.
Gro¨teke (2007) reviews theories about the degree of market integra-
tion and their implications for firm subsidies: Subsidies have a diﬀerent
eﬀect in a closed than in an open economy. In the former, they can be
used to correct market failures (e.g. due to technological externalities or
natural monopolies) and increase eﬃciency, but have a negative eﬀect
because of the deadweight-loss of taxation. Often it might then be better
to directly address the cause of the market failure instead. In the latter,
the negative externalities onto other economies should be taken into ac-
count. The European Union went through several successive stages of
economic integration: (i) free trade, (ii) common tariﬀs vis-a`-vis third
countries, (iii) free movement of factors of production, (iv) harmoniza-
tion/unification of economic policies (the current, still developing stage).
The more economies integrate, the bigger the possible externalities due
to subsidies and the lower their ability to countervail them.
It is therefore vital to not only view the question of state aid con-
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trol from the perspective of the competition between firms, but also to
consider the externalities imposed on other countries, as well as the fact
that there is a competition also between jurisdictions. In this latter case,
the externality is not an externality anymore, but an inherent part of
the inter-jurisdictional competition game played by countries or entities
in a federal or quasi-federal system.
3.2 Competition between jurisdictions
In order to understand the problem of state aids, it is crucial to see that
there are two diﬀerent competitions taking place. First, firms compete
for customers and try to maximize their profits. The other kind of com-
petition is more delicate to describe. It is the competition of jurisdictions
at various levels. These levels can be local (e.g. cities, counties, commu-
nities), regional (e.g. German La¨nder, U.S. states, Canadian provinces),
national (countries), international (regional groupings of countries, such
as the European Union10). The goal in this competition is to attract
firms, capital, and/or jobs. In theory, the desired outcome is that politi-
cians are incentivized to oﬀer bundles of laws, public goods, and tax rates
which optimally reflect the preferences of individuals. As Hans-Werner
Sinn said, “It has often been argued that systems competition is com-
parable to competition in private markets. [...] Governments are seen
as firms which compete with one another by oﬀering attractive pack-
ages of services and tax prices and, although they are driven by national
goals, competition makes them behave in a way compatible with an in-
ternational welfare optimum” (Sinn, 1997, p. 248). But Sinn was also
aware that the analogy between firms and governments does not work
perfectly: “[...] governments undertake a variety of economic activities
which cannot be handled satisfactorily by competitive markets. Since
governments have stepped in where markets have failed, it can hardly
be expected that a re-introduction of a market through the backdoor
of systems competition will work. It is likely to bring about the same
kind of market failure that justified government intervention in the first
place” (Sinn, 1997, p. 248)
10The Airbus v. Boeing saga shows that the EU has indeed become an actor on a
global stage with regard to subsidies and inter-jurisdictional competition
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One important eﬃciency-related eﬀect stems from inter-jurisdictional
“bidding wars” and the subsidization of ineﬃcient firms. In the for-
mer, jurisdictions (say, EU member states, German La¨nder, or American
state, county or municipal governments) spend resources to incentivize
firms to relocate. Society as a whole does not gain from this competition
(in order to keep the provision of public goods the same, the subsidiz-
ing jurisdiction needs to levy higher taxes, thereby producing a higher
dead-weight loss of taxation). Society might gain from a relocation of a
firm - but if a firm is really more productive in a diﬀerent location, it
would have moved on its own, even without the subsidy. As an exam-
ple of such a “bidding war”, Facebook announced on October 27, 2011,
that it would immediately begin building a new data center (a so-called
server farm) in the Swedish town of Lulea, near the Arctic Circle. The
location was chosen because of the suitable climate for environmental
cooling and clean power resources. The farm will require 300 full-time
positions during the first three years. The Swedish government mean-
while announced that it would subsidize the project with 103 million
Swedish kronor (approximately e 11.4 million). “The investment in a
data center will give the area expertise in a future growth industry and,
not least with the proximity to the Lulea Technical University, will cre-
ate possibilities for more companies and activities in the region going
forward”, the Swedish Enterprise Minister Annie Loeoef said. Lulea’s
mayor welcomes the opportunity to turn the Lulea region into a major
node for European data traﬃc, dubbing the region “The Node Pole.”
He adds that “We hope other global companies see the innate climate
qualities and benefits of the Node Pole region, and choose to follow in
Facebook’s path.” All quotes are from National Post (2011). Through
the pretext of regional aid (presumably), the Swedish government par-
ticipated in what was most likely a “subsidy race.” Knowing that other
IT firms such as Google or Microsoft already built similar server farms
near the Arctic Circle, it was very probable that Facebook would choose
a similar location. Thus, the Swedish government subsidy only aﬀected
the choice of location. The eﬃciency loss (on the global scale) in this
case is the deadweight-loss of taxation born by Swedish taxpayers in or-
der to finance the subsidy. This is at least true if we assume that the
benefits of the server farm are the same in Canada, Norway, Sweden or
Finland. A more pessimistic view might say that the eﬃciency loss is
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even bigger: namely, if the Swedish location performed worse than, say,
the Canadian alternative, but that this diﬀerence was compensated by
the subsidy.
But subsidies occur also when relocation is not an issue. States have
repeatedly engaged in the support of ineﬃcient firms or whole sectors.
As Martin and Valbonesi (2006b) point out, “much state aid in the EU is
driven by the sunkenness of capital - capital immobility - in integrating
markets and the reluctance of member state governments passively to
accept that market integration implies a reduction in the equilibrium
number of firms11.”
On a purely intra-jurisdictional level, this is simply a waste of tax-
payers’ money. It becomes a concern to other jurisdictions though as well
if this subsidy distorts competition in the inter-jurisdictional commerce.
In any case, the money used for bidding wars and ineﬃcient firms
or sectors, wastes resources that could have been used for things more
useful to economic growth. The losers of competition in this Tiebout’ian
setting, as Sinn (1990) notes, are the immobile workers and landowners
on one hand, and the poor on the other hand because governments will
not be able to maintain the same degree of redistribution.
The previous section showed that state aid decisions aﬀect the goods
markets. They can either alleviate an existing market failure, or be the
cause of one - even both at the same time. The strategic trade literature
linked goods markets to states acting on an international stage. This
means that an aid decision will not only aﬀect domestic firms, but also
foreign firms, and, as a result, foreign societies. Yet, the view that trade
should only be based upon the endowment of natural resources of coun-
tries without interference by the state would be too fast a conclusion.
In fact, not only firms are in a competition, but there is also a competi-
tion between jurisdictions for firms. The competition is fierce indeed. In
1996, it was estimated that around 15,000 investment attraction agencies
competed for only 200 to 300 large-scale projects Loveridge (1996). The
externality identified earlier might then just be an inherent outcome of
this second type of competition. Whether this inter-jurisdictional com-
11“Equilibrium number of firms” here refers to a Cournot model in which firms
make enough revenue in order to cover their fixed costs and thus stay in the market
in the long-run. If two Cournot oligopolies merge due to economic integration, then
this number will be less than the sum of the numbers of firms in the two formerly
separate oligopolies.
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petition produces eﬃciency problems is the subject of this section.
As a first approach, Charles Tiebout’s positive theory of the free rider
problem in local governance comes in useful.
Tiebout (1956) identified several conditions for the eﬃcient provision
of public goods: (a) unrestricted mobility of consumer-voters, (b) per-
fectly informed consumer-voters, (c) large number of communities, (d)
unrestricted employment opportunities. (e) no externalities in between
communities, (f) communities have a non-infinite optimal size, and (g)
communities try to reach this optimal size.
Taking those assumptions and applying them for instance to the situ-
ation in the EU (or other economically integrated regions) seems to make
sense to a certain degree. The EU allows – at least legally – uncompli-
cated and free movement of people, firms, goods, services and capital.
It is probably also safe to say that EU citizens are increasingly aware
of developments in other member states (see for instance recently the
Europe-wide coverage of the sovereign debt crisis, especially in Greece).
Some non-legal restrictions, mainly the language barrier, still exist, nev-
ertheless. Also, employment opportunities vary a lot between countries
and there clearly are externalities between countries. The model most
definitely works better in the United States.
The inter-jurisdictional competition angle of the law and economics
of state aids to firms needs to address issues like (i) the incentives govern-
ments have to grant subsidies, (ii) under what conditions those subsidies
are eﬃciency-enhancing, (iii) under what conditions ineﬃciencies arise
(creating the need for a higher-level subsidy-control), (iv) what the prob-
lems of subsidy control in an institutional setting might be and what the
alternatives thereto might look like (Gro¨teke, 2007).
When designing a federal structure, there has to be a constitutional
choice addressing the so-called “assignment problem” (Oates, 1972). The
question is, how competences should be allocated and responsibilities
among governments divided in a federal system in such a way that the
eﬃciency of the public sector be maximized. The core idea is the het-
erogeneity of citizens: if decisions are made at the local level, the pref-
erences of all citizens can be better reflected than if decisions are made
at a federal level. Furthermore, decentralization enables learning and
experimentation. The local community can try diﬀerent bundles until it
finds an optimal one.
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Problems arise, of course, if there are positive of negative external-
ities, which cause either under-investment or over-investment, respec-
tively. In terms of state aids, it means that a e.g. a subsidy allowing a
firm to produce at a lower price will benefit the entire market, although
only the citizens of the local jurisdiction pay for the subsidy. European
Union law would consider such an aid problematic, as it aﬀects trade
between member states. The question, though, is: if citizens of a juris-
dictions democratically choose to subsidize a firm and thereby provide
a good at a lower price to citizens of other localities, why does this war-
rant a government intervention? The answer, in fact, is that state aid
control serves not the purpose of avoiding this free-riding problem. It
serves the purpose of over-coming a prisoner’s dilemma situation. In a
certain way, state aid control could be interpreted as a cartel of sorts,
in the sense that the participants in a market (in this case: the local
jurisdictions) agree jointly on tax-benefit bundles and thereby reduce
inter-jurisdictional competition. Unlike cartels of firms, localities can
overcome the commitment problem inherent to cartels by establishing a
central authority which enforces the agreement. The examples of failed
regional agreements in parts of the United States (in the Midwest and
in the New York/Connecticut/New Jersey tristate area) show that the
prisoner’s dilemma colluding firms face is also present in agreements
between political entities.
The so-called “second generation of fiscal federalism” (Weingast,
2013) incorporates concepts from political economy into federalism the-
ory. Politicians are seen as self-interested, and federalism gives them the
incentives which will maximize the welfare of the federation as a whole.
Federalism, so the claim, will let politicians not only choose an eﬃcient
bundle of taxes and public goods, but the politicians will have an interest
to also provide rules and frameworks which guarantee a functioning mar-
ket for goods (such as enforcement of contracts and maintaining private
property).
3.2.1 Is there a level playing field? Problems with
the definition of state aid/subsidy
The declared aim of state aid regulation is to create a so-called level play-
ing field (the term appears in many policy documents, see for instance
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European Commission (2012)), in which firms compete for markets with-
out assistance from their governments. Yet, is this a realistic scenario?
Snape (1988) notes that, to a certain degree, every government action
may be regarded as a subsidy: for example, a requirement to fly domes-
tically manufactured flags on government buildings is de facto an aid to
flag makers. This measure gives them a secure home market and lets
them achieve economies of scale, thereby giving them an advantage also
on the worldwide market. Furthermore, the term state aid is diﬃcult to
define. It is in fact not obvious what the term specific (which is used in
many legal documents regarding state aids) means. Is an environmental
regulation aﬀecting only one firm in an industry (e.g., because it is the
only firm) a specific aid? Is building infrastructure close to a business
park a specific aid to the firms locating in said business park? What if
the government decides to promote computer science in its high schools,
thus benefiting the large computer company in the country – could that
be an indirect export subsidy?
This problematic, of course, has an eﬀect on the possible regulatory
solution. The paramount question is: if it is not trivial to define state
aids and jurisdictions compete through so many parameters, is state
aid control then actually feasible? And is the current state aid control
mechanism in place in Europe – banning specific aids to firms, but not
competition through other factors – really the best solution? Might it not
be conceivable that inter-jurisdictional competition is less harmful when
it takes place through subsidies than through labor or environmental
law?
As de Cecco (2013) puts it: “... State aid is incapable of targeting
strategic regulatory diﬀerentiation among Member States, but can only
target asymmetric regulation within individual Member States. Yet, in
the perspective of locational competition, the latter type of diﬀerentia-
tion may often be a more eﬀective and financially less onerous tool to
achieve the result sought by the former sort of regulatory diﬀerentiation.
Selective regulatory incentives are, in fact, more eﬀective in that they
target those undertakings that are more likely to respond to the appeal
of public incentives, or undertakings that belong to a specific sector that
the Member State seeks to attract to its jurisdiction; moreover, selective
regulation also reduces the impact on public finances, in that it does not
cover all undertakings across sectors, but only those undertakings that
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it seeks to attract.”
3.2.2 Recent trends
It is important to stress recent trends in the development of the phe-
nomenon. The lack of comprehensive data, a returning issue in this
book, renders an exact analysis of trends diﬃcult. Yet, at least anecdo-
tal evidence seems to indicate an increase in worldwide competition for
capital (see e.g. Friedman (2006) for a global view, and LeRoy (2005),
Chirinko and Wilson (2006), Fisher (2007), and Tannenwald (2001) for
the increase in availability of incentive packages in the United States).
Markusen and Nesse (2007) give a brief historical overview that draws
the competition for mobile capital in the U.S. even back to the nine-
teenth century, in which Californian cities competed for military bases.
So-called “bidding wars” for plants or facilities have increased since the
1960s.
The automobile industry has for long been an important battlefield
for bidding wars. A reason for that is that it employs large numbers of
blue-collar workers at relatively high pay. Already in the 1970s, there
were major relocation decisions made based on state aids. Pennsylva-
nia and Ohio competed for Volkswagen’s first American assembly plant.
Volkswagen accepted a package that included $100 million from Penn-
sylvania, as well as federal funds to train the workers. This led Lee
Iacocca, president of Ford Motor Company, to declare that the location
of major Ford plants would henceforth by determined by the highest
incentive package. Only weeks later, Ford received a $70 million subsidy
from Canada, leading it to build a $533 million engine plant employing
2,600 workers. At the same time, DeLorean, which achieved some fame
for building the DMC-12, the sports car-turned-time machine from the
Back To The Future movie trilogy, received $100 million from Northern
Ireland, thereby outbidding oﬀers from Detroit, Puerto Rico, and others
(Flint, 1978).
Of course, this competition takes also place in many other institu-
tional settings. Australia, for instance, has a history of inter-jurisdictional
competition for capital with rather unsuccessful attempts of states to re-
strict themselves. Europe’s state aid control mechanism, on the other
hand, dates back to the 1950s. In other parts of the world, especially
developing countries, “American-style regional competition for capital”
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(ibid, p. 6) is proliferating. Accordingly, fiscal competition between
jurisdictions is rampant in Brazil, India, and China, with various legal
regimes trying to either cool down the competition (Brazil) or accelerate
it (China, India). It is also taking place in small independent countries
competing for American, European, or Japanese plants – Poland and
Bulgaria (before EU accession), Cambodia, Lao, and Vietnam would be
examples thereof.
There are some reasons why the competition for firms has increased
in the last decades.
Falling transportation and communication costs, vertical dis-
integration Technological progress has constantly reduced the costs
of transporting goods between plants and to customers. At the same
time, advances in telecommunications have facilitated the communica-
tion and coordination between various stages of the supply chain spread
through the world. The macroeconomic literature tells us that economic
development and technological progress go hand-in-hand. Technological
progress also had another eﬀect: it reduced transportation and commu-
nications costs and thus, jointly with the removal of trade barriers and
the establishment of regional trade agreements increased capital mobil-
ity. Firms thus have a bigger choice of locations (and for various reasons
are better able to cooperate) while coordination between jurisdictions
has become more diﬃcult because their number increased12 and many
of their attempts to coordinate failed (see below). As a result of lower
transportation costs (in the wider sense), firms disintegrated vertically,
that is, separated the headquarters from their manufacturing plants,
R&D centers, and other functions (Fro¨bel et al., 1979). Quite paradox-
ically, falling transportation and communication costs have diminished
the role of location, clustering, that is, geographic concentrations of in-
terconnected firms, is an increasing phenomenon in advanced economies
(Porter, 2000).
12Without customs unions, jurisdictions could just compensate another jurisdic-
tion’s subsidies by levying a tariﬀ on the product manufactured by the subsidized
firm to remedy the distortion of competition. Therefore, with increasing economic
integration, the number of jurisdictions in direct competition to a given jurisdiction
rises.
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Political devolution Devolution is the process in which central gov-
ernment cede powers to a lower-level government. These powers can nev-
ertheless ultimately rest reside in the central government, which distin-
guishes devolution from federalism, in which federal entities rejoice statu-
tory, constitutional rights. The consequence of devolution is that even
unitary, that is, non-federalist countries now face inter-jurisdictional
competition between their lower levels of government. Major devolution
process can be observed in Spain with its system of autonomous regions,
in France (enfranchisement of its re´gions), or the United Kingdom with
the 1998 establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assem-
bly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly (England remaining
un-devolved). In federal states such as the United States, Australia
or Germany, individual states can devolve internally and cede powers to
the local governments. Some American countries have devolved and also
granted special powers to indigenous people (e.g. Mexico). Devolution
has a problematic side-eﬀect with regards to the competition for firms. It
can be argued that through this process, local and regional governments
are entrusted with the task of economic development, without receiving
the adequate resources or revenue-raising authority (Llanes, 1998) and
without the necessary expertise, worsening the information asymmetry
problem (Markusen and Diniz, 2005; Schneider, 2004)). As Markusen
and Nesse (2007) point out, governments in, say, Brazil and India are
inexperienced when it comes to negotiating deals with multinational cor-
porations, which end up taking advantage of their position. This is
amplified by the advent of site consultants, who facilitate incentive com-
petition by identifying potential rents and selling this information to
companies. The problem, as they identify it, is that these consultants –
whose trade is unregulated – often work for both sides (drawing double
commissions), which can lead to a lower quality of information available
to the bidding jurisdiction.
Rise of the site consultancy industry Over the last decades, the
process of matching firms with jurisdictions has been significantly pro-
fessionalized. In the United States, the site location industry was fueled
in the 1950s by the federal government’s policy of dispersing its military
manufacturing plants for fear of strategic bombing by the Soviet Union.
In 1975, the first “business climate” ranking was compiled by Fantus
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Corporation, which contributed to bidding wars among American states
(LeRoy, 2005).
Politics and political calculus Another recurring theme in this book
and in the more public-choice-oriented literature on state aids is asset
ownership and their specificity. Groups within jurisdictions with local
assets or benefiting from there directly lead to the development of what
Molotch (1976) calls “growth machines”. These groups lobby for the
attraction of population and mobile factors in order to avoid having to
move themselves. Local rent-seeking coalitions and the specificity of
assets are discussed again in the next chapter.
3.3 Regulating the competition
It has been mentioned earlier that it seems paradoxical that the more
centralized a federal system, the less likely it is to show strict state aid
control. The United States has a relatively stronger federal government
than the European Union, yet it does not have a strict regulatory state
aid control system (see chapter 3). On one hand, the European Union,
a vague, sui generis association of states, on the other hand, sports a
very sophisticated control mechanism.
3.3.1 States’ rights and discrimination
Whether there is indeed a paradox can be disputed. In fact, this situation
might not be as paradoxical as it seems. In certain aspects, American
states enjoy much wider discretion than EU member states. The EU by
now has in place a very strict regime prohibiting all kinds of discrim-
ination against Europeans by national states. The U.S. constitution’s
so-called Privileges and Immunity Clause bans a state from treating U.S.
citizens of other states in a discriminatory manner (U.S. Constitution,
article IV, section 2, clause 1). The scope of this clause is disputed,
though. In a landmark case in 197813, the Supreme Court upheld the
state of Montana’s right to charge higher fees for out of state elk hunters.
The common interpretation of the clause (which is still being followed
13Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)
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today) is thus that there is no constitutional requirement for states to
treat residents and non-residents equally for all purposes. The major-
ity’s opinion in this case was that the purpose of the clause is to prevent
discrimination concerning fundamental matters, but not to prevent all
distinctions between state residents and non-residents, e.g. in matters
such as recreational opportunities like hunting (Linder, 2012). Most im-
portantly, the State-Immunity Doctrine also applies to anti-competitive
conduct. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court re-aﬃrmed the doc-
trine that “federal antitrust laws do not prevent States from imposing
market restraints ‘as an act of government’.” (Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc, et al., 568 U. S., 2, citing
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 350?352)
In the European Union, the functional equivalent to the Privileges
and Immunity Clause is Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union. It prohibits any discrimination on grounds of
nationality (which is equivalent to the concept of state residency in the
U.S.). It could be argued that the European Court of Justice is stricter
in its application of Article 18 than the Supreme Court is in applying
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
After all, the European Union might have already developed into
a federal structure which – at least in some aspects – might give less
sovereignty to its federal entities than what is subsumed under the term
“state rights” in the United States. This might be a part of the answer
to the question whether a EU-style state aid control mechanism might be
a realistic perspective in the United States. State rights, their interpre-
tation in constitutional law, and the sometimes very strong ideological
views about them might in fact be a crucial factor hampering the kind of
development in the United States that has been taking place in Europe.
3.3.2 The number of actors
As emphasized in various parts of this book, there is a varying degree
of inter-jurisdictional coordination. Comparing the regimes on public
subsidies in the European Union, the United States and Canada yields
puzzling results. The federal structure with the lowest regional strength
of central government (the EU) is the only one with central monitoring
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and control of investment competition14, while the United States with its
relatively strong central government has no monitoring or enforcement.
Canada, which is in-between the two in regards to centralization, has a
Code of Conduct among the ten provinces (the equivalent of states in
the U.S. and countries in the EU). The enforcement is assured through
complaints, but not through a central entity’s own initiative (as it is the
case with the European Commission).
A possible explanation for this result might be the number of ac-
tors. While the United States has to solve a prisoners’ dilemma with 50
states and a federal government, Canada needs to coordinate a mere ten
provinces15 and European state aid control has its origins in times when
the EU consisted of its six founding members. There were two attempts
by some American states to create regional anti-piracy16 agreements. In
the 1980s, the agreement of the Council of Great Lakes Governors failed
even before it was signed (Schweke et al., 1994; Thomas, 2000), whereas
in 1991 the agreement in the Connecticut-New Jersey-New York tri-state
area did so a few months after the Governors signed it (Mahtesian (1994)
cited in Thomas (2000)).
But the number of actors is not a satisfying explanation as to why a
country like the U.S. never implement a state aid control system, while
the EU seems to have done so with great ease. What the next chapter will
highlight, is that there can be substantial political pressure on leaders
at the lower level in a federal system to not enter agreements.
The discussion on inter-jurisdiction competition goes far beyond the
mere granting of subsidies to firms. States or regions have other instru-
ments, which might even be more powerful than subsidies. It therefore
would also have to encompass questions of competition through labor
law, industrial relations (e.g., the role attributed to labor unions–see for
instance the distinction between “right-to-work” states and non-“right-
14The EU controls state aid in order to avoid distortions of competition and bid-
ding wars between member states/regions. The Council of Ministers though has the
authority to approve an aid scheme by unanimous vote. Interestingly, for some rea-
son, this almost never happens (ibid.). Are there really never any aid schemes that
might constitute a Pareto-improvement for all members?
15Canada’s situation became more complex though with the customs union with
the U.S. and the founding of NAFTA. Henceforth, the ten provinces are in a direct
competition with the several United States and Mexican states.
16“Piracy” in the U.S. or “poaching” in Canada is the term designated for a juris-
diction’s attempts to make a firm relocate there from another jurisdiction.
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to-work” states17), or environmental policies.
3.3.3 European state aid control as the total welfare
maximizer
The European Commission could be considered a benevolent principal
which tries to maximize the total welfare of all jurisdictions. The EC
is considered a benevolent principal in the sense that it does not follow
private benefits, but one and only one objective: maximizing the total
welfare of the union. Its welfare function is thus the sum of the individual
member states’ welfare functions minus the total amount of externalities
produced. One way of interpreting this scenario is that the EU levies a
sort of “Pigou tax” on state aids. As with real taxes, politicians in the
member states have incentives to avoid them. This is particularly true
since there is no punishment system in the EU beyond the requirement
to recover state aids deemed unlawful. Unlike in models on corruption
with benevolent governments and corrupt tax collectors, the agent can-
not be threatened with losing their job. The only one who can punish
politicians in democracies are the voters. Yet, their motives might be
diﬀerent than the motives of EU bureaucrats. For example, voters might
care more about protecting jobs than about the externalities on other
countries produced. Of course, if public choice theory is to be applied
at the state-aid-granting level, it should also be applied to the sphere
of the regulator. Regulation of state aid would fall into the domain of
international economic law, and public choice theory thereof has been
controversial although good arguments have been made in favor of it
(see e.g. Stephan, 1995).
As a regulator, the European Commission is limited by its regional
boundaries. It can address state aid that is awarded by EU Member
States, but not aid that is awarded to firms that do business in the EU
or compete with European firms outside the EU. The airline industry
is an example where this is subject to a political debate. For instance,
in 2010, Dubai-based airline Emirates ordered an additional 32 Airbus
A380 planes, taking its total orders for Airbus’ new high-capacity plane
to 90 aircraft. In November 2011, it also announced the order of 50
17Right-to-work laws prohibit agreements between labor unions and employers that
would make membership in a union a condition of employment.
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Boeing 777 planes. These planes will be used to expand the airline’s
intercontinental network. The hub of this network is Dubai. Through
Dubai, American and European passengers connect to flights to Asia,
Africa and Australia. After years of high growth, it has become the
second largest airline in the world in available seat kilometers (ASK).
European legacy carriers like Lufthansa consider Emirates a threat to
the European airline industry. Their claim: Because of in-kind subsidies
that Emirates allegedly receive (mainly at their base in Dubai), they are
able to oﬀer long-haul flights at a very low cost and thereby destroy the
European airlines’ long-distance network (and thereby also harming the
intra-European feeder network attached to it). In order to restrict Emi-
rates’ ability to route passengers through Dubai, European airlines lobby
their national governments to restrict the number of permitted flights
between their country and the United Arab Emirates. This example
tries to illustrate the diﬃculties of trade between countries with a state
aid control regime and countries without one. Not receiving subsidies,
be it because of the austerity of the government or because of state aid
control, can severely restrict of firm’s ability to survive in the market.
While some would demand action against these subsidies, others would
take the position that, from a competition order point of view, there is
not necessarily a problem with shifting production from a non-subsidized
to a subsidized firm
3.4 Towards an extended view
Most of the justifications of state aid control focus on establishing a con-
stitutional order under which economic competition takes place. State
aids to firms intervene in the competition between firms. At the same
time, they are an instrument for the competition between jurisdictions.
Unlike firms, which usually have as an only goal to maximize profits18,
jurisdictions follow diﬀerent and various objectives. The way the com-
petition between jurisdictions can be seen is as a utility-maximizing be-
havior, in which jurisdictions enact laws and policies that maximize the
utility of their citizens. This might be overly idealistic, though. Another
18Indeed, this is not true for all firms as there are special cases. Firms providing
services of general economic interest (SGEI) are often state-owned and are designed
as non-profit firms.
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view might emphasize more the principal-agent problems involved, char-
acterized by the fact that jurisdictions are governed by politicians who
might mainly seek personal benefits, of which re-election is one of them.
State aid control does not take place in a political void, in which
benevolent politicians care only about the welfare of all citizens. In fact,
there are firms and interest groups which demand state aids, although
there is no economic justification for that, and there are politicians who,
led by their personal interests, will provide such state aids. Therefore
it is also worth approaching the subject from the public choice angle.
Such studies can give paramount insights as to how a state aid control
mechanism shall be designed institutionally and legally in order to be less
vulnerable to serving economically non-justified interests (e.g. Mueller,
2000; Haucap and Schwalbe, 2011).
The conclusion from this section – and this will be a general assump-
tion in the subsequent chapters – is that there is some kind of need for
the regulation of how jurisdictions award subsidies to firms and engage
in inter-jurisdictional, regulatory competition. Indeed, there is a consen-
sus among most parts of the literature to at least prevent the excesses
of inter-jurisdictional competition.
The previous chapter showed how various federal or international
settings deal with subdivisions’ granting of subsidies (or tax abatements)
to firms and that paradigms vary grossly around the globe. The variety
is not only present in a single dimension, but in regard to many aspects
(e.g. disclosure, enforcement, etc.). Hypothetically, some other varieties
could be conceived (for instance a regime mandating full disclosure, but
no formal rules banning state aids to firms, or a regime that requires a
certain minimum in the quality of jobs created), but are not observed in
the existing world.
Interestingly, not only the regimes regulating subsidies diﬀer among
regions, but also the political alignments in their support or opposition,
which also says something about how subsidies are structured. For in-
stance and broadly over-generalizing, the European left traditionally is
tolerant of or actively supports state aids to firms. This is especially the
case when a “national champion” firm is in crisis and needs subsidies in
order to maintain its employment. The European right rather opposes
the “waste of taxpayers’ money” and has a stronger laissez-faire ap-
proach towards firms in need of support. In America on the other hand,
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the left denounces what they call “corporate welfare”, that is, what they
see as a public support of big, often very profitable corporations. The
American right cares less about this equity concern, but more about the
eﬃciency aspect (for the left-right debate see e.g. LeRoy (2005) and
Thomas (2000)). The reason for this contrast in political alignments
might be that subsidies are more discussed in the context of relocations
in America, and rather in the context of support one’s “own” national
firms or even champions in Europe. It shows that the public choice, the
collective decisions (the processes and their substance) matter.
Because state aid decisions are political, it is worth the eﬀort to take
a closer look at how these agreements are made. There are three aspects
which need to be seen jointly. First, state aid decisions are made under
uncertainty. Governments do not always know the return to their invest-
ments and might therefore make unnecessary or insuﬃcient investments.
Information asymmetries between firms and governments play an impor-
tant role. Secondly, state aid decisions are made by politicians who have
their own, personal agenda. This personal agenda could be reelection
(by taking popular decisions, that is, usually those creating more jobs)
or other private benefits (such as outright grafts, but also borderline or
perfectly legal motives like preventing firms to fall into bankruptcy in
order to be able to take up senior executive positions after the political
career). They hand out subsidies to firms which are controlled by self-
interested managers who do not necessarily act in the best interest of
the shareholders. Thus, the agency problems need to be taken into ac-
count. Thirdly, all state aid decisions in North America and Europe, but
also in other reasonably open economies, take place in a setting of fierce
inter-jurisdictional competition. The following chapters will therefore
discuss this conundrum in further detail, emphasizing the public choice
and inter-jurisdictional competition aspects. The principal-agent prob-
lems within companies will then be addressed in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 4
Evaluations of state aid
measures
The eﬀectiveness of specific state aid measures has been analyzed by
several studies, both in the EU and in the U.S. The following chapter
gives an overview of the findings.
The literature sometimes refers to the terms “vertical aid” and “hor-
izontal” aid. The former refers to aids given to specific sectors of the
industry or dependent on firm specifics, as in the case of rescue and re-
structuring aid. Horizontal aid, on the other hand, is aid awarded for
general objectives, independently of industry aﬃliation or firm specifics.
The typical horizontal aids are aid for research and development, the
development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), or environ-
mental protection. It has been noted though that this distinction is not
very clear and that horizontal aid is sometimes tantamount to vertical
aid (Gual and Jo´dar-Rosell, 2006). For instance, primarily horizontal
aid is often restricted to a certain industry or sub-sector (the EU State
Aid Scoreboard, that is, the main source on state aid in Europe, does
not distinguish between horizontal aid for the entire economy and hori-
zontal aid for certain industries only). Furthermore, while vertical aid to
the manufacturing sector has decreased steadily in the last two decades,
almost all of state aid in Europe for horizontal objectives is awarded to
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the manufacturing sector.
For instance, although aid to the manufacturing sectors is currently
dwarfed by aid to the financial sector, the automobile sector is still an
important recipient of aid in the manufacturing industry. It is subject
to two specific framework agreements for state aid. In the years 1990 to
2008, sector aid to that sector decreased, but the motives for such aid
shifted from the sectoral development motive to a regional development
motive (Nicolini et al., 2013).
4.1 Sectoral aid
Sectoral aid is aid given to specific sectors. There are not many studies
with comprehensive descriptions of the eﬀects of sector state aid, and
even fewer recent ones.
The Danish Competition Authority performed some assessments of
the shipbuilding industry in Denmark, which received the lion’s share of
Danish sectoral state aid in the period 1995 to 2005. Their conclusion
was that the total turnover of Danish shipyards, their number and the
workforce in this industry has been declining over the last decades while
the share of state aid in wages increases to a level of over 70% in 2001.
The productivity of these shipyards has increased less than in the rest of
the Danish manufacturing industry, while wages for workers at shipyards
have been 8 to 20% higher than for their colleagues in the metal and
iron industry in the same regions (Gual and Jo´dar-Rosell (2006) see this
as evidence for rent seeking). At the same time, the profits of these
companies were low, which might indicate that, at least, the state aid
was not used for accruing profits (Danish Competition Authority, 2002).
The authority, in Danish Competition Authority (2001), also estimated
the eﬀects of state aids on total factor productivity and growth. They
find that subsidies often go to sectors with limited competition, and that
the profit rates in those markets that received a large amount of state
aid were generally larger than in markets that did not. Sectors with
low competition exhibit higher amounts of received state aid. After
comparing the growth rates of 1,500 Danish firms, which received some
kind of state aid in the period 1994 to 1997, with the growth rates of
20,000 other firms that did not, they find mixed results. There is no
evidence that state aid increased growth rates in the short run. For
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aids awarded in the business sector through regional development and
environmental programs, they observe decreasing growth rates. R&D aid
in the business sector also seemed to decrease productivity growth rates.
The speculated reason for that is that state aid can cause ineﬃciency in
the receiving firms due to the administration of support programs, but
also that state aid can cause technical ineﬃciency. This, so the claim, is
the case when financial support mainly goes to one production factor.
4.2 Rescue and restructuring aids
The study by London Economics (2004) notes that only one out of three
firms survive in their original form after receiving rescue and restructur-
ing (R&R) aid. One third of the firms will be acquired by another firm
and another third disappears completely. Given that usually the idea is
that firms downsize in the process of restructuring, the study provides
evidence that the contrary is the case. Unfortunately, the study does
not assess in detail the negative eﬀects on the competitors of these res-
cued firms. According to the study, restructuring aid cases yield a higher
probability of survival than rescue aid cases. Many variables do not have
a significant impact on the chances of survival: size, age, legal status of
the firm, sector growth after the aid measure, condition of the firm at
time of receiving aid, and relative amount of aid awarded. The reasons
why a firm got into trouble determine the eﬀectiveness of the R&R aid.
If the reasons are a general market decline or poor management, the
chances of survival after restructuring are higher than if the turmoil is
caused by external failure, liquidity problems, low competitiveness or fi-
nancial liabilities. The way how the firm is rescued seems not to matter
either, with the following features not producing a significant impact on
survival rates: duration of restructuring, capacity reductions, person-
nel reductions, focus on core business activities, cost-cutting, financial
consolidation, selling or closure of plants and assets, new investment,
training and upgrading and plant relocation. Furthermore, after receiv-
ing the aid, these firms were not able to significantly outperform their
competitors despite their cost advantage. Nevertheless, the aid seem to
make them at least partially close the gap regarding profitability and
productivity.
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G#lowicka (2008) conducted a study with a similar thrust. Using data
from 86 cases during the years 1995 to 2003, she finds that the chance
of survival increases during the four years immediately after the bailout,
but drops afterwards – an indication that bailouts might merely delay
exit and do not prevent it.
4.3 R&D aids
Not every R&D aid actually leads to more research and development.
Several studies analyzed whether R&D aids act as a complement or
rather as a substitute to private research. One survey of the econometric
evidence comes to the conclusion that about one third of R&D grants
given to firms replaced existing research projects instead of inducing
or complementing them (David et al., 2000). Drawing upon evidence
from Israel, Lach (2002) finds that R&D aids act as complements for
small firms (even at at a rate of 1 to 11), but induces no statistically
significant own R&D in large firms (more than 300 employees). The
policy problem here is that it is predominantly large firms that receive
aid (the largest 25% receive about 70 to 80% of all subsidies). This result
can be explained by the fact that smaller firms have a more diﬃcult
time acquiring funds on the capital market, but it could also be a case
for a public choice approach (see next chapter). Gelabert et al. (2009)
address the question from a diﬀerent angle. Using Spanish data from the
Community Innovation Survey, they estimate how appropriability, that
is, the degree to which firms can reap benefits from their innovation,
determines the eﬀect of research subsidies. They find that the higher
the degree of appropriability, the less research aid stimulates additional,
privately financed R&D. This is an alarming result as it means that
research aid is less eﬀective where the need for it is lower.
A recent study of Austrian companies which received funding through
the O¨sterreichische Forschungsfo¨rderungsgesellschaft (FFG) asked recip-
ients of R&D funds whether they would have conducted their research
without the aid. Only 20% of the research projects receiving funding
would not have been conducted at all without said contribution. 6%
say that they would have done the project to the same extent without
any external funding, 15% say that they have done the project to the
predominantly same amount, and 59% claim that they would have sig-
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Figure 4.1: Would firms have conducted their research without R&D
aid?
nificantly reduced the size of the research project (Kaufmann and Wolf,
2011). Of those firms that said ”yes”, 80% say that they would have
delayed the project. This does not necessarily mean that R&D funding
is ineﬃcient, but it shows that not all R&D aid actually produces ad-
ditional research and development. To a certain extent, it nevertheless
means that some R&D aid could be seen as a hidden business devel-
opment aid. Burger (2013) points out that additionality should not be
the only measure, though - R&D support can increase the quality of the
projects and lead to better planning of research at the firm level (as it
requires firms to submit a very specific proposal and funding agencies
provide certain consulting services).
4.4 Regional aids
The main purpose of regional aid is “cohesion”, that is, bringing the
economically less-developed regions up to the standards of the richer
ones. Traditionally, Europe has a much higher income disparity be-
tween regions than the United States. Regional aid is therefore generally
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considered unproblematic by the European Commission and the aid for
Eastern Germany and bordering regions after the German reunification
is even explicitly exempt from state aid control in Art. 107(2)(c) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Regional aids can be used to attract mobile investment. They must
compensate for the disadvantages linked to relocating to an under-de-
veloped region. According to neoclassical theory, the abolishment of
barriers to trade and capital mobility should lead to a leveling of regional
diﬀerences. Mostly due to agglomeration eﬀects (of richer regions), this
does not happen in some regions.
The literature on economic growth stresses the importance of research
and development. A successful cohesion policy would thus foster R&D
in the cohesion countries. This does not seem to happen. EU-provided
data seems to suggest that cohesion countries spend a below-average
amount of their manufacturing aid on R&D. The gap in technologi-
cal factor endowment of regions thus seems to widen (Thomas, 2000).
In fact, the question here is actually more complicated than that. If
we distinguish between innovation leaders (countries at the frontier of
technological progress) and innovation followers (countries transferring
technology from the innovation leaders), then it can be argued that the
innovation leaders need to invest more in R&D in order to stay on top
of innovation, while innovation followers only need to adapt technologies
and therefore require less R&D expenditure. The next step here is to
have a closer look at the EU data1 and further evaluate the impact of
R&D aid on growth.
Ramboll and Matrix (2012) evaluated the European Commission’s
regional aid guidelines for the period 2007 to 2013. In line with the EC’s
in-depth assessment approach, the criteria of analysis were whether aids
fulfill the need to be:
• “well-targeted so as to provide incentive eﬀects for investors and
attract investment in less developed regions
• proportionate to the challenge faced by ensuring value for money
1The reason why most empirical approaches and results relate to the EU is that -
because of the state aid control regime and the notification requirement that comes
with it - it is the only region to provide comprehensive data on public subsidies to
firms. A comparison with the United States would provide a great counterfactual,
but is not really possible due to the lack of data.
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in terms of employment and other benefits to the region and to
account for potential externalities
• well-designed so as to minimize negative eﬀects on competitors,
other sectors and other Member States and to ensure that positive
impacts outweigh negative impacts.” (Ramboll and Matrix, 2012,
p. 2)
This ex-post evaluation reached some findings that are of relevance
to the next chapter.
First, depending on what level of government grants awarded the aid,
the aid level increased. “... [R]egions that were competing to attract
investment within the same country could find themselves in an upward
spiral that increased aid levels” (Ramboll and Matrix, 2012, p. 3). The
authors of the study also found that there was a high variation in the
ex-ante project evaluation processes and criteria applied among granting
authorities.
Secondly, although in most countries projects are assessed against a
set of qualitative criteria, they found no evidence of cases “where the
incentive eﬀects of aid on the investment or location decisions were sys-
tematically assessed as part of the ex-ante process carried out by the
granting authorities” (ibid.), which indicates that “[t]he obligation for
the investors to prove that regional aid was necessary for their invest-
ments appeared largely to be dealt with as a matter of formality” (ibid.).
The various assessment methods are summarized in table 4.1. Quite
noteworthy, Germany considered the additional administrative burden
of producing cost-benefit analyses as too high.
Thirdly, the study also surveyed how the amounts of aids were set.
In all investigated countries but Poland, the granting authorities nego-
tiated the level of financial incentives with the potential beneficiaries.
Although the regional aid guidelines set a ceiling on the outcome of such
negotiations, it is important to note that bargaining power seems to play
a role in such deals.
Fourthly, countries deal diﬀerently with the non-achievement of goals
set out in the aid agreement. While in some countries (Ireland, Poland,
Slovakia), the payment of the aid is conditional on the achievement of
objectives in terms of the number of jobs created, other countries (Spain,
Portugal, Germany) paid the subsidies even if the goals were not met.
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Country Assessment method
Poland Multi-criteria analysis
Ireland Cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
Slovakia CBA + Financial and socio-economic analysis
Germany No CBA
Table 4.1: Some examples of ex-ante assessment of regional aids, Source:
Ramboll and Matrix (2012), compilation PH
Fifthly, regional aid seems to have “at most a marginal impact on
the initial decision for a company to initiate an investment program”
(ibid, p. 5). While aid was never reported to be irrelevant, “no investor
consulted during this study considered such aid to have been a decisive
factor in their decision making process” (ibid.). In some projects, aid
did influence the size of the project, though. An important factor is also
that the availability of regional aid facilitates access to external funding.
The study also notes that they could not observe any evidence of lock-in
in eﬀects of state aid on the investments.
Whether regional aid aﬀects location is not clear. Ramboll and Ma-
trix (2012) report cases in which projects would have taken place in a
diﬀerent place if it had not been for regional aid, while in other cases
the beneficiaries acknowledged that regional aid had little eﬀect on their
location decision.
From a theory of federalism point of view, control of regional aid re-
stricts the autonomy of subnational jurisdictions in the EU. Streb (2013)
argues that is in stark contrast to the “widely held presumption in the
EU literature, as for example by proponents of multi-level governance,
that European integration works invariably to empower and strengthen
regions in Europe” (p. 129).
4.5 Incentive packages: Cost per job cre-
ated
The United States, which does not know the kind of state aid regime
that the European Union has, provides a fertile ground for estimating
the costs of incentive packages to attract firms. In the U.S., it is heavily
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debated whether incentive packages have any eﬀect and to what degree
(section 6.1 addresses location decisions at the firm level).
Some studies diﬀerentiate not according to the type of aid as done
in the earlier sections of this chapter, but use diﬀerent classifications.
For instance, there are several studies that calculate the amount of state
aid necessary to create (or maintain) one job. Farrell (1996) calculates
a cost of up to $2.4 million per newly created job in the United States.
An important criticism is that these calculations do not assess whether
these jobs would have been created without the subsidies. McEntee
(1996), for instance, claims that most jobs created through financial in-
centives would have been created anyway and quotes a statement of the
Council of State Governments in Economic Development in the States
from 1989: “A comprehensive review of past studies on the eﬀects of in-
centives reveals no statistical evidence that business incentives actually
create jobs.”
4.6 Firm productivity
Due to the ultimate relationship between productivity and economic
growth, Gual and Jo´dar-Rosell (2006) assess the eﬀects of vertical aid
(which, in their definition, goes beyond sectoral aid; see above) on pro-
ductivity in the manufacturing sector (a sector more prone to vertical
aids because of its relatively higher mobility). They find a positive ef-
fect of vertical state aid on productivity growth and thereby contradict
the view that the eﬃciency rationale behind sectoral and rescue aid are
quite weak. This nevertheless supports the task of the Commission to
eﬀectively monitor potentially distortive aid.
Bergstro¨m (2000) calculated the eﬀect of Swedish state aids (vari-
ous specific aids) to be used for investment in machinery and buildings.
Even though he observes a productivity increase in the short run in
subsidized firms (as compared to firms that did not receive state aid),
they exhibit a relatively lower productivity after three years than their
non-subsidized counterparts. The firms that received aid were equally
productive before the subsidy as the firms that did not, so there is no se-
lection bias in the sample. His conclusion is that state aid might produce
allocative ineﬃciencies (a suboptimal mix of labor and capital) and/or
technical (X-)ineﬃciencies (the diﬀerence between eﬃcient behavior of
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firms assumed or implied by economic theory and their observed be-
havior in practice). More specifically, the productivity loss, the author
conjectures, might stem from slack or lack of eﬀort on the part of the
management and/or the fact that the managers might have become more
engaged in subsidy-seeking activities than productive activities.
4.7 The 2011 evaluation by the European
Court of Auditors
In the year 2011, the European Court of Auditors evaluated the Com-
mission’s procedures to ensure eﬀective management of state aid control.
The Court made several observations. With regard to identifying
relevant state aid cases, it noted the insuﬃcient Commission checks to
ensure Member States are complying with their obligation to notify state
aid and that the Commission is not proactive enough in raising Member
States’ awareness of this obligation. Regarding the handling of cases, the
Court lamented that the Commission is hampered by a lack of reliable
management information and organizational problems. Furthermore,
new procedures for managing notifications have not resolved the problem
of timeliness and cumbersomeness. Complaints continue to take a long
time to resolve and the procedure is not transparent. It criticized that
the state aid data provided by the Member States is incomplete and
insuﬃciently reliable, and that the number of ex ante evaluations has
been limited and the Commission does not have an ex post evaluation
function.
It concluded that the Commission has insuﬃcient assurance that it
deals with all relevant state aid cases. State aid procedures, especially for
complaints, still take a long time and lack transparency. It recommends
that the Commission assess the ex post impact of its state aid control in
a comprehensive way.
This report was produced in 2011. The Commission responded by
committing to certain reforms that address the criticism put forward by
the auditors. Meanwhile, some of them have been implemented.
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4.8 Conclusions
The previous chapters described how the European Union is concerned
about distortions of competitions between member states and not so
much about the waste of taxpayers’ money. This chapter tried to provide
some evidence that critical evaluations of state aid measures sometimes
come to the conclusion that there is wasteful spending. This is not to
say that state aid in general is wasteful, but rather to emphasize the
importance of the terms and conditions under which aid takes place, as
well as the eventual outcome of such spending decisions. It should be
reminded that the European Commission’s mandate (responding to the
European Council’s call) is “less, but better targeted state aid”. Yet,
what exactly constitutes “better targeted” aid remains elusive.
With this important result in mind, it is worthy to look at the dy-
namics involved in such state aid decisions in order to better understand
the reasoning behind them. It also leads to important policy conclusions
which question the approach taken by the EU and call for stricter control
of aids in other federal settings.
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CHAPTER 5
The public choice of state aid
to firms
5.1 Introduction
State aids to firms are more than just technocratic decisions. They
are sometimes at the very center of political discussions and the result
of lengthy political processes. Only recently, Vice-President Joe Biden
coined a new mantra for the 2012 presidential re-election campaign of
the Obama administration: “Bin Laden is dead and General Motors is
alive.”1 In what might be the harbinger of a future tax money debacle,
Azmi Samaan, the new regional director of recently reestablished Pales-
tinian Airlines declared “This is part of the independent state, to have
an airline, no matter what it will cost us” (AP, 27.5.2012).
The public choice of state aid to firms is a wide field encompassing
many aspects. Mueller (2000) for instance briefly reviews four of them:
(a) redistribution within the community, (b) redistribution across com-
munities, (c) redistribution from consumers to producers, (d) govern-
mental ineﬃciency (budget-maximizing bureaucrats and irrational col-
lective decisions).
1http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/04/
biden-bin-laden-dead-gm-is-alive/1#.T8N4w-2kK5c
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This chapter tries to explore issues of collective decision-making in
regard to awarding subsidies to firms. The decision makers can either be
jurisdictions (countries, states, provinces, local or county governments,
supra-national institutions, etc.) or individual citizens who have to de-
cide on their government’s or governments’ policies. Additionally, firms
make decisions on entry into market, exit, or relocation.
The underlying assumption of this chapter is that voters hire politi-
cians. These politicians maximize their own utility, which is mainly char-
acterized by the private benefits they receive form the job (this would
be basically tantamount to corruption) and by the mere fact of being in
oﬃce (in other words, they permanently seek re-election). This is in line
with the usual framework of public choice, as described e.g. in Mueller
(2003). To put it in the words of (Behboodi, 1994, CHECK, p. 33),
politicians are “entrepreneurs selling policies for votes”.
Firms’ incentives to seek economic rents are stronger than the incen-
tives to the taxpayer to prevent such a redistribution. As a result, large
benefits are provided to a small number of people, causing a very great
number of consumers a small loss (see e.g. Pareto (1927) on protection-
ism in general).
State aid can also be seen as a form of economic patriotism. It can
serve as a tool to advance a perceived economic self-interest of players
defined according to a shared territorial status (Clift, 2013). Unlike the
term “nationalism”, “patriotism” is more flexible as to which territorial
unit it refers. It can refer to the regional level just as well as to a
supranational (e.g. European) feeling of unity.
And indeed, states – at least the ones this book is about – are not
islands anymore. They are part of a larger, global economy and in a
perpetual competition with others. The stream of information in this
competition is not perfect. Not all state aid deals are made public, and
especially not in a systematic way. Firms, seeking new locales for their
factories or headquarters, will induce not just a competition, but a race
between jurisdictions.
Even if states enter into agreements – a cartel of sorts – not to waste
resources on such races, many practical problems arise. The comprehen-
sive monitoring of compliance with the agreement is an almost insur-
mountable task and can lead to excessive enforcement costs, especially
in the absence of penalties that might act as deterrents. What this
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chapter shows is that even if there are agreements and sanctions, the
incentives to breach are high. Oddly, federal settings with similar char-
acteristics can exhibit diﬀerent equilibria with regard to the prevalence
of state aid.
5.2 Diﬀerent understandings of capitalism
and the role of the state
The European Union unites countries with somewhat diﬀerent approaches
to the relationship between the state and the economy. In a seminal
book, Hall and Soskice (2001) developed the Varieties of Capitalism ap-
proach. Although their approach suﬀers from shortcomings with regard
to explaining the origins of market economies, their taxonomy can be
used to highlight a fundamental problem in the collective choice of state
aid rules.
In their view, capitalist economies are grouped around two opposing
poles, namely liberal market economies (LME) such as the United King-
dom and the United States, and coordinated market economies (CME)
such as the Scandinavian countries. Obviously, this approach is subject
to change over time, with the financial and economic crisis contributing
significantly to its overhaul (see e.g. Bruﬀ and Horn (2012)). Within
the CME-type countries, additional distinctions can be made. France,
for example, is usually considered a particularly statist (that is, empha-
sizing the role of the state) variant of a CME. State aid has always been
an important instrument of dirigisme (Schmidt, 1996) and (Schmidt,
2003). The state had an important role in providing funds for industrial
investment, and intervened in the economy through price, credit, and
exchange controls, through tutelle, that is, hands-on supervision over in-
dustries, both private and public (Clift, 2013). These diﬀerences are also
reflected in the general role that a firm plays in society. In the United
Kingdom, company law sees firms primarily as independent entities with
no or little requirements vis-a`-vis society as a whole. The French and
German approaches are very diﬀerent. French company law incorporates
the concept of l’inte´reˆt social, which simply does not have a functional
equivalent in English company law (Clift, 2007; Vie´not, 1995). Simi-
larly, “[r]ather than a British ‘private association’ approach, German
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lawmakers constitutionalized shareholder representation through public
authority” (Jackson, 2001, p. 132), by requiring two-tier board arrange-
ments that draw upon all sides of the companies and reflect the variety of
the stakeholders in a firm. Corporate governance, aiming at protecting
the public interest, then spans not only company law, but also market
regulation, and financial regulation (Clift, 2013; Jackson, 2001).
This role that is attributed diﬀerently to firms across countries is
reflected in the data on state aid expenditure in the EU. The more a firm
is seen as a public good, the higher, it can be assumed, the propensity to
aid it using public money than if it seen as a private good. For instance,
the United Kingdom consistently spends less on state aid in percent of
GDP (0.259% in 2012) than France (0.737%) or Germany (0.449% in
2012, but with values around 0.77% in the mid-2000s and even higher
amounts in the 1990s)2.
This poses a problem to European state aid control, as it has to set a
common framework for competition in a single market for all Europeans.
Dirigiste-style industrial policy is challenged by a more LME-oriented
approach favored by the Commission (Clift, 2013). Yet, the crisis has led
to a surge in Keynesian or post-Keynesian thinking and might also be
reflected in the Commission’s lenience towards crisis-related measures.
Authors like Clift (2013) observe a development of “new forms of politi-
cal intervention in economic activity, notably in response to the financial
crisis, in order to protect their industrial patrimony. Sarkozy’s anachro-
nistic ‘neo-liberal economic patriotism’ economic strategy (Clift, 2008)
is but one example of a wider European phenomenon. It combines neo-
liberal and protectionist elements in pursuit of advancing the economic
interests of particular territoriality defined groups – at times French, at
time European” (p. 115).
5.3 Protectionism and rent-seeking coalitions
In economics, the word rent can have two meanings. It can be defined as
a return in excess of the resource owner’s opportunity cost. In this sense,
rent-seeking is tantamount to profit-seeking; rents emanate naturally in
the price system. Yet, the sense in which rent is used in this book is
2Source: European State Aid Scoreboard 2012
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one in which rents emanate artificially through government action. This
fact does not mean that they are exempt from competition. Rent seeking
is therefore a competitive process. The vast literature on rent seeking
has shown the ineﬃciencies involved. The activity of spending resources
in competing for artificially induced transfers is considered ineﬃcient
(Tollison, 1982). All parts of society can seek for rents. Several semi-
nal articles focus on firms seeking to obtain a monopoly granted by the
government (see e.g. Harberger (1954), Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974),
Posner (1975), Buchanan (1980), Tullock (1980)). The consumer though
needs not be entirely passive. Although the consumers are usually por-
trayed as unorganized and dispersed, some authors note the increase in
number and size of organized consumer groups. The more the regulator
focuses on votes and less on private benefits such as bribes, the more he
or she has to trade oﬀ between consumer prices and firm profits (see e.g.
Evans (1980), Peltzman (1976)).
The main diﬀerence between politics and the market is that the lat-
ter is a proprietary setting in which actors bear themselves the con-
sequences of their actions. The former, on the other hand, is non-
proprietary setting marked by a principal-agent problem. An agent –
the politician – performs a service to a principal – the voters. Both are
wealth-maximizers, and controlling the behavior of the agent is costly.
Furthermore, the principals, who are not a homogeneous group, face dif-
ferent incentives to control the behavior of their agents. Managers of
political entities (such as states, bureaucracies, or regulatory agencies)
do not benefit personally from cost savings they accrue in favor of their
organization. For instance, the head of a competition authority does not
earn more if he or she dissolves monopolies or uncovers cartels. They
therefore have diﬀerent incentives than the managers of a private firm
(Tollison, 1982). Furthermore, the principals in politics, that is, the elec-
torate, are more constrained relatively to the owners of a firms as they
are not able to liquidate their ownership rights: a person cannot sell his
or her citizenship to a foreigner in case he or she is not satisfied with the
government (ibid.). The only option is to vote by feet (Tiebout, 1956).
Institutional settings matter with regard to the possibility for a so-
ciety to make transfers between individuals or groups. If there is an
unanimity rule and voting is costless (and this also applies to gathering
the necessary information to cast an informed vote), then there cannot
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be any Pareto-inferior transfers Tollison (1982). Of course, unanimity
rules are virtually nonexistent in the political sphere. European inte-
gration has also constantly reduced the number of policy fields in which
unanimity is required in the European Council (the Treaty on the Euro-
pean Union, which results from the Lisbon Treaty, introduces to so-called
double majority from November 2014 on – such a qualified majority is
defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, representing at
least 65% of the EU population; see Article 16 TEU and Article 238
TFEU). Unanimity has been restricted gradually over the last decades
and remains only for policies deemed to be sensitive, specifically the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, taxation, the accession of new
member states, social security and social protection, and operational
police cooperation between the member states3. Notably, the WTO op-
erates on a unanimity rule and foresees votes only if consensus cannot be
reached (Ehlermann and Ehring, 2005). There is no power delegated to
a board of directors or secretariat. Most importantly, this also applies to
its sanctioning mechanism. Critics argue that although there is equality
in law between the member states, not all states have the same capabil-
ity to sustain a veto due to diﬀerences in power. Pareto-improvement
are therefore not always achieved (Steinberg, 2002).
The likelihood of transfers – and state aid, with the exceptional case
of a Pareto-improving kind of subsidy, constitutes such a redistribution –
is linked to the information costs with respect to seeking them. Winners
and losers could either both be easily identified or not. It could also be
that only one side is readily identifiable, but not the other one. It follows
that transfers can be expected especially in a situation in which the
winners are specific, but the losers are diﬀuse. Politicians, seeking to be
associated with clear benefits but elusive costs, will want to actively scout
for such projects (Tollison, 1982). Aiding specific firms and advertising
the number of jobs saved is the archetype of such an easily identifiable
transfer – the exact burden borne by society and the precise distribution
thereof remain intangible (Haucap and Schwalbe, 2011).
Rent-seeking requires organization, which is obviously more costly
the more diﬀuse the interest group is. State aid can align the incentives
of two well-organized types of institutions: the firm and labor unions.
3See EU glossary at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/
unanimity_en.htm
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The managers of a firm and its senior employees are hired, among other
tasks, to also engage in rent-seeking. They can use the firm’s infras-
tructure as a launch pod for their activities. An individual taxpayer
who is concerned about the potential waste of his or her payments is
in a natural disadvantage. In the same way, labor unions have strong
incentives and the means to lobby for their member base4. The firm as
a rent-seeker also has an advantage over other lobbying groups: it is not
a victim to free-riding by members of the organization. If a firm success-
fully acquired a state aid, it reaps the entire benefit of its rent-seeking
activities. Other institutions – labor unions and consumer organizations
are examples – face the problem that many regulations they successfully
lobby for will also apply to non-members. Free-riding ensues. This ad-
vantage persists at the level of specific state aid measure, but the result
is more ambiguous when lobbying for state aid policy in general. Firms
might be able to free-ride on the rent-seeking activities of other firms.
An assessment is more diﬃcult and would have to be done on a case-by-
case basis as it is not straight-forward which state aid policy firms favor
in general. From a firm’s perspective, a more relaxed policy towards
state aid might after all also mean that its competitor finds it easier to
acquire subsidies to the detriment of the firm.
One way to obtain rents is by encouraging protectionism against for-
eign competition. Interest-group models have been applied, for instance,
to the U.S. Tariﬀ Act of 1824 (Pincus, 1975), or the tariﬀ protection
granted to Canadian industries (Caves, 1976). Mayer (1984) shows for-
mally that “small, important producer groups can be quite successful in
securing import protection” (p. 971). Hillman (1982) models a situa-
tion in which the government pursues their own self-interested motives
in order to maximize political support and therefore support declining
industries (that is, industries facing a decrease in the world price of its
output). The reduction of protectionism over the last decades might be
an explanation for the recent reduction in academic interest in this topic.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) point out the frequency of the ques-
tion “why free trade is so often preached and so rarely practiced” and
notes that “most international economists blame ‘politics’ ” (p. 833).
4As a side note, there has been a debate on the legal standing of labor unions in
state aid cases. Although labor unions are de facto interested parties in state aid
decisions, they are only very rarely considered as such by the ECJ (Jonker-Hoﬀre´n,
2012).
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In their model, they endogenize trade policy and describe how influence
groups influence it. It also explains why lobbies may prefer trade policy
as a means to transfer income instead of more eﬃcient policy tools. Gen-
erally, it remains a puzzle in the study of trade policy why governments
resort to it instead of, say, direct income transfer, tax cuts, or subsidies
(Mueller, 2003; Rodrik, 1995).
State aid can be seen as a remnant of protectionism. With the in-
creasing integration of modern economies, many of the tools of protec-
tionism have become unavailable. The WTO agreements set boundaries
for the levying of tariﬀs. They also reduced the ability of states to im-
pose so-called non-tariﬀ barriers to trade (NTBs). At the same time, the
expansion of the European Union has lead to a more countries having to
abide to the anti-interventionist rules of the European internal market.
Bhagwati (1988) called it the “Law of Constant Protection”: industries
will always seek some kind of protection, and adjust according to the
availability of instruments. For instance, a reduction in tariﬀs can lead
to lobbying for NTBs.
5.3.1 Local coalitions
Urban policy has become a driving force behind industrial policy. Crouch
and Le Gale`s (2012) noted that in services-oriented economies of the
early 21st century, urban policy has replaced industrial policy of the 20th
century. Governments spend heavily on infrastructure projects and enter
competitions to attract major events, such as the Olympics. This is an
important paradigm shift, as it means that state aid (the term being used
here in a broader, more general sense than the sense of articles 107-109
TFEU) then fulfills the function of supporting “champion” regions that
are already well-developed instead of fostering the catching-up of regions
or industrial sectors that are lagging behind. This comes not without
conflict, since “[s]hifting resources to favour national champion cities
always generates massive opposition from political interests representing
the rest, i.e., the majority of the population and regions.” (Crouch and
Le Gale`s, 2012, p. 412).
A city, or, more generally, any locality can be interpreted as a “growth
machine” (Molotch, 1976). In these settings, a local elite is seen as prof-
iting from the increasing intensification of the local land use. These elites
then compete with other elites of diﬀerent localities for growth-inducing
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resources. This growth target is assisted by governmental authority, on
which these elites have an important influence. As Molotch puts it:
“I speculate that the political and economic essence of vir-
tually any given locality, in the present American context, is
growth. I further argue that the desire for growth provides
the key operative motivation toward consensus for members
of politically mobilized local elites, however split they might
be on other issues, and that a common interest in growth
is the overriding commonality among important people in a
given locale [...].” (Molotch, 1976, p. 310)
But already in 1976, as he points out, growth was not undisputed.
Indeed, coalitions built with the intention to reduce growth and its ad-
verse eﬀects. The core of these coalitions is “a leisured and sophisticated
middle class with a tradition of broad-based activism, free from an en-
trenched machine” (ibid, p. 327). For instance, he observed support
from professionals from research and electronics firms in Santa Barbara,
California, as well as from certain very wealthy people “who continue a
tradition [...] of aristocratic conservation” (ibid, p. 328).
Thus, local coalitions in sub-national entities can be a driving force
behind economic development, and thus fuel inter-jurisdictional compe-
tition. Nevertheless, such policies are subject to a political debate on
the shape and goals of economic policy.
5.3.2 The eﬀect of state aid
The result that government spending facilitates re-election can also be
found when focusing on a special kind of government spending, namely
state aid. In a study using Flemish data on a local state aid spending and
the performance of local politicians at the regional elections in Flanders
(Belgium), Buts et al. (2012) find that the total amount of subsidies as
well as subsidies per capita granted in the year 2008 positively correlate
with support for incumbent parties in the year 2009.
An important driver behind state aid decisions is the securing or
creation of jobs. Buts and Jegers (2013a) look at the eﬀect of subsidies
to Belgian firms on their levels of employment. This study has a severe
limitation though: it ignors the opportunity cost of state aid decisions.
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That firms which receive state aids are more likely to create jobs does not
come as a surprise. The relevant question though is the eﬀect on total
employment if there is no state aid (and, e.g. the taxes are lower due to
lower government spending and there is no distortion of competition).
State aids can be a powerful tool for politicians to secure re-election.
As Haucap and Schwalbe (2011) point out, the burden is divided among
the entirety of the taxpayers, leaving each individual taxpayer with a
fairly small, barely noticeable amount; yet, the granting of a large sum
to one company is quite noticeable. The taxpayers will therefore not take
any significant action against state aids, while those with economic ties
to potential beneficiaries of state aids will exert a high level of eﬀort in
order to acquire state assistance and to help favorably-minded politicians
get (re-)elected.
Aydin (2007), using data from the OECD for the period 1989 to
1995 (a data set unfortunately not available for more recent years), finds
that (a) unemployment is correlated with higher levels of subsidies; (b)
governments will tend to hand out more state aid in pre-election periods,
(c) openness of an economy leads to lower subsidies, and (d) governments
of EU countries exhibit lower levels of state aid than non-EU countries,
showing the eﬀectiveness of the state aid control mechanism.
The advantage of state aids is that they can easily target select vot-
ers. The success of firms seeking state aids is dependent on how easily
they can mobilize voters in their favor. This gives an advantage to estab-
lished firms and industries and disadvantages new firms and industries.
Established firms or industries in need of state aids are more likely to
be in decline and thus threaten the destruction of jobs. The danger of
this threat is that ineﬃcient sectors of the economy will receive funding
Gro¨teke (2007).
By supporting shrinking markets, governments produce an external-
ity onto other jurisdiction with similarly struggling firms. The role of
state aid control is two-fold. It is supposed to prevent the prisoner’s
dilemma situation. But the underlying reason for that is that – because
of the political processes involved – individual member states are not
able to credible commit to abstaining from state aids. The question now
is how far state aid control should go: should it only prevent external-
ities or should it, more generally, prevent any eﬃciency-reducing state
aids (even if the impact is only felt locally)?
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The problem even goes further. The European Union, and hence its
state aid control mechanism, is, too, run by politicians and maybe self-
interested bureaucrats. Simply demanding a state aid control mechanism
does therefore not automatically eliminate all problems of public choice,
rent-seeking, and agency, but only deflects the issue to a diﬀerent level of
government (Gro¨teke, 2007; Besley and Seabright, 2000). Since decision-
making rules at the EU-level are diﬀerent than at the national level, this
might make a diﬀerence nevertheless.
In a recent op-ed, Zingales makes the point that banks are politically
influential because of the feared catastrophic consequences to the econ-
omy that a bank crash might have. This idea can be expanded to other
industries as well. For the political decision, it is irrelevant whether the
policy makers having those fears are right or not.
“Suppose a large asteroid is hurtling toward Earth and has a
5 percent chance of hitting us, creating $10 trillion worth of
physical damage to the U.S. Should the president authorize
a $700 billion mission to destroy the asteroid and stave oﬀ
disaster? If you reason in purely statistical terms, the ex-
pected cost of failing to act (0.05 * $10,000 billion = $500
billion) is much less than the cost of acting.”5
The point though is that the consequences are not really known. If
the president in Zingales’ example decides – wrongly, if we assume risk-
neutrality – to take action, then nobody will know what would have
happened if he or she had not taken action. If he or she, on the other
hand, decides not to authorize the mission, the president is taking the
risk of knowingly letting a catastrophe happen (in this case, at a 5%
probability). From the point of view of the president, choosing to take
action is more appealing.
5.3.3 Transparency
There is a central problem facing anybody who tries to study the phe-
nomenon of state subsidies to firms empirically: the diﬃculty of acquir-
ing reliable and complete data. But this is not only a problem to the
researcher. It is also an issue for all those involved in making private or
5Bloomberg, 29.5.2012
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collective decisions on that matter. Thanks to the European state aid
control mechanism, the 27 EU member states need to notify every aid
granted to firms to the European Commission. Those notifications are
made available to the public on a yearly basis, giving aggregate numbers
of public subsidies by country, industry and type. Even though Euro-
pean jurisdictions are caught from time to time trying to hide state aid
and not notifying it, these data (with some limitations6) can be used for
analysis.
The various forms of subsidies vary in their transparency and de-
tectability. For instance, in its Second Survey on State Aids in the
European Community (European Commission, DG Competition, 1990)
and re-iterated subsequently, the European Commission ranks them as
follows (in decreasing transparency): grants and direct tax reductions
(since they do not require any information on the recipient of the aid,
such as its creditworthiness), soft loans and tax deferrals, guarantees,
and equity injections. From the published data it is possible to infer
trends: by comparing the developments in the use of various forms of
state aid, it will be clear whether there is general movement towards
more or towards less transparency.
The situation presents itself completely diﬀerently on the other side of
the Atlantic. The United States and Canada, both highly federal struc-
tures, follow an alternative approach. Not only is there no regulation of
state aid at the federal level, but there is also no systematic collection of
federal, state or province, county, and local subsidies to firms. In fact,
“control” and “information” are handled by other actors, namely NGOs.
Whereas NGOs opposing state aid are non-existent in Europe, the U.S.
(and to a lesser degree Canada) has a vivid scene of NGOs campaigning
against what they call “corporate welfare.” The political orientation of
those NGOs can be leftist (when opposing subsidies on grounds of eq-
uity considerations) or rightist (when doing so for eﬃciency reasons). It
is also an indicator of the fact that there might be a dis-alignment of
incentives between voters and politicians. The diﬀerent situations also
reflect the diﬀering approaches towards “checks and balances” present
in political systems.
6As the whole notification and authorization process involves some informal ne-
gotiations between the Commission and the member states granting the aid, some
figures, such as the percentage of approved aids, do not give much insight.
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Mueller (2000, p. 356f) notes that “citizens make less rational choices
when they vote” because “they have poorer incentives to gather informa-
tion about collective decisions than about their own private decisions”,
giving the example of the Danish citizen who “is much more likely to
be informed about the possible benefits and costs to her of the Danish
government’s subsidizing a Danish firm than about those of the Euro-
pean Union’s subsidizing a Spanish firm.” This is true for the EU. But
as the analysis of data availability suggests, in the U.S. and many other
countries, it is not just a matter of likelihood, but also even a matter of
impossibility.
In addition, the wording can be ambiguous. What constitutes a tax
and what a subsidy is not always as clear-cut as it might seem. For
instance, there was a debate within the Republican Party (of the U.S.)
whether abolishing the tax credit for ethanol constitutes a spending cut
or a tax increase. Conservative Senator Tom Coburn favored ending the
tax credit as it would constitute a spending cut, while Grover Norquist,
a prominent anti-tax activist accused Coburn for breaking his no-tax-
increase pledge (Burman and Slemrod, 2012).
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) take the information problem into
account in their model of “wasteful” public spending and state aid con-
trol. In their setup, politicians will fund projects that are wasteful in
order to signal to their voters that they are exerting an eﬀort by provid-
ing public goods. These latter will then rationally re-elect them. As a
result, some state aid control (at an unspecified level of government) is
necessary to avoid this waste of taxpayers’ money. The model has some
shortcomings though. It does not explain in any detail why voters will
take the politician’s eﬀort to acquire investment projects as a reliable
signal of the overall “quality” of the politician. The authors claim that
politicians’ accountability to the electorate is the source of the ineﬃ-
ciency here. It might be argued though that, to the contrary, increased
transparency might induce voters to rely less on state aid as a signal for
politicians’ eﬀorts.
Another aspect of the information problem is that there is an asym-
metry. Firms can keep their information, especially their cost structure,
their degree of mobility and - when hiring location consultants - even
their identity, secret. Governments on the other hand hardly have any
secrets. So the two parties negotiating subsidies each have a diﬀerent
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level of information about the other (Thomas, 2000).
Firms are in an easy position to conceal their cost structure through
(perfectly legitimate) accounting methods. For example, say, there is a
small town with a vibrant industry and a local airport. Because it is
a small town, it cannot sustain its own long-range airline connections,
although the local industry and other interest groups strongly wish for
being able to reach far-away destination. The solution is that an airline
provides a regular connection to its main hub, from where passengers
can journey onward on the carrier’s long-haul network. In order for the
airline to know whether serving the local airport is profitable, it somehow
has to apportion the airfare it receives from the passengers to the two
segments of the trip (the short-distance flight to the hub and the long-
distance flight from there). This is a complicated computation, requiring
very detailed information about the airline’s cost and revenue structure.
In its accounting, the airline has all incentives to apportion a higher share
to the long-distance segment and represent the regional connection to
the small town as loss-generating. As a result, the politicians in said
town, pressured by the interest groups, might then be more inclined to
support the airline. This can be done, for instance, through an auction,
in which the municipality awards a monopoly on a specific route to a
certain airline and pays a price for an obligation on the airline’s part
to serve this allegedly unprofitable route. In the European Union, the
legal instrument for this mechanism is called “public service obligation”
(PSO) and is governed by Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common
rules for the operation of air services in the Community. In the United
States, a government program called “Essential Air Service” hands out
an average of $74 per passenger (NYT, 6.10.2006), with some subsidies
reaching $801 per passenger (Lowell et al., 2011).
5.3.4 Constitutional settings and state aid
State aids are usually justified with the goal to alleviate the negative ef-
fects of market failures. When states cannot eliminate the source of the
market failure (e.g. through antitrust, patent laws, etc.), then subsidies
can be a “second-best” solution. What empirical research can attempt
to analyze is whether the desire to correct market failures is the main
driving force behind state aids or whether it is the country’s constitu-
tional and political arrangements that drive its propensity to provide aid
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to firms (as compared to countries with diﬀerent such arrangements) or
even to conduct more interventionist industrial policy. The research in
this field is so far rather preliminary.
Nevertheless, there is literature on how constitutional and political
institutions shape spending decisions of governments. Persson (2002)
and Persson and Tabellini (1999) discuss how electoral rules with larger
districts channel spending towards broad, non-targeted programs and
how the majority rule (as it exists in the UK and the U.S.) leads to
higher politician accountability than electoral systems with proportional
representation (e.g. in the Netherlands or Israel). It is also claimed that
larger districts lead to more competition among candidates or parties
and that rent-seeking will be less because voters can oust corrupt politi-
cians and easily replace them with candidates with similar political views
(Myerson, 1993).
Furthermore, what Persson (2002) and related literature call the
regime type matters. Herein, they distinguish between presidential sys-
tems (e.g. the U.S.) and parliamentary systems (e.g. the Netherlands).
It is then argued that the more checks and balances there are, the more
constraints on the abuse of powers by politicians there are. If power is
concentrated, then rents and taxes will be higher (Persson et al., 1997,
2000). State aid can also be interpreted as a provision of public goods
(e.g. Mueller, 2000). The model (and empirical test) in Persson et al.
(2000) finds that presidential-congressional regimes exhibit fewer rents
for the politicians. Yet, they tend to under-provide public goods.
Van Buiren and Brouwer (2010) try to find institutional determinants
for state aid in Europe and test for several hypotheses: They confirm
various hypotheses:
a. State aid occurs more intensively in countries with a higher share of
net exports in GDP. This is in line with the theory that countries
engage in subsidy-wars and try to capture profits to the detriment of
foreign firms.
b. It is less (and policy more aimed at broad programs) in countries
with a single national district than in countries with smaller districts
and that this eﬀect is reinforced by a plurality rule of election. The
theory behind this is that with smaller electoral districts, their rep-
resentatives have higher incentives to acquire public funds for their
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home districts and majority-winning coalitions are more easily made
(50% of voters in 50% of the districts).
c. State aid is higher in presidential regimes (where policy is more aimed
at targeted programs) and less in parliamentary regimes (where policy
is more aimed at broad programs). In presidential regimes, so the
theory, powerful minorities can more easily attract funds because of
the lack of confidence requirements of the government.
The following hypothesis, derived from the theory, have to be re-
jected though:
d. State aid is higher in countries with a lower level of public services
than in countries with a higher level of public services. The reasoning
behind this hypothesis was that net taxes (taxes minus subsidies)
might be high in countries with a high level of public goods and
services, reflecting the “price” of a location, and therefore, given a
certain level of taxes, subsidies would be lower there.
e. State aid is higher in less concentrated countries (“periphery” coun-
tries) than in concentrated countries (“core” countries). This relates
to the theories of clustering and concentration of firms, e.g. in Krug-
man (1991b).
Most importantly for any policy recommendation, they find that
those economic, political and constitutional variables play a stronger
role in the ten new EU member states, which are under state aid control
for only a couple of years. This means that state aid control neutralizes
the eﬀect of those variables.
Vobolevicius (2008) investigated state aid decisions in Germany, Spain,
and the United Kingdom. He finds that politically safe regions (that is,
regions were the political party or candidate in power does not face se-
rious competition) of Spain are more likely to receive state aid and that
they exhibit better unemployment results than the rest of the country.
In the UK, though, marginal districts (that is, districts that are politi-
cally contested) receive more state aid. The link to unemployment is less
clear in Britain. Germany seems to behave similarly to the UK with re-
gard to privileging industries in marginal districts. Regions of Germany
with many marginal districts tend to experience greater reductions in
the unemployment rate.
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Ideally, European state aid control allows measures that aim at al-
leviating a certain market failure and bans all others. Although there
are other factors that might explain state aid propensity (e.g. industry
structure), the variation along constitutional setups could be an indica-
tion that state aid control still gives some leeway for state aid that is
not in line with the general spirit of Article 107.
There is an emerging literature on the link between the level of regula-
tion in place in a country and lobbying. Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009)
investigate lobbying in the EU, which, so far, is less understood than
corporate lobbying in the United States. Using a sample of 2000 large
firms, they find that regulatory exposure positively aﬀects firms’ direct
lobbying activities in the EU. It is quite intuitive that a firm subject to
numerous regulations will have higher incentives to engage in lobbying
than a firm that is not7. Calo` (2014) takes the next step and analyzes
the link between regulatory exposure and state aid. She theorizes that
regulation aﬀects the probability of a firm bailout: “While protecting the
incumbents, high levels of regulation could lower the need for a direct
intervention of the government in rescue of the firm, as captured by the
net acquisition of financial assets. On the other hand, big and politically
connected firms would have the incentive and the capacity of lobbying
for State aid [...]” (p. 6). Her results indicate8 that stricter regulation
in the product markets leads to a higher likelihood of a bailout (defined
here as a takeover by the government due to the complete failure of the
firm), while it leads, at the same time, to less state aid in general (defined
as aid to the firm without change in ownership and management).
5.3.5 Rent-seeking in the grey area
Rent-seeking per se, although often negatively associated, is not neces-
sarily illegitimate or illegal. It is the natural result of the competition for
redistribution in pluralist democracies. In some instance, rent-seeking
transcends the boundaries of what is accepted by the constitutional and
7Future research could try to establish a link between direct lobbying in the EU
and state aid. The hypothesis would be that firms that are present in Brussels and
actively engage in rent-seeking will find it easier to have their state aid schemes
approved. This obviously has to be controlled for a number of factors, such as firm
size.
8Due to some issues with regard to robustness, the results are not definite.
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legal order of a society – it becomes outright corruption. Parts of the
economic development literature deal with rent-seeking and corruption.
The allocation of state monies to state-owned or private firms is of course
an important field for rent-seeking and in some cases maybe even fraud.
For example, Rose-Ackerman (1999) reports the case of fake firms re-
ceiving export subsidy monies. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide many
examples in which politicians make economically unsound subsidy and
locational decisions in order to get reelected. This has much to do with
the fact that creating jobs (especially in politically well-situated, but
economically not always optimal places) is an important factor for re-
election.
The United States and the European Union diﬀer in their institu-
tional setting for lobbying. The U.S. has a legal framework and culture
assuring a high degree of transparency in lobbying expenses at the federal
level. Lobbying expenses at the state level and the amounts of subsidies
awarded by municipal governments, counties, states, or the federal level
are essentially opaque though. In Europe, the situation is opposite: lob-
bying at the member state and EU levels is opaque, but the extent of
state aid is highly transparent (Martin and Valbonesi, 2006b).
The United States has substantial transparency in lobbying expenses
at the national level, while the extent of lobbying expenses at the state
level and the amounts of aid granted at both the state and the national
level are essentially opaque. In the EU, the extent of lobbying expenses
at the member state and the Union levels are opaque, while EU eﬀorts
have made the extent of member state aid substantially transparent.
The problem of corruption is also addressed by practitioners. For
instance, an IMF conference on FDI in South East Asia came to the
result that incentive packages are expensive and ineﬀective (Fletcher,
2002) and that, since incentives are believed to be unavoidable, they
should be streamlined and designed to limit the potential for corruption
and drain on the budget (Tsang, 2002).
Just like rent-seeking with regard to state aid have to be analyzed in
the context of federalism, so has corruption. The literature on corruption
has repeatedly addressed the link between the degree of centralization
and corruption. Fisman and Gatti (2002) note that the theoretical liter-
ature makes ambiguous predictions and this subject, but their empirical
findings suggest that fiscal decentralization in government expenditure is
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strongly and significantly associated with lower corruption (these results
are also valid when decentralization is instrumented for by the origin of a
country’s legal system). More recent literature question this result (Fan
et al., 2009): the more levels of government there are are, the more com-
plex the government structures are and therefore the higher the danger of
uncoordinated rent-seeking. Lessmann and Markwardt (2009) empha-
size that devolution ensues a beneficial interjurisdictional competition
only if there is a supervisory body such as a free press. They find that
decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees
of press freedom, whereas countries without eﬀective monitoring suﬀer
from decentralization. Grossmann (2013) has some important caveats.
Firstly, a free press is not necessarily an independent press. If a coun-
try’s press is closely linked to commercial and political groups, then it
is not an eﬃcient watchdog. Secondly, the smaller the territorial units
in a decentralized country, the easier it is for interest groups to exert
influence. Thus, decentralizing spending decisions are not necessarily an
adequate instrument in small countries. Thirdly, free press only works
if there is a minimum of transparency. If certain decisions are never
disclosed, then the free press cannot discuss them. By transposing these
insights to European state aid control, some conclusions can be drawn.
Firstly, the press in the European Member States is not everywhere in-
dependent from political pressure and the state still plays an active role
in the media politics of many countries (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Sec-
ondly, state aid decisions in Europe can be made by very small localities
prone to strong pressure from local interest groups. Thirdly, the lack of
comprehensive transparency rules regarding state aid in most countries
prevents the free press from exerting its control power.9
9This theory described above calls for an empirical test. If state aids act as rents
to be “grabbed,” then there should be a correlation between state aid spending and
the level of corruption in a country. Measuring corruption, by its nature, is a diﬃcult
task and highly subjective. The arguably most well-established such measurement
is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published yearly by Transparency Inter-
national (TI). There does not seem to be any evidence for a link between state aid
spending and corruption in Europe. Using state aid data provided by the European
Commission (EU State Aid Scoreboard) and the CPI for the year 2010, there is a
statistically significant (99% level) eﬀect: “cleaner” countries hand out more state
aids in absolute terms. This can easily be explained by the fact that less corrupt
countries are usually richer and therefore they have more money to spend on state
aids. Oddly, richer countries (in terms of GDP) also hand out more state aid in
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5.3.6 Who receives state aid?
5.3.6.1 Characteristics
There are not many studies trying to characterize the set of firms that are
more prone to receive state aid than others. Bergstro¨m (1998) developed
five hypotheses based on size, age, industry, and performance of firms.
Larger firms could be expected to be more likely to apply for state
aid as the cost of doing so is relatively smaller for them. They have more
lobbying resources and can take advantage of scale economies in the pro-
duction of pressure in the sense of Becker (1983). Political connections
build up over time. Therefore, it can be conjectured that older firms
are relatively more likely to be granted a subsidy10. Certain industries
might generally be treated more favorably by the state because of the
support they garner from other interest groups such as unions. This
might especially work for basic industries that are very labor-intensive,
such as shipbuilding, mining, forestry, and others. The firms’ regional
importance, and thus the support they receive in their respective region,
could hence matter as well. Finally, firms in distress have a larger incen-
tive to seek state aid. As Magee (1997) put it: “... the lowered rate of
return from economic activity makes political activity a more attractive
investment” (p. 537).
Using data on Swedish regional aid, he tests the five following hy-
potheses (result in brackets):
• Larger firms should be more likely to be granted supports. (not
rejected)
• Older firms should be more likely to become supported. (rejected)
• Firms that belong to regionally important industries should be
more likely to be granted supports than firms that do not belong
to regionally important industries. (not rejected)
percent of GDP. Therefore, since CPI and GDP are highly correlated, less corrupt
countries also hand out more state aid measured in percent of GDP. For the U.S.,
this kind of analysis is virtually impossible to conduct, given the limitations on data
disclosure and the lack of corruption measures for individual states.
10Although not a part of Bergstro¨m’s theorizing, the endowment eﬀect might play
a role. Citizens might be more tempted to support a firm that they have grown
accustomed to.
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• Firms that belong to declining industries should more likely to be
granted supports. (ambiguous)
• Firms with economic problems should be more likely to be granted
supports. (ambiguous, likely rejected)
5.3.6.2 Political connectedness, firm performance, and state
aid
As the public choice literature suggests, a firm’s political connections
might have an eﬀect on its propensity to receive state aid. In a study
of government bailouts of 450 politically connected, but publicly traded
firms from 35 countries during the period 1997 to 2002, Faccio et al.
(2006) show that these firms are more likely to be bailed out than simi-
lar firms that do not enjoy such connections. Interestingly, such bailouts
happen more often if the International Monetary Fund or the World
Bank provides financial support to the firm’s home government. This
increases the likely of bailouts both for connected and non-connected
firms. Among all bailed-out firms, those with political connections per-
form worse financially than those without during and after the bailout.
In a seminal paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) emphasize that politi-
cians will extract some of the rents generated by political connections to
firms. If the firm is private, that is, the managers control it and not the
politicians, then politicians can use subsidies to convince the managers
to pursue political objectives. If the firm is controlled by politicians,
then the managers use bribes to convince them not to pursue political
objectives. Firms benefit from such connections therefore only if the
marginal benefit of the connection dominates the marginal cost. Fis-
man (2001), conducting an event study in Indonesia, and Faccio (2006)
find a positive relation between political connectedness and firm value.
The latter, using a sample of 20,000 listed companies from 47 countries,
investigated the eﬀect of political connections on firm value. She finds
that such connections are less common in the presence of more stringent
regulation of political conflicts of interest11. They are more widespread
among large firms. An event study shows that if people connected to
11Connections are also more likely in countries with a higher degree of transparency
- which is probably due to the fact that in those countries they are more easily
uncovered.
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the firm (large shareholders, board members, etc.) announce that they
enter politics, there is a significant impact on stock value. Interestingly,
there seems to be no significant price eﬀect for appointments of politi-
cians to corporate boards and might be a reflection of the hypothesis
that politicians extract rents from companies they manage.
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) investigated the political role of out-
side directors on the boards of American firms. They argue that outside
directors with experience in politics and government provide advice and
insight into the functioning of government, or exert influence on the gov-
ernment directly. They test whether politically connected directors are
more important in manufacturing sector firms which are more dependent
on politics12. They find that politics is more important to large firms
and that the incidence of politically connected and lawyer-directors is
higher. Firms that sell more to the government, export more, and lobby
more (relative to other firms) are also more likely to have politically ex-
perienced directors on their boards. Where the firm is struggling against
the government (e.g. firms that pollute more), the board will see more
lawyers among their midst. Furthermore, the boards of electric utili-
ties during the 1990s, when competition became stronger, also saw their
numbers of politically experienced directors increase.
Tahoun (2014) examines how stock ownership by politicians con-
tributes to enforcing non-contractible quid pro quo relations with firms.
He shows that the ownership by members of the United States Congress
in firms contributing to their election campaigns is higher than in non-
contributors. “Firms with a stronger ownership-contribution associa-
tion receive more government contracts. The financial gains from these
contracts are economically large. When politicians divest stocks, firms
discontinue contributions to the politicians, lose future contracts, and
perform poorly. Politicians divest the stocks in contributors, but not in
noncontributors, in anticipation of retirement” (Tahoun, 2014, p.86).
Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) use data from before and after the intro-
duction of a new transparency law in 2007 in Germany. They also find
that firms connected to parliament members (mostly from the political
right) are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than uncon-
nected firms. They face fewer growth opportunities, but exhibit slightly
better accounting performance. In terms of stock market valuation, they
12Unfortunately, the data they use is only from 1987.
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outperformed unconnected firms before the introduction of the law, but
this gap decreased strongly after the 2007 reform.
The considerations discussed here call for a specific, empirical re-
search. Using data from the EU’s State Aid register, it would be possible
to calculate the share of firms with political connections in the total pop-
ulation of firms receiving state aid. If their share is higher than in the
general population of firms, then this would constitute a serious problem
with state aid in Europe.
Park (2012) theorized that vertical state aid has an inverted U-shaped
relationship with the level of centralization of economic interests, while
horizontal state aid increases monotonically with the level of centraliza-
tion of economic interests. When the relevant lobby groups are organized
centrally, they do not have incentives to aid specific firms, but rather
want to spread the rent equally across firms and industries. If they are
organized at a very decentralized level, they lack the strength to lobby
eﬀectively for subsidies and face more competition in the competition
for rents. But if workers and firms are organized at the industry level,
they have the incentives to actively lobby for specific aid and also the ca-
pability to coordinate their eﬀorts in such a way that they do not harm
each other. Using the EU state aid scoreboard dataset, he finds that
countries where labor and firm interests are organized at the industry
level are more prone to grant aid to specific firms or industries, while
countries in which industrial relations are either decentralized or highly
centralized are less prone to do so. Horizontal aid targeting a wider
range of economic sectors, he finds, increases with the centralization of
labor and business interests.
5.3.7 A simple model of state aid coalition-building
In the public choice literature, there is sizable amount of studies evaluat-
ing the link between general government spending and and the proximity
of elections. They often find that there is a positive link.
If it is assumed that the main objective of a politician is to get re-
elected, then she has several policy choices and objectives:
• She has to provide for public goods, as demanded by her voters.
These public goods are funded from tax revenues.
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• Using state aids, she can attract new firms. These new firms pro-
duce jobs and increase the overall wage level. At the same time,
these new firms are competing against existing firms in the area13.
• Some of the firms in her jurisdiction are in distress. They are
producing losses and threaten to disappear, leaving their workers
temporarily unemployed. These firms can be saved by handing out
subsidies.
• Of course, taxes (which fund the public goods and the subsidies)
are unpopular measures. Her objective is therefore also to keep
the taxes low.
If it is furthermore assumed that she cannot fund her policies through
debt and that the tax rate is proportional to the income, then these
conflicting objectives produce a number of problems.
• Increasing the supply of public goods increases the tax rate.
• Giving state aid requires tax revenues - a burden borne by the
whole community. In this setting, let us assume that aids to firms
in distress redistribute towards the employees of the firms. Aids
given to new firms, on the other hand, increase the total income
of the jurisdiction.
• People can move away. I assume that moving is very costly and
only happens after the election.
• People might be attracted to move to the jurisdiction. Reflecting
the principle that new immigrants do not immediately receive the
right to vote, these people are not taken into consideration in this
median-voter model.
• There is a fundamental diﬀerence between already existing firms
in distress and new firms. The goods of new firms are generally
more sought after than the goods of old firms.
13This is particularly true for retail companies. New retail companies take away
business from pre-existing retailers. Manufacturing companies do so less, assuming
that the jurisdiction is an open economy allowing imports and exports.
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To make the optimal decision, she has several instruments. She can
set the amount of public goods. Furthermore, she can select projects
eligible for state aid. These projects vary in scope and kind. The firms
can either be troubled firms already in the jurisdiction or they can be
firms willing to move to the jurisdiction. If there is no deficit-spending
and if creating a surplus is not a policy-goal, then the tax rate is not a
variable of choice: it follows from the set of projects and the amount of
public goods the politician selects. The voters, on the other hand, are a
continuum of individuals with diﬀerent preferences for public goods, tax
rates, wages, and the goods produced by the firms.
With more than one firm to potentially support and, in addition,
the possibility to provide public goods (that is, not through support
a specific firm), the optimization problem gets quickly very complex.
Whether the politician supports one or several firms will depend on the
preferences of the voters and which majorities prevail.
To understand how and under what conditions majorities in favor
of state aids to a specific firm are built, it can be useful to sketch a
simple public choice model: if the community uses the majority rule,
then a firm will receive subsidies if a coalition of the firm’s owners (in
case of publicly-held stock companies, this might be a large number), its
employees and those voters with “close economic connections” constitute
a majority of voters.
Unless there are constitutional rules preventing them from redis-
tributing excessively, they could award state aids even without economic
justifications. The crucial question therefore is the amount of economic
ties that a firm has in a given community and the number of people.
The setting is as follows. There are two countries (domestic and
foreign) producing goods x and y. y is produced in a worldwide com-
petitive market by some unspecified firms. Good x is produced by a
foreign firm14 called F selling it at pHx . This firm sells this good (which
it is also selling in other markets) at a price equal to its marginal cost.
But x is also produced by a domestic firm called D. This firm though
has a disadvantageous cost structure and produces losses. It is therefore
on the verge of closing down. The government is considering to grant
a state aid to the firm, which will allow it to produce at a lower price
14For this analysis it is not relevant whether there is only one foreign firm or if
there is competition abroad.
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than the foreign firm. Furthermore, the employees earn a wage wH if
they can keep their employment with the firm and a lower wage wL if
they get fired and have to find another job15. All other citizens eligible
to vote earn a wage wH .
Citizens maximize their utility Ui(x, y), which is subject to t+pxx+
pyy = w(t), where t is lump-sum tax levied to fund a transfer to D. If
t = τ , then w = wH for everybody in the jurisdiction and px = pLx , that
is, the new price of x is lower. If t = 0, that is, no state aid is given, then
w = wL for the α percent of citizens who work for D and w = wH for
the 1 − α percent who do not. The employees of the firm will approve
the state aid if the utility they reap from the lower price of good x and
keeping the high wage outweighs paying the tax τ . On the other hand,
citizens who are not employed by the firm will approve it if the benefits
from the lower price outweigh the tax burden. The eﬀects in place are
thus the income eﬀect (the income is lower because of the tax) and the
substitution eﬀect (the relative prices make shifting consumption from
good y to good x more favorable). It is now possible to express the exact
condition under which non-employees, that is, people whose interest in
the firm lies only in the fact that they consume the good it produces (at
varying degrees - even not at all in some cases), will favor granting the
state aid.
We assume that all individuals have a Cobb-Douglas utility function
of the form:
Ui(x, y) = xβiy1−βi (5.3.1)
Without loss of generality, βi shall be restricted such that 0 < βi < 1.
This means that individuals value goods x and y diﬀerently. The higher
their individual β, the more they would be willing to pay for the good of
the troubled firm. If the state aid is granted, then the budget constraint
for non-employees of the firm producing x will be t+ pLxx+ pyy = wH .
By equating the marginal rate of substitution with the relative prices, it
can easily be shown that:
15The rationale is that the lower wage incorporates the period of unemployment
and thus loss in life income.
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xt=τ = βi
wH − t
pLx
(5.3.2)
yt=τ = (1− βi)w
H − t
py
(5.3.3)
Conversely, it t = 0, then px = pHx , with
xt=0 = βi
wH
pLx
(5.3.4)
yt=0 = (1− βi)w
H
py
(5.3.5)
In a hypothetical referendum, voters who do not work for the firm
and are only connected to the firm through their consumption of good
x will chose the tax policy that maximizes their utility. Thus, they will
vote for the state aid if:
Ui(xt=τ , yt=τ ) > Ui(xt=0, yt=0) (5.3.6)
This condition is met if
τ < wH
(
1−
(
pLx
pHx
)βi)
(5.3.7)
Thus, if the tax is high, the price drop must be big too. The more
an individual values the good (high β), the more tax he or she is willing
to pay.
For the employees, the condition is met more easily. Their utility
function is the same as those of the non-employees, but their budget
constraint is aﬀected by the state aid decision. If there is state aid, then
their budget constraint is τ + pLx + pyy = wH , reflecting their higher
income if the firm is saved, while if the firm goes bankrupt and the
employees suﬀer from a period of unemployment, their budget constraint
will be τ + pLx + pyy = wL. As a result, employees will approve state
aids if:
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τ < wH
(
1− w
L
wH
(
pLx
pHx
)βi)
(5.3.8)
Note that the right-hand side in equation 5.3.8 is larger than the
right-hand side in equation 5.3.7, meaning that employees will be willing
to accept a higher tax rate since they have more to lose than the non-
employees. The total amount of tax levied nt must be suﬃcient for the
firm producing x to stay in the market.
Numerical example If a person (not employed by the firm) has an
income of $1000, and a state aid would reduce the price from $10 to $5,
then she would be willing to pay nothing if her β = 0, up to around $159
if β = 0.5, and up to around $292 if β = 1.
The three following graphs illustrate the model. Straight lines rep-
resent budget constraints. The two parallel lines represent the budget
constraint before and after the tax. The third line is the budget con-
straint after the state aid has altered the relative prices of goods x and
y. The blue curve (tangent to one of the two parallels) is the initial
indiﬀerence curve. Depending on whether the income eﬀect or the sub-
stitution eﬀect prevails, the indiﬀerence curve tangent to the new budget
constraint can represent an equal, lower, or higher utility level.
5.3.8 Implications and necessary extensions
The model lays the framework of a more complex situation in which
there is not only one firm in distress, but in which there are several
goods in diﬀerent sectors produced by firms in need of state aids. In
this case, politicians will have to chose or rank diﬀerent projects and
there will be competing coalitions. Eventually, they will want to select
them in such a way that they can gain reelection in the next elections
– for this, they will need to know what could be called the “marginal
contribution to reelection” of state aid projects.
The assumption in the model is that granting a state aid to a firm
will have an eﬀect on prices. This means that there is a world price
for the good, which can be undercut locally by the firm if it receives
subsidies. The model does not take into account that the state aid will
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Figure 5.1: Individual indiﬀerent about the state aid decision
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Figure 5.2: Individual approves the state aid decision
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Figure 5.3: Individual opposes the state aid decision
also aﬀect the prices outside of the jurisdiction (if the firm is suﬃciently
large), or that other firms might be able to price discriminate between
countries.
Most probably, the ownership structure of the firm receiving state
aids will play an important role. Ownership could be concentrated or
dispersed – or the firm could be state-owned. Also firms can be for-profit
firms or non-profit providers of services of general interest. Furthermore,
whether the firm is owned by locals or is a foreign firm might make a dif-
ference. Another question to be addressed is the role of the management
in this game (see also section 6).
The size of any given jurisdiction is an important category because it
determines the number of people who would be forced to pay taxes if the
majority decides to grant a state aid to a firm. At the same time, it also
determines how broad a “coalition of the willing” would have to be in
order to build such a majority. This leads to a preliminary result. The
bigger a jurisdiction, the more diﬃcult it is to build a majority coalition
of people with economic ties to the firm. Thus, given a certain firm size
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with given ownership structure and economic ties, it is more likely to re-
ceive state aids in smaller jurisdictions than in bigger ones. Federalism
theory has dealt with the problem of the optimal size of a country or
sub-entity. In Auster and Silver (1979), a U-shaped average total cost
curve as a relation between cost per person (i.e. the cost of “producing”
punishment and collective protection) and population is assumed. When
combining those two theories, the dynamic aspect of the question should
also be noted. Advances in transport and communication technologies
lowered administrative costs for jurisdictions (thus allowing bigger juris-
dictions) and made it easier for firms to operate on a larger scale (thus
making them more likely to receive state aids).
People, in this case: voters, can face diﬃculties correctly estimating
future outcomes. A new set of variables could therefore be introduced,
namely Ei(wLi ) which represents the expectations of individual i about
his or her future low income. If we call E(wL) the objective (true)
future low income, then Ei(wLi )−E(wL) is the bias in i’s perception. If
individuals systematically estimate wL too low, then this diﬀerence could
probably best be described as a mathematical expression of a status quo
bias16. If we allow for the existence of such a bias, then this might be
a further argument for a technocratic, economic approach to state aid
control. After all, a status quo bias will systematically produce too much
state aid – not according to any inter-jurisdictional eﬃciency measure,
but even when taking into account only the utility-maximizing criterion
at the jurisdictional level.
5.4 The role of capital and citizen mobility
Globalization has lead to the increased mobility of capital and labor.
Nevertheless, the worldwide integration process is not equally-paced ev-
erywhere. European integration led to legal institutions that allow for
full mobility of capital and labor, but non-legal barriers to mobility still
exist.
16The term “over-pessimism bias” could also be discussed, but this would require
a theory that distinguishes it from the “over-optimism bias” also existing in the
behavioral literature, that is, it is not clear when the over-pessimism bias is present
and when the over-optimism bias appears. The status quo bias, on the other hand,
is not in contradiction to any other bias prevalent in the literature.
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In the discussion of inter-jurisdictional competition, much attention
has been given to the role of mobility of citizens (“voting by feet”) and
to the taxation and attraction of mobile capital. This following section
attempts to organize in a systematic way the implications stemming
from variations in the degree of mobility on the side of the firms and the
citizens/voters.
Both mobilities play a role in the attractiveness to tax or subsidize
firms (Mueller, 2000). The analysis of constitutional and public choice of
state aid to firms thus should take into account these contingencies. The
main result is that depending on who is immobile and who is mobile (that
is, capital and/or people), the problems of choosing rules restraining
state aids and the solutions thereto will vary.
Subsidies have eﬀects on several aspects of the firm. They determine
the location of the firm and they decide whether a firm disappears into
bankruptcy or is founded in the first place. As for the firm location, the
eﬃcient outcome is the one in which a firm is in the exact location where
its capital is used most productively. In regards to firm exit and entry,
it is clear that ineﬃcient firms should leave the market.
A main feature of integrated markets is that there is mobility be-
tween jurisdictions. The original Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956) had
citizens “voting by their feet” and thereby sorting themselves accord-
ing to their tastes for public expenditure and according tax rates. This
model required a number of strong assumptions, of which the absence of
externalities was one of them; the existence of at least as many jurisdic-
tions as there are types of consumer-voters was another one. Oates and
Schwab (1991) expanded this model to the mobility of firms.
Others looked at the competition for capital between jurisdictions
with immobile citizens (Thomas, 2000). The following analysis tries
to demonstrate that the choice of state aid rules (from a normative
and a positive perspective) is contingent on the mobility of firms and
voters and will and should look diﬀerently depending on the economic,
institutional and legal environment. The analysis should also take into
account another problem of constitutional choice, namely that those
contingencies are not fully known at the time in which the rules are
designed.
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Full mobility of firms and voters Under full mobility, there is no
need for state aid since firms are immediately replaced. There is only a
limited willingness to pay for state aid as people could simply relocate
to other jurisdictions to find employment or goods they seek (exit in the
sense of Hirschman (1970)). As a consequence, regulation of state aids
at a supranational level is not necessary. On the contrary, there might
even be under-provision of public goods because of free-riding, that is,
individuals might wait for another jurisdiction to provide and pay for
the public good and then move there afterwards.
For other combinations of capital and labor mobility, the description
is not so straight-forward. The main benchmark of most of the state aid
literature and of European state aid legislation is probably the scenario
of full mobility of capital and immobile people.
Mobile firms, immobile voters In this setting, state aids are used
to attract firms and capital. Regulation might be needed to prevent
ineﬃcient subsidy wars. In the EU, the lack of mobility of workers is
often an issue for policy measures (see e.g. IDEA Consult (2010) on the
mobility of researchers and engineers in Europe).
Immobile firms, mobile voters If capital is immobile and people
move, then the situation can be interpreted as a competition among
people to live in the jurisdiction with the desired goods and tax bundle.
It could be related to Buchanan’s theory of clubs (Buchanan, 1965).
Immobility of firms and voters In the case that neither capital nor
people are mobile, there might be a higher will to grant state aids, while
people are more easily expropriated for state aid. The willingness of
firms to move can be discussed in terms of asset specificity (Williamson,
1985). As Zahariadis (2008) points out, the cost and therefore ability of
firm owners to move their assets to more profitable uses drives domestic
lobby groups to request subsidies – the less exit is an option, the higher
the relative payoﬀ of voice in the sense of Hirschman (1970).
Zahariadis (2001) tested the hypothesis ”that under threat of interna-
tional competition disbursement of state subsidies varies systematically
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with the degree of asset (factor) specificity employed in a national econ-
omy.” He shows empirically that asset specificity and subsidy protection
are related and that asset specificity helps determine the scope of subsi-
dies.17
This set of distinctions can co-exist at the same time. For instance,
some industries might show high degrees of mobility, while others do not
(be it for capital or for labor).
The taxation of capital is linked to its mobility as well as to its
consumption of local public goods (Mueller, 2000). If capital does not
require local public goods in its production process, then it is more
diﬃcult to tax it as it can more easily move to a diﬀerent jurisdiction
(shown e.g. by Gordon (1986)). If, on the other hand, firms use local
public goods in their production, then the local jurisdiction can charge
capital a marginal tax rate equal to the marginal benefits from said
public goods and services. This point has been made by Oates and
Schwab (1988, 1991). The assumption of perfectly mobile capital leads
to the result that there are no possibilities for exploitation: “capital will
not be able to exploit local communities, nor will local communities be
able to exploit capital” (Mueller, 2000, p. 342).
Subsidies to firms can be interpreted as the provision of public goods
(see e.g. Mueller, 2000). Citizens might find particular value in one spe-
cial firm, especially if it is unlikely that it will be replaced anytime soon.
Members of a particular community might own assets specific to the firm
(that is, they can only work with this one firm) or to the community.
Moving would then come at the cost of giving up ties to this community,
while at the same time maybe being forced to live in a jurisdiction that
does not oﬀer the same desired bundle of local public goods and tax
rates. In this case, state aids might be eﬃciency-enhancing.
LeRoy (2005)–being a prominent voice of anti-subsidy grassroots or-
ganizations in the United States18– insists on the nexus between tax and
17He does so by using a data set of thirteen OECD countries in the period 1990-93
and two measures of asset specificity (physical specificity and human capital). As a
proxy for physical specificity he uses R&D intensity. For human capital, he uses net
job creation (loss) in the manufacturing sector as a percent of total jobs in manufac-
turing. It seems that this setup leaves space for some improvement and extension.
The eﬀects of asset specificity on specific subsidies and on horizontal measures could
be tested on a broader sample. More generally, the concept of transaction costs could
be introduced to existing state aid models.
18While LeRoy’s book does admittedly clearly not meet scientific requirements
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subsidy competition among states and local communities on one side and
the ability of said jurisdictions to provide public goods that are adequate
for economic development. Local governments compete for investments
by giving away subsidies or granting tax breaks. These local govern-
ments levy property taxes from which they directly finance the local
infrastructure and, most importantly, schools. Thus a community that
fights fiercely in the “bidding wars” has less money at hand to invest in
the “business basics”, such as a qualified workforce, functioning infras-
tructure, and the like. The quality of attracted firms and jobs created
by them will therefore also be lower.
In a setting where capital is mobile, it will relocate to regions that
provide the best environment and highest incentives. This is bad news
for poorer, more peripheral regions. Because of their low tax base, they
have a relatively harder time to attract firms than the richer, central
regions. They might have the advantage of lower wages, but at the same
time they usually also have a less-skilled labor force. The “curse” of de-
veloping countries is therefore that, because of those bidding wars, they
are only able to attract low-tech manufacturing firms. This is a counter-
intuitive result: developing countries should have a higher interest in
banning public subsidies to firms than developed countries. Actually,
van Buiren and Brouwer (2010) find empirical evidence that state aid
is not higher in less concentrated countries (“periphery”-countries) than
in concentrated countries (“core”-countries).
The quantitative dimension should be kept in mind. In practice,
people do not vote that easily with their feet. They do not simply
relocate just because of a state aid decision that went against there
interest. Nevertheless, there could be long-run eﬀects, and they could
diﬀer from industry to industry.
Zahariadis (2008) postulates three hypotheses. First, as discussed
above, higher asset specificity leads to more subsidies. Secondly, higher
asset specificity leads to more sectoral aid and, thirdly, to fewer horizon-
tal aid. The argument is that firms with specific assets will want aid that
is tailor-made to their needs. If they lobby for horizontal aid, they are
more likely to face conflicting demands from a higher number of actors.
Aydin (2008) uses EU state aid data from the period 1992 to 2006
and confirms the following hypothesis:
(and especially the tone), the issues it addresses are nevertheless very relevant.
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1. The higher the ratio of mobile to immobile capital in a country, the
larger is the spending on subsidies. The measurements of capital
mobility are based on assumed mobility of specific sectors, not
observed mobility, though.
2. The higher the average subsidy levels of neighboring countries, the
larger is a country’s spending on subsidies. This measures how
subsidies possibly entail subsidy races between neighboring states.
3. The smaller district magnitude in a country, the higher will be the
level of subsidies.
4. The lower the unity of parties in a country, the higher is the level
of subsidies
Subsidies and state aids only account for a small amount of the over-
all location decision [source]. It is also not always known how quickly a
firm which has gone into bankruptcy or left the market will be replaced.
For instance, on February 3rd, 2012, state-owned (re-nationalized in
2010) Hungarian legacy airline Malev ceased its operations, shortly af-
ter the EU (on January 9, 2012) decided that it had to repay State aid
monies worth its entire 2010 revenue. On the very same day, Ryanair
announced that it would open a new base with four airplanes in Bu-
dapest within two weeks to serve 31 destinations. According to its press
release, Ryanair will support 2,000 jobs at Budapest airport (Malev em-
ployed 2,600 people before its grounding). At the same time, Wizzair,
Lufthansa, Air Berlin, and Smartwings unveiled plans to increase their
presence in Budapest19. This is an example of high capital mobility. In
this case, claims of the Hungarian government that state aids are neces-
sary to maintain the connectedness of the Hungarian economy were not
justified as other firms immediately jumped in to replace the failed firm.
As a result, state aid control should be fine-tuned to the mobility
patterns in place. An aid to a firm which can be easily replaced should
be treated diﬀerently than an aid to a firm with very location-specific
investments, which happens to be in a temporary financial turmoil.
19http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/us-malev-stoppage-idUSTRE8121JS20120203
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5.5 The firm location race: inter-jurisdic-
tional competition with uncertainty
In the early 2000s, Seattle-based aircraft manufacturer Boeing sought a
new location for its firm headquarters. In a rare instance of transparence
in those kinds of decisions, they hired Deloitte to organize an auction –
cities and counties could bid to become the new firm location. Crucial
components of these bids were so-called incentive packages in order to
increase the attractiveness of the locations. Among others, Dallas/Fort
Worth, Denver and Chicago submitted viable bids and eventually the
latter prevailed. The combined oﬀer of Chicago and the state of Illinois
consisted in subsidies to the amount of $41 million from Illinois and $20
million from Chicago. Additionally, a $2 million grant was added, as
well as the promise to build a public heliport conveniently close to the
new headquarters building. A similar competition was staged shortly
after for the location of the manufacturing site for the new Boeing 787
Dreamliner plane – a competition in which Washington state succeeded
in maintaining Boeing within its jurisdiction (Boeing is traditionally
closely tied to the Everett and Seattle, WA, area).
In other instances, jurisdictions went even further in order to be at-
tractive for the investment. Recently, the trend to build Las Vegas-style
casino macrocomplexes (as they already exist in Macao and Singapore)
almost arrived in Europe. In 2012, Las Vegas Sands Corporation, which,
inter alia, operates the famous Venetian Resort Hotel Casino as well
as the Sands Expo and Convention Center in Las Vegas, proposed the
construction of a so-called EuroVegas. According to news reports, it
was supposed to host twelve hotels, six casinos, a convention center,
three golf courses, an indoor stadium, theaters, shopping malls, bars,
and restaurants. Although it is not known with how many governments
the investors negotiated, the competition soon narrowed down to one
between Madrid and Barcelona. The complex was expected to create
260,000 mostly unskilled jobs. In times of high unemployment, this was
a tempting oﬀer to the Spanish government. But the company required
more. They demanded substantial tax exemption (virtually turning the
village into a tax haven for ten years) and infrastructure investment by
the government to support the project. Furthermore, they considered
the EU-wide ban on smoking an obstacle to the atmosphere in the casi-
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nos and thus pushed for a waiver. It was also reported that “the group
wanted changes to Spain’s labour laws, lower social security payments,
relaxed smoking laws and the creation of university degrees in casino
management” (Reuters, 28.3.2012). Eventually, the conservative Span-
ish government – faced by opposition from an alliance of labor unions,
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Madrid, and socialist politicians –
had to pull the brake. The main trigger seems to have been that the
investors demand that the government oﬀer a guarantee not to change
the favorable legislation in the future or to pay compensation. Deputy
Prime Minister Soraya Sa´enz de Santamar´ıa declared: “It is impossible
to create a legal shield against regulatory changes because the courts are
sovereign, majorities can change and the idea of indemnifying against fu-
ture regulatory changes does not exist in our legal system” (Financial
Times, 13.12.2013). Although the project eventually failed, it shows
how far governments are willing to go in order to attract firms and in-
vestments. It also illustrates that the competition takes place through
various locational factors, such as subsidies, tax breaks, but also labor
or public law.
This process of competing for firm locations is a very costly one. It
unavoidably entails redistribution within the jurisdiction that prevails
in the competition, but sometimes also in the jurisdictions that lost the
race. Furthermore, any regulator supervising such competitions would
need to watch very closely the activities of local governments since many
state measures can be more or less covert contributions to a subsidy race.
A view that emphasizes the distributive aspects of inter-jurisdictional
competition therefore needs to understand how harm might be caused
in “bidding wars” and also consider the cost of close monitoring. What
this section will show is that the competition for firms leads to ineﬃcient
allocation of resources, and that the argument in favor of deterrence (e.g.
through fines) of certain practices can be made. It also keeps in mind
certain political considerations, such as the unpopularity of sanction
mechanisms that subject the state. This contrasts to related policy
fields such as competition law, where high fines serving the purpose of
deterring future violations are commonplace. Again, the peculiarity of
state aid law, namely that states have to agree on regulation that aﬀects
their own behavior, comes into play.
The existing literature so far has treated this competition merely as
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an auction. A novel way pursued in this model is to interpret this com-
petition not only as a competition, but even as a race. In this view, time
matters. Jurisdictions spend money not only in order to attract firms,
but also to do so before any other jurisdiction attracts the firm. They
make investments that have some distributional eﬀects. The fact that
“subsidy wars” are also races has implications from a welfare point of
view. Individual local governments spend resources to accelerate firm re-
locations to their jurisdiction. The costs are twofold: first, there are the
actual incentives paid out to the firm, secondly, they have costs that ac-
crue even if they lose in the competition. Not simply being a restatement
of the “winner’s curse,” it is the latter of the two which produces most
of the concern in this model. A jurisdiction might for instance invest in
big infrastructure works (such as expanding their highways or airports)
– infrastructure works that only make sense if any firms actually decide
to relocate to this jurisdiction. Similarly, jurisdictions might have to pay
out subsidies to other firms or reduce their tax base below the desired
tax rate solely to build up a reputation as an attractive location, even
though those other firms either never threatened to leave or would have
come anyway.
While the traditional view of state aid emphasized the competition
among firms, Nicolini et al. (2013) argues that, instead, interjurisdictio-
nal competition has gotten the upper hand nowadays. “While state aid is
considered a competition policy problem in the EU, where each national
government typically supports its national champion, the U.S. example
stresses that industry subsidies are actually regional policy issues, where
states compete for investment, but where all firms are equally likely to be
welcomed by States. As traditional firms are no longer confined within
the original national borders, a convergence of EU policies towards this
approach may emerge as an option” (Nicolini et al., 2013, p. 86). This
is reflected in the fact that these so-called national champions have been
replaced by multinationals (or have become that themselves). These
firms (e.g. car manufacturers like Renault, Rover, or Alfa Romeo) have
been privatized and internationalized their production chains. Of course,
defending production plants within national boundaries – and the jobs
they create – is still deemed of high importance (Nicolini et al., 2013).
In chapter 3, the point was made that inter-jursidictional competition
might not necessarily be detrimental to total welfare. This section makes
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the point that the competitive process is in itself costly and might lead
to over-investment. In this view, state aid is more than simply a transfer
of resources from the state to a specific firm.
Jurisdictions do not know beforehand when firm-relocation oppor-
tunities might arise, but they can invest in order to have them appear
earlier. Yet, the more they invest, the higher the damage (in terms of
wasted resources) for the people living in these jurisdictions. This set-
ting is actually very similar to “patent races,” in which firms invest in
research and development, but only the firm which reached an innova-
tion first reaps its benefits. More precisely, this setting is analogous to
one in which the patent race induces firms to release unsafe or insuf-
ficiently tested products – an outcome calling for punitive damages or
prior product approval by a regulating authority (Baumann and Heine,
2013).
If we now assume a misalignment in the incentives of voters and of
politicians, something similar could happen. Politicians making invest-
ment decisions might not fully take into account all potential damages.
One reason for this is that they might apply the median voter concept
and do not care about damages accrued to the minority which does not
vote for them. Again, these damages would be included in an aggregate
welfare function maximized by a hypothetical social planner. The poten-
tial damages are the damages stemming from giving state aid to a firm.
For instance, a majority with strong preferences for a good produced
by a firm receiving state aids could redistribute income from a minority
with weak preferences for said good by levying a tax and using these
funds to lower the price of the good (this was the premise of the descrip-
tive model earlier in this chapter). This “expropriation” is exactly the
damage caused by state aids which is not fully taken into consideration
by the politician’s objective function. In line with the literature on state
aid, these damages can be much more: they could be distortions of com-
petition, that a firm ends up in a dominant position and abuses it, the
creation of an oligopoly, the eﬀects on the eﬃciency of the firm (e.g. its
reduced innovative activity), etc.
Most of the standard literature on state aids reaches the conclusion
that bidding wars are always detrimental because of the distortions of
competition they ensue. This is not the spin taken by this model. Here,
state aids are a priori positively valued, even though they of course
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produce costs. The idea is that they might help reach a better match
between firms and locations, or that they favor the creation of new firms
with better products. For instance, Mueller (2000) interprets subsidies
to firms as a provision of public goods.
Applying an approach to the race for firms that emphasizes the po-
tential damages is both fruitful and sometimes problematic. The fact
that politicians of local governments are in a race against other juris-
dictions induces them to rush measures increasing the attractiveness of
their locality. Thereby they cause harm among some of their electorate
which would not occur if the competition was merely comparable to an
auction. This situation is reflected in the model which uses a hazard rate
to encompass the time dimension and a damage factor. But the problem
resides in the options available to remedy the excessively low “level of
care” of politicians: there is no liability imposed on firms or individuals
causing harm in this context. Politicians can hardly be forced to pay
compensations to their electorate. The only possible remedy is ex-ante
notification of investments and state aids to a supranational authority
– in the end, a system comparable to the current EU state aid control
mechanism, but to a diﬀerent extent. This indeed has an analogue in
the aforementioned literature, namely the requirement of oﬃcial product
approval. The practical problem in terms of resulting policy implications
is the diﬃculty of drawing clear boundaries to the activities of the state
in the economy.
This section follows less the existing state aid literature, but rather
draws its inspiration from the literature on the timing of innovations
under rivalry. In a seminal paper, Kamien and Schwartz (1972) study
a firm’s choice of development period and introduction time for a single
innovation. Their main assumptions are that the firm’s costs increase
with compression of the development period, that firms have fewer profit
opportunities if they prolong their development period, and that the
probability with which its rivals innovate and introduce new products
(described as a hazard rate) aﬀects the potential rewards available to
the firm. This model has been generalized and refined in Kamien and
Schwartz (1980). Dari-Mattiacci and Franzoni (2014) connect tort liabil-
ity with innovation and discuss the optimal liability rule and standard
of care for diﬀerent kinds of innovations. Baumann and Heine (2013)
addressed the question of increased damages to customers due to the
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rushed release and marketing of new products. They designed a model
combining a “patent race” with torts and analyzed the implications for
the design of optimal tort law regimes. A crucial point in their model is
that firms do not take the whole amount of the expected damages into
account when deciding their speed of innovation – yet, a social planner
would. The model presented in this section draws a very close anal-
ogy between the setting in Baumann and Heine (2013) and the race for
firms through inter-jurisdictional competition using incentive packages
(or state aid, as it is usually referred to in European law).
For the purpose of this section, it is paramount to distinguish rescue
aids, that is, subsidies to firms in distress, from firm location incentives,
which have the purpose of inducing firms to relocate to the state-aid-
granting jurisdiction. Since around 2007, state aids to firms in Europe
and North America have largely been dominated by bailouts for banks
and large corporations deemed “too big to fail.” This of course is a
consequence of the current financial crisis and is – hopefully – only a
temporary phenomenon (indeed, aid to non-financial industries in the
EU declined again in 2010). This section focuses on eﬀorts made by
jurisdictions to attract new firms and does not address specific crisis-
related aids, even though conceptually, the diﬀerence from rescue aids is
not too large. After all, a firm going bankrupt is more or less tantamount
to a firm not choosing to locate in any jurisdiction.
This section follows the following structure: subsection 1 introduces
the model of the race for firms, subsection 2 discusses the equilibrium,
subsection 3 introduces state aid control, and subsection 4 deduces the
policy implications from the model and concludes.
5.5.1 The model
There are n jurisdictions competing for the relocation or creation of a
firm. For the moment, it is assumed that the “market for firms” consists
only of one firm. The citizens’ valuation of having the firm relocate to
their jurisdiction is v and exceeds the potential harm d caused by the
state aid decision. In order to attract firms, jurisdictions have to make
investments to increase their attractiveness. Therefore, the politicians of
every jurisdiction i (i = 1, ..., n) set the amount of investment, modeled
as a hazard rate called hi at which it succeeds with its bid. The costs of
this investment are described by a strictly convex cost function c(hi > 0
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(thus, c′(hi) > 0 and c′′(hi) > 0). The term 1hi represents the expected
time until the jurisdiction is successful.
In order to actually have a time-cost trade-oﬀ, it must be assumed
that the average expected costs of winning a firm relocation, c(hi)hi , in-
crease in the hazard rate.
The citizens of the jurisdiction value it if a firm relocates to their
jurisdiction and build rational expectations h¯ about the hazard rate
chosen by the government. At the same time, they also have to bear
the cost of making the necessary investments and concessions. The rent
that the median voter m reaps from the firm’s relocation is described
by:
Rm = v − (1− γ)x(h¯)d (5.5.1)
The parameter γ measures the share of the damage due to the specific
state aid measure borne by the median voter. Thus, γd is the expected
harm attributable to said policy. The fate of the politician is closely
linked to the payoﬀs the average citizen receives. Thus, the rent Rm
also translates into the rent πI of the politician. Finally, the continuous
interest rate used to discount future payments is r and all players are
considered risk-neutral.
5.5.2 Equilibrium analysis
5.5.2.1 Levels chosen by politicians
Politicians now make decisions on investments and subsidies. Thanks
to the description of the model, it is now possible to determine their
political rents.
The political gain of the politician in jurisdiction i if he or she is
successful in attracting a new firm is given by the rent of their voters,
minus the “damages” caused by the policy.
πI(hi) = Rm − γx(hi)d = v − (1− γ)x(h¯)d− γx(hi)d (5.5.2)
If he or she is not successful, she suﬀers the costs c(hi).
Thus, the ex-ante expected present value of politician i’s objective
function can accordingly be written as:
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Eπi =
∫ ∞
0
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]
dt
(5.5.3)
If no jurisdiction was successful in acquiring a firm by time t, then
jurisdiction i incurs a a cost c(hi). If no other jurisdiction was successful,
then the density function for jurisdiction i acquiring a firm at time t is
hie−hit. But if the jurisdiction was too slow, meaning that the firm
already moved somewhere else, then its income is zero.
The last equation can be simplified and rewritten:
Eπi =
hiπI(hi)− c(hi)
r +
∑n
j=1 hj
(5.5.4)
Given this expected present value of the objective function (the
expected “profits” per period during the competition adjusted by the
discount rate), each politician/government now maximizes this ex-ante
function by choosing its hazard rate hi, yielding the following first-order
condition:
∂Eπi
∂hi
=
1(
r +
∑n
j=1 hj
)2
∗
[ [
πI(hi) + hi
∂πI(hi)
∂hi
− c′(hi)
]⎛⎝r + n∑
j=1
hj
⎞⎠
− hiπI(hi) + c(hi)
]
= 0
(5.5.5)
This first-order condition can be transformed into:
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A :=πI(hi)
⎛⎝r +∑
j ̸=i
hj
⎞⎠− hiγx′(hi)d(r + n∑
j=1
hj)
− c(hi)
⎡⎣c′(hi)
c(hi)
⎛⎝r + n∑
j=1
hj
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦ = 0
(5.5.6)
The first term in this first-order condition is the gain from being the
first to acquire the firm. It equals the increase in costs due to the higher
expected harm plus the higher costs of winning the competition.
Deriving by hi, that is, calculating the second-order condition, shows
that there is indeed a maximum of ex-ante expected profits:
∂A
∂hi
= (−2γx′(hi)d− hiγx′′(hi)d− c′′(hi))
⎛⎝r + n∑
j=1
hj
⎞⎠ < 0 (5.5.7)
From looking at the reaction curve hi(hk), it is possible to conclude
that the hazard rates are strategic complements, that is, the eﬀort ex-
erted by jurisdictions increases with the eﬀort of the other jurisdictions.
∂hi
∂hk
= −
∂A
∂hk
∂A
∂hi
=
hiπI(hi)− c(hi)
−
(
r +
∑n
j=1 hj
)
∂A
∂hi
> 0 (5.5.8)
where k ̸= i, the first-order condition 5.5.6 has been applied and the
expected profits are assumed to be positive.
Using these conditions, the equilibrium can be determined. Assuming
that all jurisdictions are symmetric and rational expectations formed by
citizens (h = h¯ = hi), the equilibrium condition is:
AE :=(v − x(h)d)(r + (n− 1)h)− hγx′(h)d(r + nh)
− c(h)
[
c′(h)
c(h)
(r + nh)− 1
]
= 0
(5.5.9)
In order for this equilibrium to be stable, it has to be assumed that
∂AE
∂h < 0. From equation 5.5.9 it can be seen that the equilibrium hazard
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rate h increases with the number of jurisdictions n taking part in the
firm relocation race. Furthermore, it decreases with the factor γ, that
is, the amount of harm attributed to the government policy. Thus, if the
competition is fierce, politicians will spend more money on winning it.
The more accountable they are vis-a`-vis their voters, the fewer incentives
they have to invest in the race.
5.5.2.2 The levels chosen by a “social planner”
The next step now is to compare this outcome with the level of in-
vestment and eﬀort a hypothetical social planner, that is, a supra-
jurisdictional authority, maximizing a utilitarian welfare function would
choose. This computation will yield the socially optimal outcome.
The social planner maximizes not only the politician’s welfare func-
tion, but also takes into account the utility of the voters. Because the
“market for voters” has been simplified by the assumptions made earlier,
the “voter surplus” is equal to zero in the equilibrium. It is therefore
suﬃcient to solely look at the politicians’ expected present value of their
objective function.
The expected social welfare is then given by:
ESW =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[
e−
Pn
j=1 hjt
(
n∑
k=1
[hk(v − x(hk)d)− c(hk)]
)]
dt
=
∑n
k=1 [hk(v − x(hk)d)− c(hk)]
r +
∑n
j=1 hj
(5.5.10)
Again assuming the symmetries in the equilibrium, the expected so-
cial welfare can be restated as:
ESW =
nh(v − x(h)d)− nc(h)
r + nh
(5.5.11)
The first-order condition is:
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∂ESW
∂h
=
1
(r + nh∗)2
[n(v − x(h∗)d)r − nh∗x′(h∗)d(r + nh∗)
−nc(h∗)
[
c′(h∗)
c(h∗)
(r + nh∗)− n
]]
= 0
(5.5.12)
Analogously, an equilibrium condition can be defined:
B :=(v − x(h∗)d)r − h∗x′(h∗)d(r + nh∗)
− c(h∗)
[
c′(h∗)
c(h∗)
(r + nh∗)− n
]
= 0
(5.5.13)
The diﬀerence to the outcome in equation 5.5.9 is that the social
planner values the profits from firm relocation (v − x(h)d) to a lesser
extent, because he or she knows that firm relocation to one jurisdiction
implies that no other jurisdiction is able to reap the rents thereof. Unlike
the politicians, he or she considers saving the total cost of nc(h) after
the firm location, whereas a single jurisdiction only takes into account
its own cost savings.
Also, the harm done by state aids is taken into account only at a
fraction γ by individual governments, whereas the social planner does so
entirely. Because the race creates externalities upon other jurisdictions,
the optimal hazard rate h∗ decreases with the number n of jurisdictions
competing in the race.
The relevant question now is how this socially optimal level can be
achieved in practice and which constitutional framework this requires.
A first idea would be to adjust γ, and thereby γd. The wording
used to describe this parameter in this model is “harm” or “damage”
caused by the subsidy decision. Intuitively, this would call for some
kind of liability system which compensates voters for the damages they
suﬀered.
Formally, it is possible to derive the optimal damages factor by equat-
ing equations 5.5.9 and 5.5.13, while stipulating that h = h∗:
γ∗ − 1 = n− 1
h∗x′(h∗)d
h∗(v − x(h∗)d)− c(h∗)
r + nh∗
(5.5.14)
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If we stay in this thought experiment, then the optimal damages
factor would depend on (i) the number of jurisdictions in the race, (ii)
the relationship between the expected harm rate and the hazard rate,
and (iii) the value of the jurisdiction’s objective function in equilibrium
in relation to expected harm.
The problem is that with inter-jurisdictional competition (that is,
n > 1) the optimal damages factor exceeds one and increases in expected
payoﬀs. If there were a compensation scheme in place, then this would
stipulate punitive damages.
The intuition of this outcome is that if the damage factor were one,
the jurisdiction would internalize all the eﬀects of its decision regarding
the hazard rate, a result in line with the standard models of liability
in market settings, such as Shavell (2004). But because of competition,
the individual jurisdiction’s incentives deviate from the socially optimal
level. They do not take into account the loss of the other jurisdictions
when accelerating their investment eﬀorts. Only a damage factor higher
than one would slow down the jurisdiction’s eﬀorts.
Finally, it can be shown that the damages factor is monotonously
increasing with the number of jurisdictions:
dγ∗
dn
=
h∗(v − x(h∗)d)− c(h∗)
(r + nh∗)2
r + h∗
h∗x′(h∗)d
− h
∗(v − x(h∗)d)− c(h∗)
r + nh∗
∗ (n− 1)[x
′(h∗)d+ h∗x′′(h∗)d]
(h∗x′(h∗)d)2
∂h∗
∂n
> 0
(5.5.15)
The due eﬀects increasing the optimal damages factor are the one
stemming from the externalities due to competition which increase with
the number of jurisdictions, and the one stemming from the decrease
of the first-best hazard rate with the number of jurisdictions while the
private incentives for early firm location increase with the number of
jurisdictions.
Fiercer competition leads to jurisdictions making investments too
early, which then has to be counteracted by higher punitive damages.
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5.5.3 With state aid / subsidy control
A supra-jurisdictional entity could now regulate the competition. It can
do so by approving the incentive package. A key element of this model is
uncertainty. Therefore, I assume that the regulating authority operates
under the same conditions. The probability that jurisdiction i’s eﬀorts
find approval is a function of the hazard rate and denoted by q(hi),
with q′(hi) < 0 < q′′(hi). So, because of the better information on the
side of the jurisdiction, the regulator might approve even for too high
hazard rates or deny for too low rates. Accordingly, it is assumed that
the probability of the incentive being approved is increasing with the
expected time until a firm relocates to the jurisdiction ( 1hi ).
The expected payoﬀ of the jurisdiction can therefore be re-written
as:
Eπi =
∫ ∞
0
e(−r+
Pn
j=1 q(hj)hj)t
[
q(hi)hiπI(hi)− c(hi)
]
dt
=
q(hi)hiπI(hi)− c(hi)
r +
∑n
j=1 hj
(5.5.16)
The payoﬀs after approval of the measure remain the same.
Again, the condition determining the chosen hazard rate in the mar-
ket equilibrium follows:
AE :=q(h)[1 + ϵqh(h)](v − x(h)d)(r + (n− 1)h)
− hγx′(h)d(r + nh)
− c(h)
[
c′(h)
c(h)
(r + nh)− q(h)[1 + ϵqh(h)]
]
= 0
(5.5.17)
where ϵqh(h) = q
′(h)h
q(h) is the elasticity of the approval probability
with respect to the chosen hazard rate. The easier it is for the regulating
authority to determine whether the state aid is appropriate, the higher
the absolute value of the elasticity. Given this probability of approval
q(h), the new expected social welfare is:
ESW =
nq(h)h(v − x(h)d)− nc(h)
r + nh
(5.5.18)
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This welfare function can again be maximized and yields the optimal
hazard rate described by:
B :=q(h)[1 + ϵqh(h)](v − x(h∗)d)r − h∗x′(h∗)d(r + nh∗) (5.5.19)
− c(h∗)
[
c′(h∗)
c(h∗)
(r + nh∗)− nq(h)[1 + ϵqh(h)]
]
= 0 (5.5.20)
By comparing equations 5.5.17 and 5.5.19, the optimal damages fac-
tor γ∗ can be found:
γ∗ − 1 = [1 + ϵqh(h∗)] n− 1
h∗x′(h∗)d
h∗(v − x(h∗)d)− c(h∗)
r + nh∗
(5.5.21)
The diﬀerence between the new optimal damages factor and the orig-
inal damages factor (without state aid control) is the factor [1+ ϵqh(h∗)]
The result is that the optimal damages factor now depends on the
eﬀectiveness of the state aid control mechanism. It is lower with control,
meaning that ex-ante regulation and liability of politicians are substi-
tutes. If the control mechanism is ineﬀective, then – in terms of the
model – “punitive damages”, that is, some form of punishment of politi-
cians, remain part of the optimal design.
5.5.4 Policy implications and conclusion
The purpose of this endeavor was to contribute to the design or improve-
ment of a regulatory system applying to incentive packages handed out
by governments to firms. The idea here was to model the competition as
a race between a variable number of jurisdictions which has some detri-
mental eﬀects to parts of the society. It followed that there are several
relevant factors: first, the fiercer the competition, that is, the higher the
number of jurisdictions, the more damage this competition will produce;
secondly, the degree to which this competition produces damages (e.g.
through expropriation of the minority or through distortions of com-
petition); thirdly, the payoﬀ functions determine the need for punitive
damages.
Legally, it is problematic to implement punitive damages in this sce-
nario. Even the quite stern European state aid control mechanism does
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not know punitive damages. There are areas in which the EU can levy
fines. Quite famously, it ordered Microsoft to pay e 497 million for abuse
of its dominant position in 2007 and ordered Intel to pay e 1.06 billion
(both following Article 101 of the EU treaty, one of the two cornerstones
of European competition law). In 2010, it fined a price-fixing cartel of
eleven air cargo carriers e 799 million, pursuant to Article 102, the other
cornerstone of EU competition policy.
The EU can also impose fines on governments. The Commission can
withhold money if it decides that financial management of European
spending is inadequate20. In theory, the EU can impose fines on member
states not adhering to the Maastricht criteria (the criteria countries have
to fulfill in order to join the monetary union) – while not very credible
from the beginning, the rule has become more or less obsolete with the
financial crisis and the explosion of almost all member states’ deficits.
Yet, in the realm of the European state aid control system, there are no
provisions for fines. This, of course, has to do with the peculiar nature
of state aid control as a restraining device of sovereign countries. There
does not seem to be a political will to confer a sanctioning power to the
European Union. There is a relatively realistic possibility of introducing
a special kind of punishment mechanism: a recent change to the Danish
competition act provides that henceforth all unlawful national state aid
and probably also unlawful and incompatible aid according to the TFEU
shall be repaid to the state treasury instead of the aid-granting authority
(which might be a local or regional jurisdiction). Such a procedure seems
politically viable and might have a strong deterring eﬀect on wasteful
state aid spending (Lund, 2013).
Previous discussions of the competition between jurisdictions for firms
came to the conclusion that a ban or tight regulation is necessary. This
model comes to a similar conclusion. The diﬀerence though is that this
model not only calls for control of the actual incentive package or state
aid (that is, the specific measures), but generally of investments made
in order to attract firms (that is, non-specific measures, such as e.g. the
concept of “horizontal aid” in EU state aid law).
This model is primarily a model of public choice in that it describes
20For instance, the United Kingdom had to pay up to £1 billion in
fines in 2011, see www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8269828/
Britain-faces-1bn-of-EU-fines.html.
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the behavior of utility-maximizing politicians and jurisdictions, unlike
the more industrial-organization- and/or strategic-trade-oriented mod-
els by Collie (2000, 2002, 2005), Besley and Seabright (2000, 1999). The
disadvantage of this approach though is that it remains agnostic as to
how exactly the government causes harm by giving state aids to firms.
Martin and Valbonesi (2006b) liken the complexity of the state aid prob-
lem at least to the complexity of the string theory of particle physics
(the M-theory, an extension of string theory, works with eleven dimen-
sions). As such, incorporating all aspects of industrial organization with
all possible market structures into this model of a race for firms would
unfortunately lead to excessive complexity. While accommodating all
possible market structures seems too tedious, it might be possible to
say a little bit more about the firms that the jurisdictions compete for.
After all, the welfare eﬀects will be diﬀerent if the firm in question is
a new, highly innovative firm, an old firm in an obsolete industry, or
a large retailer chain (incentive packages for the latter is probably the
most problematic, as there is hardly any welfare increase from support
retail).
5.6 Self-reinforcing violation of state aid con-
trol
The “firm location race” section above illustrated a situation in which
jurisdictions compete actively for firm location. This section discusses a
diﬀerent scenario, namely the possible equilibria if there are several juris-
dictions competing, but in a setting where there is an overall consensus
among them not to engage in state aid and a weak enforcement mecha-
nism in place. The WTO would be an example for such a regime. Also
within the European Union, since states use a multitude of instruments
and administrative agencies to support their industries, it is diﬃcult for
the Commission as the supreme regulatory authority to know exactly
which subsidies are given. No national agency – unlike other competi-
tion law areas such as mergers and acquisitions – has a ’“panoramic pic-
ture of state aid allocations or enforcement powers” (Zahariadis, 2013, p.
144). Since the potential violators of state aid law are the governments
themselves, they have little interest in providing complete transparency
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in this field. This is reflected in the fact that there is no comprehen-
sive disclosure system in place at any higher level of government (some
American states do have disclosure programs).
The game is therefore similar to the game played by firms and corrupt
bureaucrats in order to receive certain government services (see Andvig
and Moene (1990), which this model follows closely). In this case, there
are no bureaucrats, but jurisdictions that can be “bribed” by firms (e.g.
by oﬀering to build a factory) in order to receive a certain service (a
state aid in the widest sense, such as infrastructure buildings or cash
transfers).
Firms approach jurisdictions for the location of a new plant. The
period length is assumed to be suﬃciently short so that only one ju-
risdiction can be negotiated with at a time. The state aid involved is
assumed to be homogeneous, meaning that the level of state aid trans-
actions can be indicated by the number of jurisdictions awarding state
aid, which is normalized to 1. It is also assumed that all firms demand
the same amount of state aid.
The fraction of jurisdictions willing to breach the state aid law regime
is denoted by y and that of jurisdictions following the rules by 1 − y.
The firm therefore has to search for a jurisdiction that is willing to hand
out subsidies. The probability that it does so after N trials is therefore
(1−y)N−1y. The expected value of N, which is geometrically distributed,
is thus E(N) = 1y and can be interpreted as the average number of trials
the firm needs to undertake before finding a willing jurisdiction. For
sake of simplicity, it is also assumed that jurisdictions do not actively
seek firms. Search comes at a cost, which is qi for firm i. The excess
profits of receiving state aid at a price b is πi(b), with π′i(b) < 0. The
expected profits of receiving a state aid can hence be written as:
Pi = πi(b)− qi
y
(5.6.1)
Of course, only firms with Pi > 0 are willing to seek and receive state
aid. The total demand for state aid is proportional to the number of firms
with a positive Pi. This demand can then be written as D = D(b, y).
D decreases with b (the more the firm has to provide to the state, the
less attractive the aid is) and increases with y (the higher the incidence
of state aid, the lower the search costs). It is assumed that function D
is continuous and diﬀerentiable in order to facilitate the analysis. The
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equation y = D(b, y) gives the relationship between the benefit b and
the normalized level of demand for state aid y. The long run demand
curve can be upward sloping and the supply directly induce demand.
The jurisdictions are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to the
costs of providing state aid. They can choose between a strategy of not
supporting firms and a strategy of doing so. They are assumed to have
an infinite horizon and discount future transfers in their favor with the
factor β = 11+r . The expected value of the options of a rationally-acting
jurisdiction i in period t can be written as:
Vi(t) = w +max[b− ci + Ui(t),βVi(t+ 1)] (5.6.2)
In this equation, b is the oﬀer of the firm (the value of creating
jobs, tax revenue, etc.), ci is the jurisdiction’s cost of providing the
necessary state aid and b − ci + Ui(t) is the expected gain of providing
state aid in period t. If the jurisdiction adheres to state aid law, then it
obtains βVi(t+1) for the next period with certainty. Thus, the expected
consequences of violating state aid law are described by:
Ui(t) = (1− s)βVi(t+ 1) + s[y(βVi(t+ 1)−B)) + (1− y)(−b)] (5.6.3)
s is the exogenously determined probability of being detected. If
the state aid transaction is not uncovered, the jurisdiction enters the
next period with the same options as in the present period. If, on the
other hand, the deal is uncovered by a competing jurisdictions, then the
outcome will depend on the deal that the two strike. If the jurisdiction
that uncovered the state aid follows a strict no-state-aid-strategy, then
the supervising authority would annul the contract and impose sanctions
against the oﬀending jurisdictions. With this punishment, there is a
probability of s(1−y) of obtaining −b+β0 in the next period. This can
be compared to the countervailing duties available in the WTO regime,
which virtually lock out the oﬀending country from competing in the
next period. Just like in the WTO setting, the jurisdictions can agree
not to report the matter. The state aid granting jurisdictions could
for instance transfer a share of its benefits, for instance, by granting
certain concessions in favor of the other jurisdiction. There are several
alternatives for the determination of this agreement, but they all lead
to qualitatively identical results. In order to simplify the model, it is
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assumed that the maximum compensation that the jurisdictions would
agree to would be b, that is, the amount the other jurisdiction, which is
in principle willing to break the law, would actually need to receive in
order to do so itself.
It stationarity is assumed (that is, Vi(t) = V (t) and Ui(t) = Ui
for all t), then 5.6.2 allows to find the expected value of a “no state
aid” strategy, namely V N = w1−β , the present value of future payoﬀs
(the payoﬀ being the fact of being in the game without having been
sanctioned).
The expected present value of giving state aid is:
V Ai =
w + b(1− s)− ci
1− β(1− s(1− y)) (5.6.4)
If V ai is positive, then the payoﬀ of giving state aid is higher the
higher its incidence, that is, the higher y.
A rational jurisdiction awards state aid if: V Ai > V N . From the
expressions of V Ai and V Ni and replacing β by
1
1+r , it can be shown that
this inequality is satisfied if:
ci < (1− s)b− s(1− y)w
r
(5.6.5)
The right hand side of the inequality is the gain of firm location,
the first term being the expected retained value of firm location and the
second term the expected loss of future pay-oﬀ. Those jurisdictions with
costs ci lower than the expected gain of state aid award state aid. In
order to award state aid, it is necessary (although not suﬃcient) that
(1 − s)b be higher than the costs ci, which implies that V ai is strictly
positive for self-selected pro-state-aid jurisdictions.
Each jurisdiction has a cost ci of providing state aid and it is assumed
that the cost of providing state aid is distributed over the interval [c, c]
with the cumulative density F (·) such that F (c) = 0 and F (c) = 1.
For any given values of y, b, w, s and r the proportion of jurisdictions
willing to award state aid is F ((1− s)b− s(1− y)wr .
Thus, the number of jurisdictions handing out subsidies is higher
• the higher the perceived fraction of jurisdictions giving state aid
and breaking the anti-subsidy regime
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• the higher the benefits from firm location
• the lower the sanction from being detected
• the lower the exogenously given detection probability s
• the higher the discount rate r
The term r and subsequently the discount factor β can also be seen
as the likelihood of a change in state aid policy, for instance towards a
more stringent or a more lenient approach.
F ((1 − s)b − s(1 − y)wr can be interpreted as a response function
indicating the number of jurisdictions that choose to give state aid for
a perceived level of y. Accordingly, the positive equilibrium levels of y
and b are those satisfying
F ((1− s)b− s(1− y)w
r
= yfor0 < y < 1 (5.6.6)
and
b = E(y) (5.6.7)
The last two equations describe self-fulfilling consistent beliefs about
the incidence of state aid and the equilibrium required benefits from firm
location. They also describe Nash equilibria in the game theoretic sense.
It works in a setting where each jurisdiction predicts the equilibrium level
of state aid based on rational behavior, but also if each jurisdiction only
knows their own cost ci and observes last period’s behavior of others.
Once y(t) = y(t − 1), a stationary equilibrium is reached. It is locally
stable if a small deviation from it in period t leads to a conversion back
to it. This can be called a myopic adjustment case.
5.6.1 Equilibria
Depending on the incidence of state aid, the market-clearing required
benefits values will change. The possible equilibrium levels depend on
the distribution of ci over the jurisdictions.
There may frequently be multiple equilibria. The value y = 1, that is,
all jurisdictions give state aid, is in the set of equilibria if (1−s)E(1) > c.
This means that the expected value of the equilibrium state aid when
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everybody gives state aid exceeds the cost of the jurisdiction least prone
to give state aid.
Conversely, the value y = 0 is in the equilibrium set if (1− s)E(0) <
swr + c. This condition is fulfilled if the expected value of firm location
when everybody else complies with state aid law is not high enough to
cover the expected loss of future pay-oﬀs and the costs of the jurisdiction
most prone to give state aid.
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Figure 5.4: Self-reinforcing state aid violation
More interesting results appear if the distribution of ci is bell shaped.
In this case, as illustrated in figure 5.4, there are three possible equilib-
rium levels of y on the supply side for any given value of b (the three
intersections between the y-curve and the F-curve). In the myopic ad-
justment case, only the two outer intersections represent stable equilib-
ria.
The supply side of state aid depends on the potential benefits oﬀered
by the firm. An increase in b shifts the F-curve upwards (from F1 to
F3). The highest amount of b that is able to sustain a low state aid
equilibrium is the one represented by F3. If the curve shifted upwards a
little bit more, then the only intersection would be in the region of high
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state aid. Similarly, any benefit b lower than the one represented by F2
would entail a low state aid equilibrium.
5.6.2 Extensions
The model can be modified in several ways.
So far, the model has been silent on what drives the costs for state aid.
A view more driven by a public choice, principal-agent approach could
attribute this cost solely to the governing politicians, not the jurisdiction
as a whole. In that cae, the cost could be modeled as a function of the
prevalence of state aid. If state aid is commonplace around the world,
then the political cost of engaging in this activity as well might be lower.
The demand for state aid will then increase.
It could also be said that the probability of detection decreases with
the level of state aid. The more jurisdictions hand out subsidies, the
more diﬃcult it becomes for a centralized authority to monitor all trans-
actions.
If these extensions are incorporated into the model, then the main
proposition, namely that the profitability of state aid increases with its
incidence, is strengthened. They lead unambiguously to higher equi-
librium levels of state aid but also to higher benefits for the state aid
grantor.
5.6.3 Conclusion and policy implications
The purpose of the above model was to illustrate the case of a weak state
aid control mechanism and to showcase its vulnerabilities. It demon-
strates that, on one hand, violations of the agreement can lead to even
more violations and eventually to the collapse of the system. On the
other hand, it also shows that there can be several equilibria, explaining
why similar regional groupings might nevertheless be characterized by
diﬀerent magnitudes of state aid prevalence.
In order to reduce state aid, the sanctioning mechanism needs to
be strengthened. While this might appear trivial at first, the model
shows another possibility in case installing a rigid sanctions regime is not
feasible. A centralized authority could temporarily increase the sanctions
in order to induce a shift from a high state aid equilibrium to a low state
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aid equilibrium. Once this shift has been made and because it is a stable
equilibrium, the regime can become more lax afterwards.
The novelty of this model is nested in several elements. It is an at-
tempt to combine the demand side of state aid with the supply side in
a unified model. It emphasizes that the process is costly for all parties
involved - the jurisdictions that have to bear the cost of the state aid,
but also the firm which faces search costs and has to make certain con-
cessions to meet the demands of the state aid grantor. These factors are
endogenous in this model and lead to an outcome with several equilbria.
5.7 Negotiating state aid deals
The political process of devolution or decentralization – a process gener-
ally regarded positively for its alleged improvement of democratic over-
sight21 – might have increased the informational asymmetries in the
negotiations between governments and firms. Devolution created a vari-
ety of new governments. A worry expressed e.g. in Markusen and Nesse
(2007) is that internationally-operating firms are more experienced in
negotiating incentive deals than newly formed governments.
The “state aid game” is about competition in two areas at the same
time. Firms compete among themselves, while jurisdictions compete for
capital. In this market in which firms negotiate deals with jurisdictions
(and both try to maximize either their profit or their utility, however
it is described). In the last century, there was an important innovation
in this market though: the advent of specialized consultants who act
as intermediaries between firms and governments. In a market of per-
fect information, so the common theory in law and economics, there is
nothing particularly problematic about this. In the worst case, there are
some more transaction costs, in the best case there is a better flow of
information and a higher quality of outcomes. But exactly this assump-
tion of perfect information and full knowledge of all market participants
does not hold and – worse – is even reinforced by the institution of site
consultants.
The argument goes as follows (see e.g Markusen and Nesse, 2007).
Site consultants enable an anonymous market. Thanks to them, firms
21The idea is that a regional government is closer to the preferences of the region’s
citizens than a central government in a possibly far-away capital.
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do not have to negotiate directly with governments and thereby reveal
their identity. Instead, site consultants leave governments in the dark
about the identity of the firm and of possible other jurisdictions oﬀering
incentives. This gives them the power to bluﬀ in the early-stage incentive
negotiations. In fact, they can even pretend that there is a competition
for a firm’s investment decision even though there is not. The possible
result of this is that firms receive tax cuts in the jurisdiction of their
current location even though they were not actually willing to relocate
in the first place. This of course is good for the firm – but it is not good
for the jurisdiction which – based on a democratic decision – chose its
optimal tax rate.
LeRoy (2005) gives several examples of how companies sometimes
create a bogus competition. For instance, hotel chain Marriott Interna-
tional, Inc., was ventilating the idea of relocating from Bethesda, Mary-
land (west of DC and north of the Potomac River) and received oﬀers
from suburban Virginia (south of both DC and Potomac River). The
result of the competition was that Marriott received $49 to $74 million
and staid in Maryland. Two things make this case interesting though.
First, a journalist uncovered confidential information stating that Mar-
riott never intended to move out of Maryland. The second is that taking
a closer look at the case makes that this comes as no surprise. The vast
majority of Marriott employees, including the highest-level executives,
live in Maryland, from where it is tedious to commute to commute to
Northern Virginia, given the insuﬃcient number of bridges over the Po-
tomac River. If a firm like Marriott now uses site consultants who keep
it as secret who their clients are, then Virginia and Maryland have no
way of finding out that Marriott’s sole plan was to get a better tax deal
in its original home state.
Furthermore, site consultants act as gatekeepers between firms and
governments. Some criticize the consultants’ role by claiming that they
have the power to “blacklist” governments which appear un-cooperative
in the consultants’ view. This is furthermore reinforced by business
climate indexes produced by important site location consultancy pub-
lications (such as the magazine Site Selection). Because of those busi-
ness climate indexes, local governments end up handing out aids only to
achieve a better ranking and be considered once an important relocation
decision comes up.
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The site consultancy trade is absolutely unregulated. This seems to
be an ineﬃcient situation, though. For instance, the real estate market is
usually heavily regulated, and, most importantly, agents are prohibited
from working for both sides. Similar regulations are in place for instance
in the legal profession. A lawyer cannot work for both sides in litigation,
and he or she cannot work as defense attorney and as prosecutor at the
same time. Yet, in the site consultancy industry, it can be observed that
individual consultants or site location departments in larger consulting
or accounting22 firms work not only as brokers for site location consul-
tant for firms, but also economic development consultants for various
jurisdictions. This is a lucrative business for consultants who may end
up earning a commission as high as 30% of the total aid package. From
an eﬃciency point of view, this might not be ideal.
Large firms are also better equipped to conduct negotiations in their
favor. They have the organizational advantage of flexibility that (espe-
cially local) governments do not share, since the latter need to coordinate
e.g. with the city council or regional parliament (Weber, 2007).
To understand if regulation of site consultants is necessary, it is
worthwhile to draw upon the findings of the literature on the regulation
of professions, where the profession of real estate agents is probably the
one that comes closest to site consultants. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)
provide a rationale for advocacy and the competition between enfran-
chised advocates of special interests to improve policy-making. Macey
and Miller (1997) model the attorney-client relationship as an agency
contract characterized by information and monitoring diﬃculties. Mi-
celli et al. (2000) analyze real estate agency regulation and conclude that
unbundling the matching and representation functions might contribute
to eﬀective agency reform.
22Interestingly, the major players in the industry belong to large accounting firms,
such as Deloitte (Khan, 2002).
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CHAPTER 6
State Aid, Firm Decisions, and
Corporate Governance*
Much of the literature on state aid is based on the premise that firms will
naturally seek state incentives and relocate if this is deemed profitable.
It is agnostic about the internal processes – and maybe even conflicts of
interest – within firms. This chapter tries to further the understanding of
firm location decisions, the internal governance mechanisms relevant for
the acquisition of subsidies, and what it means for state aid regulation.
So far, the firm side of the market has not received much attention. In
a certain way, modeling the preferences of firms is not straight-forward.
At first glance, all firms would want state aid. This does not necessarily
mean that they prefer a constitutional order that allows for such aid.
If it is (reasonably) assumed, that firms act profit-maximizingly, then
those firms which are more likely to receive state aids will be in favor
of lax rules, whereas firms which are not likely candidates for state aids
will want stricter rules.
*Some parts of this chapter have been co-authored with Klaus Heine and resulted
in two forthcoming publications (Hanke and Heine, 2014; Heine and Hanke, 2014).
This applies specifically to sections 6.2, 6.3.1 to 6.3.3, 6.4 to 6.6, 6.8 to 6.10, and
6.12.
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Remaining in the field of aviation, for instance British Airways’
stance on state aid policy reform is as follows: “British Airways has
suﬀered badly because of substantial amounts of state aid being pro-
vided to some its largest competitors in Europe (and indeed all over the
world - this is not just a European phenomenon but that is not a reason
to soften the line against aid in Europe). We believe that there is no
place for such huge sums to be paid in a highly competitive industry
like aviation. They have acted against the best interests of European
air passengers and penalized unfairly Europe’s more eﬃcient and bet-
ter managed airlines” (British Airways, 2005, p. 2005). This has to be
seen within the context that the United Kingdom is consistently among
the countries with the lowest amount of aids given to firms, while other
countries (especially France and Germany) have a more generous tra-
dition towards their national airlines (and the EU has been historically
relatively lenient when it comes to state aids to the aviation industry).
In a certain way, British Airways’ feedback to the state aid reform
proposal might even have some shortcomings. It would be in BA’s core
interest if not only European countries subsidized Airbus, but if the
United States supported Boeing. Thus it should perform the highwire
act of lobbying on one hand against subsidies to airlines, but on the
other hand also lobby for subsidies to its main suppliers, Airbus, Boe-
ing, Embraer and others (preferably those which do not supply BA’s
competitors). Organizations closer to the research and development in
the aviation sector, such as the Society of British Aerospace Companies
(representing 1,500 small and medium-sized enterprises), naturally put
a much bigger emphasis on block exemptions for R&D.
But the situation is actually more complicated than that. Firms are
not just a production function (as they are interpreted in neoclassical
economics), but there are agency problems. In fact, they could be seen
as a nexus of management, shareholders and workers; their incentives
are not necessarily aligned. During the financial crisis, state aids were
given to banks under the condition of increased transparency and share-
holder control rights. It is conceivable that the management of certain
financial institutions might have declined aid because of those condi-
tions, even though it might have been in the interest of the shareholders
to accept the aid. Conversely, shareholders might object to a manage-
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ment which is able to accrue state aids1 as it might as well be able to
expropriate the shareholders (similarly to the observation that a man-
agement able to evade taxes is not always in the shareholders’ interest
for the same reasons). We might thus for instance observe somewhat
“unholy alliances” between the management and the firm’s employees
and workers against the shareholders or between the shareholders and
workers against the management.
There is a recent literature analyzing the link between corporate taxes
and corporate governance. Desai et al. (2007) show that the design
of corporate taxes aﬀects the amount of private benefits extracted by
company insiders. They also show that the quality of the corporate
governance system aﬀects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes.
Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) ask themselves whether corporate tax
avoidance activities advance shareholder interests. They show that the
eﬀect of tax avoidance on firm value is a function of firm governance
and note that corporate tax avoidance is more than just a transfer of
resources from the state to shareholders and includes agency problems
characterizing shareholder-manager relations.
This literature can be expanded and applied to the analysis of state
incentive-seeking behavior. Several questions follow. What happens to
state aids given to firms, to what extent do they benefit the shareholders
and to what extent do they increase the private benefits of company
insiders? What is the eﬀect of subsidies on firm value then? And, last
but not least, what does all this mean for state aid control?
6.1 Investment and location decisions
With regard to aid decisions within the firm, it is important to distin-
guish between investment decisions and location decisions. Ramboll and
Matrix (2012) note that these decision processes are usually handled at
the highest level within the particular organization, which might also be
a reason why accessing information regarding investment and location
decisions can be very diﬃcult a task. Investment decisions can be ini-
tiated by the parent company (top-down), but some processes can also
initiate at the level of decentralized business units which propose a cer-
1State aids here are seen as rents extracted through lobbying.
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tain investment to their parent company (bottom-up). Sometimes, the
management of firms issues an internal call for competition, for instance
when firms decide where to develop or manufacture new products – the
process then incorporates both top-down and bottom-up elements. Lo-
cation decisions, similarly to investment decisions, involve the board of
the investing company, but seem to be more decentralized than the deci-
sion to invest itself. Companies often hire external consultants to screen
possible locations. Ramboll and Matrix (2012) find that the incentive
eﬀect of regional aid is stronger with regard to the location decision than
to the investment decision. This reason for this is that investment de-
cisions are usually highly strategic decisions, which means that aid can
only influence the size of the investments. Once the decision is made,
aid can play a role in the race for the location of the firm.
Ramboll and Matrix (2012) distinguish between three diﬀerent de-
terminants other than state aid: eﬃciency seeking, market seeking and
factors of production. Eﬃciency seeking means that firms seek to in-
crease eﬃciency by reducing cost, exploiting economies of scale or higher
productivity. Market seeking is the reaction to increasing or changing
patterns of demand. It can lead to better access and proximity to grow-
ing markets. Other investments seek to increase or improve factors of
production by improving the availability of raw materials and skilled
human resources.
6.1.1 Do managers care about location?
There is a variety of factors that come into play when firms decide on
location. Probably one of the first theoretical approaches to the issue
was Marshall (1890) who identified knowledge spillovers, labor market
risk pooling, and vertical linkages as the main reasons for firm loca-
tion. Krugman (1991a) emphasized the remarkably high concentration
of economic activity in space. Krugman (1991b) showed how countries
diﬀerentiate endogenously into an industrialized core area, with man-
ufacturing firms located in the region with the larger demand, and an
agricultural periphery. This diﬀerentiation depends on transportation
costs, economies of scale, and the share of manufacturing in national
income. This relates to the concept of backward and forward linkages
central to the work of Albert O. Hirschman (see e.g. Hirschman, 1958).
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Audretsch et al. (2005) highlight the importance of proximity to uni-
versities in order to benefit from technology spillovers. Managers have
not always been on a perennial quest for better firm locations. For a
long time, engineers dominated the management circles and were quite
oblivious towards the potential gains from real estate decisions. Over
time, management either professionalized or hired consultants to do the
job for them (Markusen and Nesse, 2007; Markusen et al., 1991).
In Europe, so-called “greenfield” investments are rather rare. Projects
receiving regional aid often involve expanding existing capacities, diver-
sifying output, or changing the production process of existing facilities
(Ramboll and Matrix, 2012). If political considerations are incorporated
into firms’ location decisions, then it can be conjectured that firms have
higher incentives to move to regions with high unemployment as they
might find a regional government there that is willing to go to great
lengths in order to attract the firm – for instance, by awarding state aid
(Hillman et al., 1987).
Ramboll and Matrix (2012) distinguish two diﬀerent sequences for
the location decisions. In the first model, firms diﬀerentiate between
hard and soft location factors. They first shortlist on the basis of hard
location factors. If this is deemed necessary, they submit an anonymous
information request to the local business development authorities, usu-
ally through site consultants. After that, contacts to these authorities
are formally established by the potential investors. In the subsequent
negotiations, the aid-granting authority can try to influence the location
decision. They report this kind of procedure for instance in the German
solar industry. In a second model, firms distinguish between diﬀerent ge-
ographic scales, reducing the size of the potential location in each step.
So, for instance, firms decide first whether they want to invest in Central
and Eastern Europe, and then in which specific country and region they
want to do so. The car industry in Slovakia and Hungary is an example
for this kind of procedure. The study also finds that in none of them did
return on investment calculations were used to compare alternative lo-
cations (including potential state aid). Instead, a multi-criteria analysis
was usually applied at the stage of deciding upon a location.
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6.1.2 Do taxes matter?
The assumption so far has been that governments’ aid decisions actually
have an eﬀect on the decision of firms to enter or leave a market as well
as whether to open up (e.g. due to aids for start-ups) or close down oper-
ations (e.g. due to rescue and restructuring aid) at all. In fact, the eﬀect
that aids have on firm decisions are disputed or, at least, evolving. Ac-
cording to (Markusen and Nesse, 2007, p. 10), “firms surveyed from the
1950s well into the 1980s dismissed the importance of taxes as an inter-
regional siting factor - instead, transportation costs, raw material access,
labor costs, land costs, infrastructure, and access to markets dominated
their locational calculus.” According to Bartik (2007) and Wasylenko
(1997), this seems to have changed. Falling transportation and commu-
nication costs made relocations easier and determinants influenced by
potential state aids, like land and labor costs or the available infrastruc-
ture, more important. Nevertheless, Markusen and Nesse (2007) are not
satisfied by this explanation. Indeed, since the industrial revolution of
the nineteenth century, transportation and communication costs have
been falling. And yet, no fierce competition for capital has ensued for a
long time.
6.1.3 Do firms and/or their managers always want
state aid?
State aid does not always come for free. In some cases, the jurisdiction
granting the aid has some demands in exchange for the aid. Since the
politicians involved have diﬀerent incentive mechanisms than the man-
agers of firms, an agreement does not always come along. For instance,
European airplane manufacturer EADS (recently reorganized under the
more positively-connotated name Airbus Group, which up to then was
only a subsidiary to EADS) reported strong results for 2012 and a strong
increase in liquidity. As a result, the company rejected the oﬀer of the
German federal government to provide initial funding (start-up aid) for
the Airbus A350 XWB program (a direct competitor to Boeing’s 777
and 787 models). Subject of the discussion was a loan of e 600 million
provided by the KfW (Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau, Reconstruction
Credit Institute). According to media reports, the German government
demanded that EADS maintain its production plant in Hamburg and
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establish a final assembly line for the new A350 plane there. The man-
agement was not willing to accept this deal and was credited for trying
to free EADS/Airbus from the tight corset of industrial policy consider-
ations of its owners (Germany and France hold 12% each; the amount
of free float shares was recently increased from 49% to 70%). One sub-
sequent measure was to merge the company’s administrative units in
Munich and Toulouse at its headquarters in France – a step that would
probably not have been accepted by Germany2.
6.2 Theory of the firm and state aid control
– a research gap
In this chapter, none of the approaches to the analysis of state aid control
outlined in chapter 3 shall be followed. Instead, a new perspective on the
issue of state aids shall be demonstrated, which so far has not received
attention in the literature. Herein, the topic is the influence of the
corporate governance of firms on the demand and use of state aids. The
main idea is simple: In the typical discussion of state aids it is normally
assumed that the aid-receiving firm profits unequivocally from the aid.
The owners of a firm receive a positive cash flow. Thus it is obvious
that they have an interest in being granted aids. But is this really the
case? Doubts arise once the implicitly assumed fiction of the owner-
entrepreneur is abandoned and a separation of ownership and control -
as it is commonly the case in modern capitalist economies - is assumed.
This means that the question whether state aids are actually in the
interest of the firm’s owners can only be answered positively if the owners
are also the decision makers inside the firm, that is, if there are no
problems of delegation between ownership and control.
Only in the case that there is no problem of delegation can the re-
ceipt of a state aid be directly attributed to the wish of the owners and
the aid be apportioned to the income of the owners. This clear-cut situ-
ation might not apply though to a majority of firms exceeding a certain
2See Wall Street Journal of 27 February 2013, http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324662404578329984072804560,
and aero.de of 1 March 2013, http://www.at.aero.de/news-16979/
Enders-EADS-ist-auf-A350-Kredit-nicht-angewiesen.html
190
168 State Aid, Firm Decisions, and Corporate Governance

 
 
	



		

Figure 6.1: The traditional view of state aid control
size. Typically, larger firms rather employ a professional management
running the day-to-day activities, as well as a separate supervisory body
representing the interests of the owners, such as the supervisory board
or the general assembly. The task of monitoring the management is then
characterized by an agency-problem, in which the owners cannot sim-
ply assume that the management is acting in their interest (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). It is therefore not necessar-
ily obvious whether state aids are always in the interest of the owners.
This relates to the corporate governance of the firm, which constitutes
the linchpin between owner interests and the leadership exerted by the
management with regards to state aids.
The following chapter will first outline some state aid cases illustrat-
ing the corporate governance. The next step will draw a parallel to a
new theoretical strain of literature, namely the so-called agency view of
tax avoidance (see e.g. Desai and Dharmapala (2009a)). The fourth
section further develops these arguments. Section five will frame these
considerations using a formal model, and section six will deduce rele-
vant policy recommendations as to how European state aid control can
be improved in light of the potential conflicts of interest between owners
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and managers.
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Figure 6.2: The corporate governance view of state aid control
6.3 State aid and the interests of the man-
agement - an illustration
This section will present three diﬀerent examples involving state aids and
where it might be suspected that there is an agency problem between
management and owners to which the granting of a state aid is causal.
6.3.1 Bremer Vulkan
The first case is about the Bremer Vulkan shipbuilding company. In
the early 1990s, the company acquired shipyards in Eastern Germany
from the Treuhandanstalt, the government agency founded in the im-
mediate post-socialist period charged with privatizing East German en-
terprises. In order to maintain jobs and a competitive shipbuilding in-
dustry in Eastern Germany, Bremer Vulkan received around two bil-
lion Deutschmarks (around one billion Euros, not inflation-adjusted, or
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around 1.5 billion in 2013 Euros) in state aids from the Treuhandanstalt
AG.
As Bremer Vulkan AG was in a financially tense situation since the
early 1990s, the management installed a central cash pool in 1992. This
cash pool received the financial surpluses of subsidiary companies in
order to compensate liquidity problems of other company parts on a
short-term basis. The newly acquired shipyards in East Germany were
also included in this pool, and around 850 Million DM of the granted
state aids in East Germany were diverted into the general cash pool.
In 1996, Bremer Vulkan AG finally had to declare bankruptcy in light
of the dramatically worsening financial situation of the enterprise. The
subsidies granted for the restructuring of the East German shipyards
were lost in the process and thus could not be used anymore to save the
East German shipbuilding locations. Recovering the state aids was not
feasible anymore because of the loss in substance of Bremer Vulkan.
The Bremer Vulkan case consequentially led to a legal debate about
the liability of the board of directors of the Konzern. While it is not pos-
sible to address all aspects and ramifications of the applicable company
law here, the core of the case is whether there is a case of embezzle-
ment, that is, whether there was a breach of duty on the part of the
managers vis-a`-vis the interests of the company owners (Bauer, 2008).
The courts never resolved this legal issue, as the pending lawsuit against
former CEO Friedrich Hennemann was discontinued due to the length of
the procedure and the applicable statute of limitations and the charges
against four former members of the board in a civil trial were dropped
because of a settlement.
At this point, the relevant question is whether the separation of own-
ership and control led to the loss of the awarded state aid monies. This
was obviously the case, since the management decision to include the
East German shipyards into the cash pool led to the loss. This can be
interpreted as a breach of duty towards the state aid granter or at least
as an act of the management not in favor of the economic interest of
the granter. It can also be speculated about whether stopping at an
early stage the inclusion of the East German monies in the cash pool
would have prevented the management’s business strategy of building
a world-leading shipbuilding Konzern. This might have saved Bremer
Vulkan from bankruptcy and might thereby have prevented the loss of
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wealth of the owners.
The case of Bremer Vulkan shows vividly that there may be a principal-
agent problem between management and owners when the firm receives
state aids. Of course, the motivation of the management to make use
of an information asymmetry vis-a-vis the owners can be complex and
multi-layered. In the case of the former CEO of Bremer Vulkan AG it
can be suspected that it was not only the desire for higher compensation
and retirement benefits which fueled the risky expansion of the com-
pany by using state aids, but also the hubris (Homberg, 2010) of want-
ing to forger a globally leading company group within a short timespan
(empire-building). In addition to that, there were long-standing per-
sonal and financial interrelationships between Vulkan AG and the Land
Bremen, meaning that the decisions of the management also have to be
seen in the context of political opportunities.
6.3.2 Reserves for German nuclear power plants
The second case is about the reserves put aside by German nuclear power
plant operators for the disposal of nuclear waste and long-term shut-
down of the plants (in line with the policy goal of phasing-out nuclear
energy by 2022). In 1999, a number of German communal (non-nuclear)
electricity producers sued against the Federal Republic, arguing that the
tax allowance for these reserves constitute illegal state aid. Their point
was that it creates a distortion of competition among European electric-
ity producers to the detriment of those producers which cannot build up
such reserves. This is the case because in fact the nuclear producers can
dispose freely of the reserves and use them as a source of internal finance,
e.g. to buy up competitors. A further aspect was that, although build-
ing up reserves for the disposal of nuclear waste, it is not predictable
how high these reserves have to be in order to fulfill their duty. It is
not even clear yet, when they will be needed. In the end, these reserves
contribute to managerial discretion and an advantage with regards to
financing in favor of nuclear power plant operators. This, so the claim,
constitutes a distortion of competition in the sense of European State
Aid Law (see European Commission C(2001) 3967 fin.).
In 2006 the lawsuit against the European Commission brought for-
ward by three communal power producers in 2002 was dismissed on
the grounds that the selectivity criterium was not met. The court found
194
172 State Aid, Firm Decisions, and Corporate Governance
that reserves are a necessity in operating a nuclear power plant (T-92/02,
Stadtwerke Schwa¨bisch Hall et al v. Commission). The public utility
companies appealed against the decision, which was finally dismissed in
2007 by the European Court of Justice, too.
Why would it not be in the interest of nuclear power plant owners to
profit from finance advantages provided by the possibility to accrue tax-
exempt reserves? The answer to this lies in the principal-agent problem
at hand between the managers and the owners. The management is
particularly interested in internal forms of finance, since it provides them
more discretion than other means. High disposable equity allows the
management namely to follow a company strategy such as an empire-
building strategy (which is not necessarily in the interest of the owners
but gives the managers higher earnings, a consolidation of their position
in the company, and prestige) while at the same time avoiding the close
scrutiny by the owners (Go¨bel, 2002).
In this case the problem is not only that the returns for the owners
might have been reduced due to the increase in managerial discretion.
The problem might even be that those reserves could get lost completely
due to faulty company strategies. The outcome would undesirable in that
at the time the nuclear waste needs to be disposed of, there might be
no funds available anymore. In this case the state would have to jump
in and act as a deficiency guarantor, even though the necessary funds
were already transferred in form of the original state aid. Monitoring
the management is particularly diﬃcult in this setting though, since the
final disposal of nuclear waste is an event way ahead in the future and
it is virtually impossible to estimate beforehand, how high the costs
will eventually be. A manager acting according to the precautionary
principle can therefore very easily justify building up a high amount of
reserves and expand his or her discretionary financing capacity. A study
by the German Federal Court of Auditors from the year 2011 shares this
assessment (Parliamentary Paper 17/5350) and comes to the conclusion
that the competent tax oﬃces know the amounts of the reserves, but
cannot assess their appropriateness due to the technical nature. For
reasons of tax secrecy, they are not allowed to communicate the amounts
to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology or the Federal
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety,
which could provide the required professional expertise.
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Tax secrecy on one side and the lack of professional monitoring of
the reserve practices on the other side make it for managers to use the
instrument of internal finance to follow a corporate strategy diﬃcult to
scrutinize for the owners. It can be presumed that the principal-agent
problem between managers and owners could be mitigated if the reserves
had to be built as special assets by the nuclear power plant operators
and thereby could not contribute to internal finance.
6.3.3 General Motors and Opel AG
The third case pertains to the request by General Motors in 2009 for
state aid from the Deutschlandfonds for their wholy-owned subsidiary
Adam Opel AG. Eventually, the aid was never granted, but the case nev-
ertheless illustrates the possibility of principal-agent problems between
owners and managers.
Adam Opel AG saw itself confronted with dramatically dropping
sales starting with the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. General Mo-
tors decided to sell Opel. In the possible case that Opel would be sold to
Magna, a Canadian automobile parts manufacturer with a strong pres-
ence in nearby Austria, the German Federal Government was ready to
grant restructuring aid in order to save Opel’s jobs. Eventually, General
Motors opted not sell Opel to Magna after all and to restructure the
company themselves, although – so their wish – the aid monies should
be paid nevertheless. The Federal Government, in consultation with the
European Commission, however, denied the application in the end.
At first glance it might seem obvious that it would have been to the
direct benefit of General Motors shareholders if the German taxpayer
had covered the costs of restructuring Opel. At second glance, this is
not obvious anymore, though. Awarding General Motors the aid might
have borne the risk of reasserting the failing business strategy followed by
GM and Opel’s management. The state aid would have contributed to
hiding management errors committed in the past. Furthermore, the aid
would have cemented the past company strategy by tying state aids to
certain employment figures and production locations. Such a procedure
is without doubt in the interest of managers who could thereby keep and
further consolidate their position with the company. It is, however, not
in the interest of General Motors’ shareholders who are interested in a
long-run improvement of the company’s value.
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The owners of General Motors were therefore facing the risk that
the awarded subsidies would only prolong Opel’s crisis in the medium
and long run, without a short-term exit option. On the other hand, the
management of Opel and General Motors would have profited from the
restructuring aids in the short run. In other words, the management
would have succeeded in reaping private benefits from the state aids.
General Motors also caused some controversy on the other side of
the Atlantic. GM and Chrysler entered serious turbulences in late 2008
and subsequently received bailout money from the Troubled Asset Relief
Porgram (TARP), which was originally set up to rescue banks. Both
firms restructured substantially, with significant changes in ownership
and management. They both briefly entered bankruptcy but reemerged
from Chapter 11 protection after a couple of months. This costly bailout
has been criticized. Zywicki (2011), for instance, argues that Chapter
11 re-organization would have been suﬃcient to make both firms viable
again, especially since they were both not as much in economic distress
as they were in financial distress. Bankruptcy, so the claim of the critics,
would not have destroyed the firms and their assets (such as their skilled
workforce and trusted car brands), but given them the opportunity to
get rid of deadweight. What the bailout did, though, was to create “a
kind of state capitalism that seeks to entangle the government and large
corporations in order to allow for careful management of the economy”
(p. 66).
6.3.4 American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
Starting from September 2008, AIG was facing a liquidity crisis. Due to
the importance of AIG to the financial system, the U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank (Fed) created a secured credit facility of up to$85 billion in order
to “bail out” the company and thereby giving AIG the possibility to
oﬀer additional collateral to their credit default swap trading partners.
The terms of the loan were as follows: “The interests of taxpayers are
protected by key terms of the loan. The loan is collateralized by all the
assets of AIG, and of its primary non-regulated subsidiaries. These assets
include the stock of substantially all of the regulated subsidiaries. The
loan is expected to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the firm’s
assets. The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest
in AIG and has the right to veto the payment of dividends to common
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and preferred shareholders” Press release by the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors from September 16, 2008).
The provision that the federal government can veto dividend pay-
ments was a sensible one as it prevented shareholders from diverting the
bailout money into their own pockets. But in the aftermath of this res-
cue operation, two scandals ensued. For one, “AIG paid bonuses of $1
mn or more to 73 employees at its financial-products division, including
11 who no longer work for the company, New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo said. The top 10 bonus recipients received a combined
$42 mn, he said. AIG’s financial products unit lost $40.5 bn last year”
(Fox Business, 17.3.2009).It also distributed $165 million in executive
bonuses, and the bonus payments for the Financial Products unit were
expected to reach $450 million, with bonuses for the entire company of
around $1.2 billion” (ibid.). This means that a substantial amount of
taxpayers’ money ended up with senior personnel of the corporation. In
this specific case though, the eventual damage to the taxpayer was not as
originally expected, since AIG eventually paid back all loans and other
bailout transfers. The government’s total support for AIG was worth
$182 billion. But AIG actually paid back $205 billion, which constituted
a net profit for the Treasury of around $23 billion (U.S. Department of
Treasury, 2013).
AIG, ostensibly satisfied with the resolution of its crisis, started an
advertising campaign called “Thank you, America” in January 2013.
At the same time, a group of shareholders around a former CEO of the
insurer filed a lawsuit against the U.S. federal government seeking billions
of dollars in damages. Their allegation was that the bailout was unfair
to shareholders and that the interest rate for the loans was excessive. An
insider commented pointedly to the New York Times: “The government
has been saying, We’re your friend, we owned and controlled you and we
let you go. But AIG doesn’t owe loyalty to the government ... it owes
loyalty to its shareholders” (NYT, January 7, 2013). In the case that a
substantial amount of shareholders is filing suit, the board of directors of
the company has a legal and fiduciary duty to consider joining the legal
action and, after some discussion, refused to support it. The reaction of
the American public was highly negative, of course (Berkowitz, 2013).
This case conveys an important message: subsidies or bailouts are
not always in the interest of all shareholders. The suspicion of some
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shareholders in the AIG case is that the management and the government
colluded to the detriment of these shareholders. From the government’s
perspective and in hindsight, the contract with AIG was incomplete –
the bonus payments caused significant discontent. A more pessimistic
view of the government might see a conspiracy between the managers
and the government expropriating taxpayers.
The four examples present here are very diﬀerent one from the other.
Nevertheless, they all share the insight that the management when granted
state aids receives an additional margin of discretion to follow their own
private interests which are not in line with the interests of the company’s
owners. It would therefore be in the interest of the company owners and
of the state aid granting entity to monitor this additional latitude of
judgment and to prevent the diversion of parts of the subsidies into the
pockets of the management.
6.4 Agency-theoretical analysis of state-aid-
related problems - a first approximation
If the firm is seen merely as a black box, then tax avoidance or getting a
subsidy is always in the interest of its owners. This view is predominant
in the approaches taken by public finance dealing with tax avoidance.
It is assumed that tax avoidance always leads to a profit for the firm
owners. This implies that the firm’s management and the firm’s owners
find themselves in a coalition with the shared interest of avoiding taxes,
or getting a subsidy (see e.g. Chen and Chu (2005) and Crocker and
Slemrod (2005) for these bilateral agreements).
In recent years, a new strand of literature has emerged dealing with
tax avoidance to the detriment of firms. The so-called agency view of tax
avoidance abandons the per se assumption of a shared interest between
managers and owners of the firm with regard to tax avoidance. Instead,
there can be a coalition between the state that levies the taxes (and by
extension: grants subsidies) and the owners of the firm (see e.g. Desai
et al., 2007).
The idea of the agency view of tax avoidance is that a management
capable of avoiding taxes aggressively is also capable of diverting profits
from the shareholders. This means that self-interested managers will
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not or not entirely pass on to the shareholders the profits earned by
means of tax avoidance or subsidies. Thereby the opportunistic activity
of the management remains hidden to both the shareholders and the
tax authority (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Seen this way, the state can
be considered a de facto minority owner of the firm (as it receives a
payoﬀ contingent on profits in the form of taxes), with its incentives
aligned with the owners. The state thus has an intrinsic interest that
all profits are made visible and that the shareholders receive their fair
share (Hanlon et al., 2012).
In this view, tax avoidance or subsidies increase the firm value only
if the management is subjected to a strict corporate governance regime
guaranteeing that the profits yielded are paid out to the shareholders
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009a). Thereby shareholders are in an inher-
ently bad position. If they want the management to engage aggressively
in tax avoiding activities, they have to accept an opaque firm struc-
ture and cannot rely on courts to enforce these by definition diﬃcult-
to-monitor and sometimes borderline-illegal contracts (Chen and Chu,
2005).
Indeed, there are empirical studies indicating that the public an-
nouncement of firms to further avoid taxes in the future can lead to
a decrease in firm value (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). In other words,
the owners expect more damage than benefit for themselves when the
management announces an aggressive tax avoidance strategy.
An important conclusion from the agency view of tax avoidance is
that shareholders approve of stricter corporate governance rules, e.g.
through appending company law rules by codes of management conduct,
even though those rules might prevent the management from avoiding
taxes aggressively. But not only firm-internal corporate governance rules
are relevant here, but also the signals coming from the state. For ex-
ample, when the Putin government announced in the year 2000 to take
a stronger stance against tax evasion, the stock prices of the firms con-
cerned by this measure rose. Here a stricter government policy against
tax avoidance and evasion replaced the lax adherence to internal corpo-
rate governance rules (Desai et al., 2007). The opportunistic activities of
the management of many Russian companies were made public and not
tolerated any longer. Taxation here has not only the purpose of gener-
ating revenue for the state, but also to provide standardized information
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(balance sheets) to the public and to enforce corporate governance rules.
From this and other examples it can be concluded that a strict and
credible state aid control can signal to potential investors that the state
will not support management strategies that are in the interest of the
management but not necessarily in the interests of firm owners. The
case of Opel/GM is a good example for how a broad discussion of a
possible sale and subsequent award of state aid uncovered the strategic
management problems of the corporation.
Similar eﬀects could be observed in the United States as well. Hanlon
et al. (2012) report an increase in the quality of financial reports with
an increase in tax enforcement. This eﬀect is particularly strong where
other monitoring mechanisms are less developed. Hanlon and Slemrod
(2009) investigate for example the eﬀects of media reports about a firm’s
management’s tax aggressiveness. They observe that news about firm
activities in oﬀ-shore tax havens lead to a decrease in stock prices. This
eﬀect is smaller for firms with good corporate governance – an indicator
that in those companies, the shareholders do not worry about oppor-
tunistic behavior of the management towards them. It could be spec-
ulated that, likewise, firms signaling publicly to refrain from accepting
state aids might see their share prices rise. Desai and Dharmapala (2006)
empirically find a link between tax avoiding activities of the management
and the firm’s management compensation scheme.
The analogy between tax avoidance and state aid to firms might seem
startling at first glance, since the former takes place in opacity while the
latter is more public in nature. Two points render this analogy more
powerful. First, regulatory restrictions on direct and specific subsidies
to firms (e.g. at the EU or WTO level) require states to exert some
creativity in the method how it awards aid: Often the aid is not given
directly as cash money out of the state budget, but more indirectly via
the granting of tax credits, costless use or access to public infrastructure,
or profitable deals with public authorities that discriminate competitors.
Secondly, states often do not show much interest in monitoring the use of
subsidies, and even less in sanctioning the unintended use or the firm?s
failure to comply with agreements made. This observation is in line with
the general finding that the state is a poor entrepreneur (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992; Zenger et al., 2011) and the more specific findings of a
study by the European Commission where it is showcased that jurisdic-
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tions only seldom control for the promised amount of jobs by firms in
return for state aid (Ramboll and Matrix, 2012). Another trigger for the
opacity of state aids is the potential interconnectedness between firms
and politicians. While a fair and unhampered competition between firms
demand a strict application of the rule of law, politicians may be more
in favor of discretionary policy measures that secure their success in the
booth, but that undermine fair competition between firms (see e.g. Tol-
lison, 1982). Chaney et al. (2011) also show that the quality of account-
ing information in politically connected companies is significantly poorer
than that of similar non-connected firms. This suggests that connected
firms can aﬀord disclosing lower quality accounting information because
they face a lesser need to respond to market pressures to improve the
quality of accounting information. They do not face the repercussions
of a higher cost of debt that similar, but politically not connected firms
with lower quality reported earnings face. Claessens et al. (2008) showed
that firms which contributed to electoral campaigns in Brazil substan-
tially increased their bank financing relative to firms that did not. This
indicates that access to bank finance can be a channel through which
political connections operate.
Another possible coalition in the game between managers, owners,
and the state is the one between the state and the management. This
would be the case if the management corrupts the tax authority in order
to continue extracting rents from the firm. This can happen through
outright bribes, or by paying too much taxes, e.g. on illicit profits (see
e.g. Erickson et al., 2004). The Bremer Vulkan case seems to have been
an example of a fraudulent entanglement and thus conflicts of interest
between firm managers and the state (the CEO of Bremer Vulkan was
a member of the ruling social-democratic party and former director of
the Bremen’s city administration). This is an argument in favor of a
supra-jurisdictional state aid control mechanism preventing local rent-
seeking coalitions – a proposal that would move European state aid
control beyond its fixation on competition matters.
A complex web of interrelations between a firm’s managers, share-
holders, politicians, employees and voters emerges which drives the in-
herent agency problem of giving state aids. Thereby it depends on the
specific context which of these groups profits most from the granting
of state aids. However, what can be already derived from this is that
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mitigating the agency problem will result in a better calibration of the
web of interest groups. This very general statement nevertheless has two
important implications: First, a more comprehensive collection of state
aid data would help to overcome the opacity that allows yet managers
and politicians to profit individually from the given subsidies while other
groups, like shareholders or voters, pay for it. Second, opacity is most
likely overcome if a supra-jurisdictional state aid control mechanism be-
comes implemented that is more immune against local rent-seeking coali-
tions.
6.5 Corporate Governance and incentive prob-
lems of state aids
6.5.1 The book-income gap
When the state awards an aid, it becomes active as an investor of sorts,
albeit for diﬀerent reasons than private investors. Most of the time,
the state is interested in creating or maintaining jobs or in promoting
research and development. The problem is how to represent the legit-
imate interests of this investor, which de facto can be interpreted as a
shareholder, but is not considered as such by company law. In order to
better understand this connection, the incentive structure of the man-
agement in relation to corporate governance has to be investigated. This
research has to give a particular significance to tax authorities and state
aid control.
Tax avoiding strategies lead to an increase in the gap between book
income and taxable income. As a result, the eﬀective tax rates decrease
and an increasing amount of companies pays little or no taxes at all
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009b).
This book-income gap of firms has risen since the 1990s (Desai and
Hines, 2002). This means that firms progressively report a diﬀerent in-
come to the tax authorities than they do to the financial markets. This
divided reporting is often the direct result of complicated financial trans-
actions and opaque firm constructs (see e.g. the example of Dynergy in
Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). This applies to subsidies as well, when
it is not transparent what the aids are being used for in the end or
where parts of the state aids might go to. This can also contribute to
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an increase in the book-income gap. In the case of Bremer Vulkan, the
subsidies disappeared in a cash pool of an opaque firm construct. With
the German nuclear power plants, the problem is that the appropriate
amount of reserves is unclear and almost uncontrolled internal finance
means are available to the management. In the case of Opel it was not
clear whether the state aid would not have benefited the ailing parent
company General Motors.
The increasing divergence between book income and tax income
therefore is a sign that investors on capital markets might receive less
accurate and occasionally wrong information about firms. A first con-
clusion of the agency view of tax avoidance is therefore the proposal to
abolish the balance sheet and to rely only on the tax income to calculate
the tax burden, but also to inform the capital markets (for a discussion,
see Desai, 2007).
6.5.2 Opportunistic tax avoidance by the manage-
ment
The common view of tax avoidance assumes that avoiding taxes serves
the reduction of the firm’s tax burden. In that view, managers aggres-
sively make use of tax shelters – once defined colloquially as “a deal
done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be
very stupid” (Graetz, 2010) – in order to benefit the owners of the firm.
The same is true for state aids: managers seek subsidies in order to
improve the firm value.
Yet, there is a non-trivial incentive problem for the management
linked to the use of tax avoiding strategies and application for subsidies.
Shareholders imposing a fixed salary might not give the right incentives
to engage in those profit-enhancing activities. If those activities are
deemed illegal by a court of law, then the possible consequences will
have to be borne by the managers more than by the shareholders who
can be assumed to own a diversified stock portfolio. Accordingly, the
managers do not want to jeopardize their reputation and chances on
the market for corporate control and thereby reduce their future income
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).
Conversely, this incentive problem explains why the increase of the
prevalence of performance-based executive compensation has led to an
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increase in tax avoiding activities (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). In-
dividual companies even reorganized their tax departments into profit
centers (most prominently: Enron, see Joint Committee on Taxation,
2003). This trend leads to a variety of problems. The tax department
weighs in on business decisions, with the result that firms base their de-
cisions not on whether they make them more eﬃcient, but on whether
they save taxes3. It might drive eﬃcient firms that do not pay much at-
tention to taxes out of business to the benefit of possibly ineﬃcient firms
that are more tax-savy, for instance, by being better able to attract cap-
ital. Furthermore, aggressive tax avoidance strategies reallocate human
capital to perform innovative tax optimization instead of developing in-
novative products (Burman and Slemrod, 2012). Most importantly for
this book, it has exacerbated the above-mentioned opportunism problem
shareholders face vis-a`-vis the management. Tax avoidance requires a
high degree of opacity which can be used by the management to divert
profits into their own pockets. The same applies to state aids, where
the management also has to apply an amount of creativity in order to
acquire them, which at the same time means that the advantages of the
subsidy do not necessarily benefit the owners.
The diversion of firm property by the managers is understood very
broadly in the agency view of tax avoidance. What the term subsumes
are all activities benefiting the managers but not the owners. This in-
cludes, for example, to manipulate earnings in order to augment the
variable part of the salary. This assumes that the earnings of a firm
are given exogenously and can only be observed by the managers. The
manager then determines the level of earnings he or she reports to the
owners (the balance sheet). At the same time, he or she determines the
earnings declared to the tax authorities (the tax income). This double
reporting enables the manager to divert firm profits into their pockets.
By definition, these manipulations of the balance sheet and the tax-
able income are diﬃcult to trace in detail. Due to the public interest
it caused, the Enron case revealed some of the strategies used. En-
ron transformed its tax department into a business unit, that is, into a
profit-generating department. Its task was to generate as many earnings
3The assumption here is that the tax considered is one that has as a goal primarily
to generate revenue. The statement does not hold for taxes that aim at inducing a
diﬀerent behavior, as it is the case e.g. with environmental taxes.
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as possible for the annual statement. Some of the unit’s projects were
very expensive. Desai and Dharmapala (2009b) report, for example, a
transaction that cost 11 million dollars. The transaction had the pur-
pose of artificially inflating the balance sheet, but did not entail any
significant reduction in the tax burden. Behind the veil of tax avoid-
ance, the owners suﬀered substantial costs due to these balance tricks
and entering buy-and-hold positions; thus these activities only served
the management. Similar cases can be found in the firms Dynergy (De-
sai and Dharmapala, 2006), as well as Tyco and Parmalat (Desai, 2005).
It can easily be imagined how subsidies might have similar eﬀects and
encourage a likewise behavior.
In order to better understand the opportunism problem, Desai and
Dharmapala (2009b) present an example. The starting point is a firm
with earning of $100 each in two periods. The tax rate be 35%. By
making use of tax avoiding strategies, the management can reduce the
tax burden to 30%. In the end of period 2, the firm has a value of
$100 and all its earnings are paid as a dividend to the shareholders.
The manager leaves the firm at the end of period 1. There can be two
executive compensation schemes: he or she can (a) receive a fixed salary
of $10, (b) receive a fixed salary of $10 and a 50% share of the after-tax
profits in period 1 exceeding $65, or (c) receive a fixed salary of $10 in
period 1 and 1% of the shares in period 2.
From the traditional tax avoidance literature point of view, the result
would be the following. The reported earnings are the true earnings in
each period. Tax avoidance leads to an increase in firm value in any case,
independently of the compensation scheme. But the latter determines
whether the managers have the right incentives to exert the necessary
eﬀort to engage in tax avoidance. It can be easily seen that there is an
incentive compatibility problem in cases (b) and (c).
Yet, tax loop holes and discretion in accounting rules provide the
opportunity to manipulate earnings. In the numerical example given
above, the manager could transfer earnings from period two to period
one. Instead of reporting $100 every year, he or she could report earnings
of $125 in period 1 and $75 in period 2. From a tax point of view, this
measure is neutral. If the manager receives a fixed amount as in case
(a), he or she does not have any incentive to do that. If his or her pay
is performance-based as in case (b), then he or she has every incentive
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to enter tax avoiding strategies and at the same time to raise earnings
in period 1 to the detriment of the earnings in period 2. His or her
personal income increases due to this measure. But in this example, this
strategy is harmful for the owners of the firm. They profit from a lower
tax burden, but the lose income due to the higher bonus payments to
the managers.
A possible solution to this problem could be scheme (c). In that
case the manager acts like an owner in period 2, who would be worse-oﬀ
because of the tax avoidance activities. Therefore, all possible damages
would be internalized by the manager. Desai and Dharmapala therefore
come to the conclusion that the right compensation scheme, here share
participation, can prevent managers from entering disadvantageous tax
avoidance strategies. This is only true though when managers cannot
divert earnings from period 1 to period 2.
This simple numerical example highlights the relevance of executive
compensation schemes not only for tax matters, but generally for all
kinds of rent-seeking by the management, which also include seeking
state subsidies (see e.g. Gupta and Swenson (2003) on rent-seeking by
agents of the firm in the area of policy-making).
6.5.3 Monitoring by the tax authorities
In Desai et al. (2007) the tax authorities fulfill an important monitoring
role. Managers can divert certain amounts of firm earnings, but this
can entail substantial ex-post costs, that is, punishment of opportunistic
behavior. From the perspective of the manager it is irrelevant whether
the activities are uncovered by instruments of corporate governance or
by the tax authorities. In that case, the agency view of tax avoidance
predicts that countries with higher corporate tax rates should have a
generally higher level of tax avoidance or evasion than countries with
lower corporate tax rates. Accordingly, corporate taxation improves the
quality of monitoring when the enforcement of corporate taxes surpasses
a certain level. The probability of detecting tax diversion by the manage-
ment increases. This result has to be specified further in the situational
context of firms. Indeed, this link is stronger if corporate governance
is weak. The monitoring through the collection of corporate taxes then
substitutes the weak legal rules of corporate governance. This is also
true when the ownership of the firm is dispersed. In that case, there is
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a collective-action problem on the part of the shareholders which makes
the enforcement of corporate governance rules more diﬃcult. The tax
authority then acts as a block holder of sorts and takes over the moni-
toring role.
It can therefore be said that, for any given level of quality of corporate
governance, the firm value increases with the degree of tax enforcement
(better monitoring) and decreases with the tax rate (higher incentives
for diversion of tax savings).
This relationship can also be transposed to the problem of state aids.
Firm owners have to expect that managers divert state aid monies into
their pockets the weaker the corporate governance is developed. The
weaker the corporate governance and the bigger the collective-action
problem of the shareholders, the more important it becomes that there
be a strict monitoring by state aid control. Such a monitoring is in the
interest of the aid-granting entity as well as of the owners who have an
interest in increasing firm value. At the same time it can be assumed that
the smaller the subsidy and therefore the smaller the potential amount
for diversions, the less attractive it is to the management to divert funds
from the state aid.
6.6 Moral hazard and subsidies
For long, the information asymmetry between shareholders and manage-
ment has been considered as an important trigger for ineﬃcient invest-
ment decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984).
With regard to the problem discussed in this book, the information
asymmetry gives leeway to managers to engage in rent-seeking activities
which damage the overall eﬃciency and value of firms (see, for example,
Rajan et al., 2000; Seog and Baik, 2012; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).
Firms may underinvest in growth options, which are in the interest of
shareholders but not necessarily of managers (Holmstro¨m and Ricart i
Costa, 1986; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992).
More specifically, the availability of subsidies may create a moral
hazard problem. There is a long-standing literature on so-called soft
budget constraints in state-owned firms (mainly focused on transition
economies) emphasizing the insuring eﬀect of state subsidies (Kornai,
1986). In a case study of developing countries, Buccola and McCandlish
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(1999) show how the managers of state-owned firms and their supervisors
within the civil service lobby shield the firm from competition together
and maximize the costs.
The managers of a firm are aware of the fact that unemployment
is politically costly to politicians. In case of diﬃculties, e.g. due to in-
creased imports or other competition, they can request protection (nowa-
days mainly through non-tariﬀs barriers such as health regulation) or
seek subsidies. As a result, employment levels might be sustained, but
also the firm’s profits might have increased unduly (Hillman et al., 1987).
Also the regulation of public utilities in Western market economies
has to deal with that sort of problem. Under the traditional “cost-plus”
price regulation scheme, when at the end of the regulation period all
costs become balanced by the public, managers of public utilities have
only little incentive to care for cost eﬀectiveness and investments into
new technologies (Joskow and Noll, 1981; Joskow, 2007).
In the case of subsidies to private firms, it can similarly be assumed
that rent-seeking behavior of management is induced. However, diﬀer-
ently to public utilities, those firms compete with other firms for a limited
amount of publicly available subsidies. This competition for public rents
drives a wedge into management eﬀort. On the one hand managers en-
gage in general management activities, on the other hand they strive for
rent-seeking activities. This is exacerbated by the private benefits they
receive from rent-seeking activities due to the governance mechanisms
in place within the firm.
Some papers discuss the link between access to finance through gov-
ernment subsidies and risk-taking behavior. For instance, Gande and
Kalpathy (2013) find that the federal loan assistance through the U.S.
Federal Reserve emergency loan program that some large financial firms
received during the financial crisis is related to CEO risk-taking incen-
tives (a 10% increase in CEO risk-taking incentives is associated with a
1.41% increase in federal loan assistance).
In a paper written under the impression of the insolvency of a large
numbers of government-insured savings and loans associations and the
government had to bail out financial institutions, Akerlof and Romer
(1993) introduce the concept of “bankruptcy for profit” (p. 1) and dis-
cuss the “incentive to go broke for profit at society’s expense (to loot)
instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success)” (p. 2). Although gov-
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ernments require firms operating under soft budget constraints to meet
specific targets for an accounting measure of net worth, the owners4 of
the firm will find that bankrupting it while extracting a profit can be a
more attractive strategy than maximizing true economic values. In their
model, the profits that these “looters” (ibid.) acquire is lower than the
payouts by the government – society as a whole incurs a net loss. Unlike
models of excessive risk-taking due to government guarantees, in which
the owners of a firm want the gambles to pay oﬀ, Akerlof and Romer em-
phasize strategies in which bankruptcy itself is the goal for profit reasons.
They provide three examples of how looting works in savings and loans
associations (inflating net worth, shifting yields from one period to an-
other, and creating artificial earnings through acquisition, development,
and construction loans)
An important observation appears in Akerlof and Romer (1993),
namely that loans from the state are diﬀerent from loans given by private
investors: “optimizing individuals will not repeatedly lend on terms that
let them be exploited, so if lending occurs, some kind of mechanism (such
as reputation, collateral, or debt covenants) that protects the lenders
must be at work. However, this premise may not apply to lending ar-
rangements undertaken by the government. Governments sometimes do
things that optimizing agents would not do, and, because of their power
to tax, can persist long after any other person or firm would have been
forced to stop because of a lack of resources” (p. 5). They hint at sev-
eral reasons why the political process led to the government being left
exposed to abuse: regulators hid to what extent artificial accounting
devices caused problems, congressmen exerted pressure on regulators in
favor of their constituents and political donors, and the savings and loan
industry lobbied to postpone any regulatory action so that general tax
revenue would have to address the issues and not revenue stemming from
taxes on successful firms.
4They do not consider the agency problem between owners and managers of the
firm (on purpose). In their view, opportunistic strategies can be implemented more
easily if ownership is concentrated and therefore the owners can control their man-
agers more tightly. This is also their explanation why bank regulators prohibited
concentrated ownership in savings and loans associations until the 1980s. The agency
view of tax avoidance, on the other hand, turns this view upside-down and empha-
sizes the need for opacity and lax controls for the management to follow aggressive
tax avoidance strategies.
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6.7 A model of tax evasion, subsidies, and
managerial diversion
To examine the relation between corporate governance, corporate taxes,
and state aids, I extend the relatively standard model of governance
in Desai et al. (2007), on which they superimposed a corporate income
tax, by adding a state aid (and distinguish them by kind). Likewise,
the model focuses on the problem of diversion by insiders – due to the
prevalence of concentrated ownership structures, this is generally seen
as the most relevant conflict.
6.7.1 The optimal level of diversion
In the Desai et al. (2007) model, insiders divert a proportion d ∈ [0, 1] of
the firm’s revenue. These insiders own a fraction λ of the company, and
thus, if there are no taxes or state aids whatsoever, receive a payoﬀ of
λ(1− d) + d. Diverting income is costly because insiders can be caught
and penalized, which is modeled with a quadratic function C(d) = γ2d
2.
The parameter γ captures the quality of the corporate governance system
(the higher, the better).
The diﬀerence between the payoﬀ function and the cost function (i.e.,
the optimal amount of diversion) is maximized if:
d∗ = min
(
1− λ
γ
, 1
)
(6.7.1)
6.7.2 The eﬀect of a corporate income tax
The corporate tax is characterized by two parameters: the tax rate t
and the level of enforcement α. Getting caught evading taxes produces
a personal cost to insiders of C(d) = αd
2
2 .
With corporate taxation, the total payoﬀ to insiders equals λ(1 −
d)(1− t)+d− α+γ2 d2, which leads to a new optimal amount of diversion:
d∗∗ = min
(
1− λ(1− t)
α+ γ
, γ
)
(6.7.2)
This setup leads to a couple of results and corollaries (all taken from
Desai et al. (2007), proofs omitted):
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• Ceteris paribus, countries with a higher tax rate will have higher
levels of diversion. This eﬀect is stronger where tax enforcement
is weaker.
• The introduction of a corporate tax improves corporate governance
(i.e., reduces the amount of diversion) if and only if the level of tax
enforcement exceeds a critical level (α > λγt1−λ ).
• For a given monitoring ability of the tax authorities (α), the intro-
duction of a corporate tax is more likely to reduce diversion (and
improve corporate governance) when (i) the corporate governance
system is weaker, (ii) ownership is less concentrated, and (iii) the
tax rate is lower.
• The market value of a company increases with tax enforcement
and decreases with the tax rate.
• Following an increase in enforcement, companies that were previ-
ously diverting more will experience a larger increase in price.
• The value of control decreases with tax enforcement.
• if 0 < α+γ+λ−12λ < 1, then corporate tax revenues as a function of
corporate tax rates are hump-shaped.
• The sensitivity of corporate tax revenues to tax rate changes in-
creases with the quality of the corporate governance system γ.
• The sensitivity of tax revenues to tax rate changes increases with
ownership for tax rates below 50%. For tax rates above that, it
decreases with ownership.
6.7.3 Introducing state aid
To understand the eﬀects that state aid might have on the corporate
governance problem here, it is paramount to first distinguish the various
kinds of state aids, as they will enter the model diﬀerently.
Let us consider three kinds of state aids: in-kind aids, tax cuts, and
lump-sum subsidies.
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In-kind aids The first kind does not involve a financial transfer, but
reflects a government aid specific to the firm nevertheless. This aid could
for instance be an improvement of the infrastructure in the immediate
surroundings of the firm: a direct access to the highway, a heliport, or
a new university built conveniently next to the company headquarters.
In this situation, the management will not be able to divert any of the
direct benefits of the aid. This assumes that the management is not
able to negotiate aids which constitute private benefits for the company
insiders. [EXAMPLES? E.g. heliport in Chicago for Boeing] In fact,
the management might be strong enough to extort private benefits from
the aid-granting jurisdiction. But because the taxpayers, but not the
shareholders are harmed by that, this is a problem of public choice, not
corporate governance.
Tax cuts A tax cut will counter-act against the benefits from a cor-
porate tax (assuming that the corporate tax was chosen in such a way
that it reduces diversion). The management now has less incentives to
divert funds (since the income is not taxed), but at the same time faces
a lower cost of doing so5.
Lump-sum subsidies A lump-sum subsidies might at first appear
equivalent to a tax cut. Given the framework above, they are not,
though. The total income of the firm remains the same as if the aid
was given as a tax credit. What is diﬀerent though is the monitoring.
After receiving the subsidy, the firm is still under scrutiny from the tax
authorities.
This leads to the following results:
• Tax cuts, equivalent to lax tax enforcement, exacerbate the corpo-
rate governance problem.
• Lump-sum subsidies are to be preferred over tax cuts because they
maintain the monitoring.
5On a sidenote, the European Commission has recently announced to address the
issue of aggressive tax planning from a state aid and competition point of view. The
claim is that letting companies pursue such tax strategies might actually constitute
a form of state aid (Almunia, 2014).
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• In-kind aids do not pose a corporate governance problem, at least if
the management is not powerful enough to steer a local government
away from awarding lump-sum subsidies towards giving an in-kind
aid which constitutes private benefits for the insiders.
6.7.4 Extensions
The used framework might be extended by an aspect deliberately left out
by Desai et al. (2007), namely the link between tax rates and tax enforce-
ment – and, extending even further, the amount of subsidies granted. In
fact, the public might might pressure the government granting state aids
to a firm to subject the latter to greater scrutiny than a firm operating
without any aids from the state. This indeed seems to have happened
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
In terms of the model, a state aid might be tied to an increase in α.
This has a double positive eﬀect on the market value of the firm because
not only is the eﬀective tax rate lower, but also the tax enforcement is
better (which in this model is good for the outsider shareholders). Unlike
in the original model, this eﬀect only applies to the aid-receiving firm –
all other firms keep their previous tax enforcement levels. As another
consequence, the corporate tax revenues (from this specific firm) might
not be hump-shaped anymore.
6.7.5 Limitations of the model(s)
Desai et al. (2007) address several limitations of the model. The present
extensions also need some further critical remarks.
There are no negotiations between insiders and outsiders about the
level of diversion. The power of outsiders can be subsumed under the
parameter γ. Indeed, it could be imagined that firm outsiders might
have a word to say on the rent-seeking activities of the management.
Other negotiations and possible side deals are missing as well. The
model does not consider the possibility that insiders and outsiders co-
ordinate their actions to reduce the corporate tax liability. Equally im-
portantly, it does not provide for the possibility that insiders and the
government conspire against the outside shareholders. The reason for
that are the high transaction costs involved, especially in publicly traded
companies.
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6.8 A model of managerial rent-seeking ef-
fort and diversion
Introducing an agency perspective into state aid control produces vari-
ous trade-oﬀs for management and shareholders which cannot be easily
overcome. That is because shareholders like managers to be engaged in
tax avoiding activities, however only as long as the profits of this activity
accrue to them in form of a higher firm value.
In order to illustrate the trade-oﬀs involved and to show the maxi-
mization problems of the managers and the shareholders, the following
model can help.
6.8.1 Two kinds of eﬀorts
Assume a firm is owned by the shareholders and controlled by the man-
agers. The managers do two things. They exert eﬀort m for general
management activities. They furthermore engage in rent-seeking activi-
ties r in order to acquire state subsidies s (measured in monetary units
per unit of rent-seeking eﬀort). Both eﬀorts combined are subject to a
quadratic cost function (c(m+ r)2).
Depending on the eﬀorts exerted, the firm will make a profit accord-
ing to a Cobb-Douglas function uniting the general management eﬀort
and the rent-seeking eﬀort. This reflects the idea that a subsidy on
its own is not profit-increasing, but requires an additional management
eﬀort to be transformed productively.
The Cobb-Douglas function reflects the problem better than the lin-
ear functions used by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) in their multitask
principal-agent problem. It incorporates diminishing marginal return,
which is a very realistic assumption about management and rent-seeking
eﬀorts. It also mirrors the complementarity of labor (management) and
capital (subsidies) as it is common in economic growth theories based
on Cobb-Douglas functions.
6.8.2 The managers
Thanks to high-powered incentives, managers receive a share b of the
profit. In addition, they receive private benefits from the subsidies, that
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is, the share of the state aids that does not go into the profits, but
purely into the pay-oﬀ of managers. The corporate governance measure
γ indicates how much of the aids goes into the profits and how much
into private benefits (1− γ).
The managers’ profit is therefore:
M = b(Zm)α(γsr)1−α − (1− γ)sr − c(m+ r)2 (6.8.1)
Given the exogenous parameters γ, b, Z (a constant), c, α, and s,
they chose their optimal levels of m and r.
6.8.3 The shareholders’ perspective
The shareholders of the firm are aware of the calculations that the man-
agers make. They therefore set the governance parameter accordingly.
But corporate governance comes at a price. They face coordination costs.
If they do not monitor the managers at all, they have a nominal cost
of T (representative of the minimum of costs incurred by fulfilling the
duties of being a shareholder, such as opening the invitation letter for
the general assembly). The other extreme, namely complete monitoring,
is prohibitively expensive. To monitor all actions of the managers, the
shareholders would have to attend all the day-to-day activities of the
managers. The shareholders will therefore never want to install a gover-
nance mechanism that does not allow for any possible private benefits.
The total pay-oﬀ of the shareholders is therefore the profit the firm
produces minus the bonus payments and the transaction costs of gover-
nance:
H = (1− b)(Zm)α(γsr)1−α − T
1− g (6.8.2)
The shareholders maximize this pay-oﬀ by anticipating the eﬀort
levels chosen by the managers for any given γ and set it accordingly.
Using numerical optimizations, the following graphs can be obtained:
6.9 Results
Because of the complexity of the multi-dimensional optimization prob-
lem, we use numerical estimations to get an idea of the eﬀects taking
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place.
Unless noted otherwise, the exogenous parameters are set to be c = 1,
b = 0.4, and Z = 800. The possible eﬀort parameters m and r range
from 0 to 149 (integers only). This can be interpreted for example as
the amount of working hours spent in a fortnight. The optimal γ’s were
calculated in steps of 1/10 ranging from 0 to 0.99 (a γ of 1 would cause
a division by 0).
6.9.1 The optimal choice of governance
After predicting the managers’ eﬀort levels m and r as a function of γ,
the shareholders will choose the γ that maximizes their pay-oﬀ. The
simulation shows that there is a high variance among the optimal γ’s for
diﬀerent exogenous parameters such as s or α, and that they sometimes
vary non-monotonously (see figure 6.3). Most interestingly, even in the
absence of monitoring costs, shareholders will in almost all cases want
to set the governance level somewhere in the interval ]0; 1[, that is, they
only rarely strive for perfect corporate governance. In a certain way,
the private benefits of subsidies act as a sort of bonus incentivizing the
managers to exert an eﬀort. This is in line with the findings of the
agency view of tax avoidance which comes to the conclusion that some
opacity is necessary to achieve optimal results.
6.9.2 Monitoring costs
The eﬀect of an increase in the shareholders’ transaction costs for the
managers is straight-forward and intuitive. The higher the monitoring
costs, the weaker the governance mechanism they will implement. But
the governance level set for a certain transaction cost level increases
with the availability of subsidies. In other words, the more subsidies a
firm receives, the more monitoring the shareholders will perform, ceteris
paribus. Figure 6.4 shows the optimal choice of g as a function of T for
diﬀerent levels of s.
6.9.3 The availability of subsidies
When subsidies or other state aids are readily available, the firm man-
agers will put more emphasis on rent-seeking activities to the detriment
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Figure 6.3: Optimal γ as a function of s, for T = 2100, α = 0.9
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Figure 6.4: Optimal γ as a function of T , for diﬀerent s, with α = 0.9
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of general management eﬀorts. Parts of the subsidies contribute to firm
profits, but a share 1 − γ flows into the managers’ pockets. Therefore,
the overall eﬀect of having easy access to state aids is ambivalent from
the point of view of the shareholders. Under cheap monitoring, a higher
availability of subsidies unequivocally leads to higher pay-oﬀs for the
shareholders. But with increasing costs of governance, there are local
maxima. This means that from the shareholders’ perspective, more sub-
sidies does not always mean more firm value. Figure 6.5 illustrates the
change in shareholder profit as a function of s.
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Figure 6.5: Shareholder profit as a function of s for diﬀerent T , with
α = 0.9
6.9.4 The output elasticities of eﬀort
The variable α measures the output elasticities of the general manage-
ment eﬀort and the rent-seeking eﬀort (1 − α; for the time being, we
assume constant returns to scale). Whether there are indeed local max-
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ima depends on the α: the lower the α, the higher the chance of finding
local maxima. This suggests that the characteristics of the specific sub-
sidy and the industry in general matter.
6.9.5 The regulator’s perspective
From the perspective of the regulator, the main problem is that the
private profits of the managers are not observable and verifiable. As a
benevolent social planner, it would object to the wasteful spending in
rent seeking eﬀort and consequential reduction in shareholder value. It
also has an interest in reducing the wasteful transaction costs incurred
on the shareholders by the increased need to monitor the managers.
These arguments alone could be – under certain conditions – suﬃcient
to warrant an ban or reduction of state aid.
6.10 Legal measures against private bene-
fits from state aids
During the time of the recent bank bailouts and probably induced by
scandals such as the one surrounding AIG, some European countries
passed laws to restrict the payment of bonuses to bank employees. Fur-
thermore, the EU Commission adopted a banking communication which
also sets caps on executive remuneration in the case of state aids to
banks.
6.10.1 European countries
The French government issued to decrees with rules of compensation
for senior executives of state-aided companies (Dcret n 2009-348 du 30
mars 2009 relatif aux conditions de rmunration des dirigeants des en-
treprises aides par l’Etat ou bnficiant du soutien de l’Etat du fait de la
crise conomique et des responsables des entreprises publiques, expired on
31 December 2010). According to these decrees, bonuses are prohibited
if large-scale lay-oﬀs are necessary to save the company. When aiding
banks, the government also appoints a controller to supervise whether
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the bank’s internal policies are in compliance with national and interna-
tional rules. 6
Bank aid in Germany was mainly conducted by a special program of
the German federal government called Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabil-
isierung (SoFFin - Special Financial Market Stabilization Funds), which
was then reorganized in 2011 under the newly-created Finanzmarktsta-
bilisierungsagentur (FMSA - Agency for the Stabilization of the Finan-
cial Markets). Under this scheme, banks which receive aids need to
re-examine their compensation systems. The salaries for senior execu-
tives are capped at e 500,000 for the years 2008 and 2009. All bonus
payments that are not legally required are prohibited by law, as well as
severance payments for managers and awarding stock option grants and
their exercise7.
In Italy, the Law Decree n. 98/2011 on Urgent Stability Measures
requires banks to adopt a Code of Ethics with rules regarding the remu-
neration of the top management8.
In the Netherlands, Article 14 of the Regulation on Sound Remu-
neration Policies pursuant to the Financial Supervision Act 2011 of 16
december 2010 issued by the Dutch Central Bank9 limits the variable
part of bank executives’ compensation. It says that financial institu-
tions benefiting from state aid (a) have to limit the variable part of
executives’ pay to a percentage of net revenue as long as this does not
interfere with the timely repayment of the state aid and with maintain-
ing a solid capital base, (b) ensure that they restructure their rewards
so that they are aligned with sound risk management and long-term
development, including, where appropriate, establishing limits to the re-
muneration of the daily policy makers of the financial institution, and
6Guido Ferrarini and Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Remuneration Policies at State-
Aided Banks, presentation held at the Center for Research in Law & Economics
(CRELE) Bolzano on 27-28 November 2009
7See FMSA, Vergtungsgrundstze, Neufassung im Hinblick auf die Insti-
tutsvergtungsordnung, February 2012, the Restrukturierungsgesetz, and the Finanz-
marktstabilisierungsgesetz.
8Guido Ferrarini and Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Remuneration Policies at State-
Aided Banks, presentation held at the Center for Research in Law & Economics
(CRELE) Bolzano on 27-28 November 2009
9Regeling van De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. van 16 december 2010, houdende
regels met betrekking tot het beheerst beloningsbeleid van financile ondernemingen
(Regeling beheerst beloningsbeleid Wft 2011)
221
6.10 Legal measures 199
(c) pay no variable remuneration to day-to-day decision-makers of the
financial institution, unless justified.
After the bailout of several Spanish banks, there was a public outcry
about the earnings of the managers of these banks. E.g., Bankia, the
largest Spanish bank by number of customers, paids its top executives
more than e 2 million a year after receiving e 4.5 billion in state aids10.
There were also some scandals in which managers of bailed-out banks
awarded themselves multi-million dollar severance payments. As a con-
sequence, the Spanish government set a cap at e 600,000 euros per year
for executive salaries at rescued banks, and suspended incentive pay.
The salaries of top executives at banks of which the state took over the
majority during the bailout were limited to e 300,000. Furthermore, it
limited other forms of remuneration, e.g. extraordinary pension fund
contributions. The rules stem are set forth in Real Decreto-ley 2/2012,
de 3 de febrero 2012, de saneamiento del sector financiero (Royal Decree
on recapitalization of the financial sector). This decree also limits the
salaries of the middle management (e 50,000 or e 100,000, depending on
whether the state holds a majority of shares or not).
Art. 10a of the Swiss Banking Act (Bankengesetz ) authorizes the
Federal Government (Bundesrat) to impose rules regarding employee
compensation. More specifically, it can decide to prohibit partially or
completely the payment of variable compensations. It can also more
generally adjust the compensation scheme in place. This applies only to
banks which are systemically relevant. These banks are also required to
include clauses in their compensation schemes a caveat that the variable
components of the salaries might be restricted in the case that the bank
receives state aids.
6.10.2 European Union
At the EU level, the current version of the central document pertaining
to state aids and the management is the so-called “Banking Communi-
cation’’11. Some of the measures in this new set of state aid rules relates
10http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/spain-banks-
idUSL5E8D32TP20120203
11Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of
State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial
crisis (‘Banking Communication’), 2013/C 216/01
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to the issues addressed in this chapter. Already the Banking Communi-
cation of 2008 prevented the management from receiving undue benefits
from state aids and gave EU Member States the power to curb executive
compensation. The 2009 Recapitalisation Communication also limited
the handing out of fixed and variable payments. In the Impaired Asset
Communication of 2009 the Commission also suggested considering caps
on executive remuneration.
6.10.2.1 Executive compensation
Paragraph 37 of the 2013 Banking Communication prescribes a pun-
ishment mechanism if a bank has to request state aids even though it
could have been averted “through appropriate and timely management
action”. In that case, the state aid granting entity “should normally”
fire the bank’s CEO, as well as other board members “if appropriate”.
The Communication explicitly states that managers should have incen-
tives to “undertake far-reaching restructuring in good times”, which, in
turn, will “minimise the need to recourse to State support”.
Paragraph 38 continues in that reasoning. It states that said entities
“should [sic] apply strict executive remuneration policies”. According
to the Communication, this requires a cap on executive pay as well as
restrictions on the total remuneration to senior staﬀ. This applies to
fixed salaries as well as variable components and pensions and should
be “in line with Articles 93 and 94 of the EU Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD IV)”. Article 93 of the CRD12 states that:
“In the case of institutions that benefit from exceptional gov-
ernment intervention, the following principles shall apply in
addition to those set out in Article 92(2):
a. variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage
of net revenue where it is inconsistent with the main-
tenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from
government support;
12Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and investment firms
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b. the relevant competent authorities require institutions
to restructure remuneration in a manner aligned with
sound risk management and long-term growth, includ-
ing, where appropriate, establishing limits to the remu-
neration of the members of the management body of
the institution;
c. no variable remuneration is paid to members of the man-
agement body of the institution unless justified.” (Ar-
ticle 91, CRD IV)
Article 94 sets some detailed rules about the variable component of
the compensation (independently of whether the financial institution re-
ceives state aid or not). Most importantly, it limits the bonus payments
to 100% of the base salary (200% after explicit approval by the share-
holders).
In addition to that, the Banking Communication stipulates that
“[t]he total remuneration of any such individual may therefore not ex-
ceed 15 times the national average salary in the Member State where the
beneficiary is incorporated or 10 times the average salary of employees
in the beneficiary bank. Restrictions on remuneration must apply until
the end of the restructuring period or until the bank has repaid the State
aid, whichever occurs earlier.” (para 38, footnotes omitted)
Paragraph 39 requests that banks receiving state aids in the form of
recapitalization or impaired asset measures should not “in principle make
severance payments in excess of what is required by law or contract.”
These rules apply to all banks receiving aid after August 1st, 2013.
6.10.2.2 Dividend policy
The European Union established another mechanism in 2009 to ensure
that state aids to banks do not disappear in private pockets. In Com-
mission Communication “The return to viability and the assessment of
restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under
the State aid rules” (Oﬃcial Journal C 195, 19.8.2009, pp. 9-20) of 22
July 2009, the EC states that “banks should not use State aid to remu-
nerate own funds (equity and subordinated debt) when those activities
do not generate suﬃcient profits. Therefore, in a restructuring context,
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the discretionary oﬀset of losses (for example by releasing reserves or re-
ducing equity) by beneficiary banks in order to guarantee the payment
of dividends and coupons on outstanding subordinated debt, is in prin-
ciple not compatible with the objective of burden sharing”. This follows
from the Commission’s decision in case N 615/2008 Bayern LB, in which
the Commission insisted on a commitment by BayernLB and the state
aid granting German authorities not to pay out dividends on existing
shares. Dividend payments are only allowed if the bank is in a binding
obligation to do so.
There have been instance in which this rule might have been violated
if it had not been for the stern supervision by the Commission. E.g., in
December 2012, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into
payment of dividends by Caixa Geral de Depo´sitos (CGD), a Portuguese
bank which received a rescue capital injection from the Portuguese state
amounting to e 1.65 billion. As a result, CGD agreed to re-pay to the
Portuguese government an amount that is equivalent to the dividend
payments (Commission press release IP/13/738 of July 24th, 2013 and
case number SA.35062 in the state aid register).
6.10.3 United States
In the context of TARP-related regulations, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which amends Section 111 of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 USC 5221), inter-
venes in the governance of banks and other financial institutions profit-
ing from federal subsidies. The Act requires the Treasure Secretary to
set rules which limit incentives to ‘take unnecessary and excessive risks’
(Sec. 111(b)(3)(A), 12 USC 5221) and to make provisions for the recov-
ery of variable payments to the 21 most highly-compensated employees
of the TARP recipient if it turns out that the financial statements the
bonus was based on are later found to be materially inaccurate. Further-
more, TARP recipients may not award any golden parachute payments
to the six most highly-compensated employees as long as any financial
assistance from TARP remains outstanding.
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6.10.4 Discussion
As outlined above, several countries as well as the EU have taken steps
to prevent managers from accruing private benefits from state aids. All
these measures have to be seen in light of a general development in
Europe and the world to curb executive pay, especially its variable com-
ponent. The CRD IV limits bonus payments to managers, even if the
bank does not receive state aid. While this is not the place to discuss ex-
ecutive compensation in general, it can be concluded nevertheless that
interventions into the internal governance of a state-aided firm might
be a wise policy. As it has been implemented with banks, these “pun-
ishment mechanisms” could also be implemented for non-financial firms
which are being granted a state aid. This overview of the law applicable
to banks has identified two main measures that might show the possible
road to be taken for other firms: (a) mandatory replacement of the CEO
and/or other board members, (b) curb on bonus payments. These rules
could be implemented relatively easily within the European Commis-
sion’s state aid assessment procedure. It seems that, so far, France is
one of only a few countries (if it is not the only one) to apply this range
of rules not only to banks, but to all firms receiving aids.
A provision like those that cap dividend payments can cause conflicts
among shareholders, as the example of AIG illustrated.
On the other hand, a possible consequence of these legal measures is
to cause the opposite of what was intended. Firm managers, fearing to
be fired or to suﬀer from a pay cut, might either end up not seeking state
aids even though that would be clearly in the interest of shareholders,
or putting too much eﬀort into repaying the state aid in order to get
out of the strict corset imposed by the government or the European
Commission.
In fact, there seem to be cases in which the firm management might
have rushed paying oﬀ the loan or not have accepted a state aid because
of the eﬀects on the managers’ private benefits.
6.11 Policy implications and conclusion
Due to the complexity of industrial policy and historical reasons, the
regulation of aid to firms by political subdivisions of integrated markets
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varies around the globe, with the EU and the U.S. representing the two
ends of a spectrum (see Chapter 2). Therefore, the specific policy impli-
cations stemming from this thought exercise will be shaped diﬀerently
depending on the country or grouping of countries of interest. Never-
theless, some policy implications can be thought of.
Monitoring comes at a high cost to shareholders and induces them
to accept incomplete governance. A regulatory body, such as the Eu-
ropean Commission in the EU or the federal government in the United
States or Canada, might be in an inherently better position to safeguard
the interests of the shareholders. However, that central authority should
be aware of the fact that any implementation of a state-aid-regulating
regime (such as the European State Aid Control mechanism or the Cana-
dian Code of Conduct in the Agreement on Internal Trade) should take
place in full awareness of the corporate governance in place and be ad-
justed accordingly. This implies especially to take into account the local
corporate law that determines the rights and duties of management and
owners. As a consequence a centrally organized state aid control author-
ity would have to be sensitive against local patterns of governance, in
order to avoid detrimental eﬀects of its control.
Furthermore, the state-aid-granting entity may be seen as a de facto
investor in the firm and be treated as such. This could mean including
representatives of the state aid grantor in the supervisory board of the
firm or building specific committees to monitor the adequate use of the
subsidy. It might also be conceivable to implement a compliance man-
agement system surveilling the use of the subsidy. Such a compliance
management system could take, for example, the form similar to the
financial services industry, where a compliance oﬃcer is mandatory to
survey the proper delivery of financial services to customers.
Finally, any policy increasing the transparency of the management’s
activities (i.e., lowering T) would be a positive development. It would
allow the shareholders to better assess the decisions taken by their agents
and prevent shifting extra money into the pockets of managements.
These changes would be optimally addressed at the European level
and not on the member states’ level. As of now, the Commission would
stand on weak legal grounds if it were to refuse state aid on any of the
grounds suggested in this chapter. After all, state aid law is still un-
derstood as a branch of competition law. Article 107 TFEU only gives
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a mandate to prevent aid “which distorts or threatens to distort com-
petition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods” and only if “it aﬀects trade between Member States”. Whether
taxpayers’ money got transferred illegitimately into the pockets of firm
managers is of no concern to the European treaties.
This chapter applied the agency approach of tax avoidance to the
problem of regulating state subsidies to firms. Shareholders face an
agency problem in the sense that they cannot be sure that subsidies
actually serve their interest. This chapter is meant as a first step to-
wards a better understanding of the agency problems at hand by coming
up with a simple model. The here presented numerical solution of the
model provides a first step towards a better understanding of the intri-
cate mechanisms in place. The numerical solution of the model allows
to get a sort of overview over the interaction between the (multidimen-
sional) parameters which are at stake. This does not exclude that for
more specific research questions the model becomes more specified, in
order to derive analytically the optimal (interior) governance levels. For
example, one could investigate more in-depth the eﬀect of an exogenously
given restriction of management profits, as it was the case in the recent
financial crisis when firms (especially banks) received state aid. Or, one
could model more analytically the eﬀect of the availability of state aid
to firms. This future research path would also make a stronger link to
the implied public choice problems, namely the propensity of politicians
to give subsidies to firms which are seen as relevant for winning the next
elections. While in that case managers, politicians and employees (vot-
ers) may form a rent-seeking coalition, this coalition is above a certain
threshold level very likely to the detriment of shareholders (Pagano and
Volpin, 2005)13.
Another future research avenue concerns the empirical test of the
model. An empirical test would not only clarify the validity of the the-
oretical model, it would also be possible to come up with more specific
policy recommendations. While the theoretical model already allows
to identify relevant parameters and their interaction, it is yet still open
how these parameters play out in a concrete institutional setting, like the
13Pagano and Volpin (2005) find that a proportional electoral rule leads to weaker
investor protection. Van Buiren and Brouwer (2010) find that proportional electoral
rules lead to less state aid (see section 5.3.4). This is good news, as it implies that
where investor protection is weaker, states are also less prone to grant state aid.
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European Union in combination with the member states’ diﬀerent cor-
porate governance systems. Such a subsequent empirical analysis could
answer also more practical legal questions, as for example, whether in
certain member states it would be more eﬀective to implement compli-
ance oﬃcers who monitor the usage of state aids, or whether it would
be more advisable to create a sort of board position for the grantor of
the subsidy, in order to stress the grantor’s de facto co-ownership of the
firm and to secure corporate control.
Overall, a more elaborate theory would have to further dissect the va-
riety of parameters, institutional settings and the subsequent dynamics
taking place. This would especially imply a deeper and even more ana-
lytical look into the actual governance mechanism - the γ of the model.
Further empirical research would then also look at governance measures
at the level of aid-receiving firms (and e.g. compare them to firms that
do not receive aid).
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CHAPTER 7
Towards a better regulation of
state aid to firms
The deliberations on inter-jurisdictional competition as well as the in-
sights from public choice and corporate governance lead to the conclusion
that the eﬀect on trade between member states is not the paramount is-
sue. Indeed, the legal literature seems to concur that, in fact, the EU is
less and less considering the eﬀect on trade between member states as
a relevant criterion (see e.g. de Cecco, 2013; Friederiszick et al., 2007).
While the existing European literature mainly discussed state aid from
the perspective of the competition order, this book focused on issues of
incomplete contracts and problematic agreements between various stake-
holders. The following chapter shall therefore take stock and elaborate
on the policy recommendations that follow from the arguments made
earlier.
7.1 The allocation of rules in settings of
multi-layered government
The core of the problem of regulation of state aid is that it is the rulemak-
ers themselves that possibly engage in the activity that they are making
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rules for. At the same time, the state acts through several layers - in form
of the local council, the district government, the regional government,
the national governmental, or sometimes even through appropriately em-
powered international institutions, as for instance the European Union.
In fact, state aid might be more prevalent in federations (Markusen and
Nesse, 2007). This is a result of the competition between sub-national
governments. Unitary states are better able to regulate and at the same
are under more international organizational scrutiny.
Since all of these layers can conceivably engage in state aid, and
for the arguments of market-preserving federalism and the proponents
of interjurisdictional competition, the key question is which rights and
duties shall be allocated to which level of government1.
The presence of ineﬃcient subsidy races is an argument for cen-
tralized regulation. The sheer complexity of state intervention in the
economy is an argument against it. Centralizing or decentralizing deci-
sions can be seen as a risk-return trade-oﬀ. Centralizing decision-making
might lead to better decisions (higher return), but bears the risk that
wrong decisions will aﬀect a larger number of people. Decentralization
then has the advantage that if decisions are wrong, only few people
will be aﬀected by its consequences (see for instance Arcuri and Dari-
Mattiacci (2010)).
One string of the literature tries to produce an integrated theory of
regulatory competition in a world of overlapping jurisdictions. Parisi
et al. (2006) develop a two-dimensional taxonomy of various modali-
ties of regulation, which Depoorter and Parisi (2005) apply to antitrust
regulatory competition (in the context of decentralization of European
competition law). The following section reiterates said literature and
applies it to the regulation of state aid to firms.
The first dimension distinguishes between positive and negative reg-
ulation. Positive means that a regulator can permit an activity that is
otherwise prohibited. A firm would have to obtain a permission from the
regulator in order to engage in a certain activity. If we apply this to state
aids, then positive regulation would mean that a jurisdiction would have
1For sake of completeness, an implicit assumption shall be made explicit, namely
that geographical entities are considered given. The program of this book is to
analyze the rule-making given the world’s current division in states, provinces, and
communities. It thus looks at the second-best outcome, given that the first-best
outcome might include redrawing or abolishing jurisdictional boundaries.
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to seek permission from a higher-level authority before granting subsi-
dies to firms. Negative regulation works the other way round. The same
activity is generally permitted, but a regulator can step in an ban it in
certain cases. An example would be a general permission of state aids,
but exceptions for certain industries or special cases. The de minimis
rule (see section on European State Aid Control) might be an example
for this.
The second dimension relates to the allocation of regulatory compe-
tence. If there is only one single regulator, then the type of regulatory
activity (positive versus negative actions) is not relevant. The problem
becomes apparent when there are overlapping jurisdictions. In that case,
a firm, individual or jurisdiction (the latter being the player relevant to
the analysis of state aids), might need to acquire several regulatory in-
puts or might be able to choose among alternative regulatory inputs.
What matters then is whether the competence of the various regulat-
ing bodies are concurrent (an aﬃrmative action of multiple regulators is
needed for the eﬀectiveness of a regulatory act) or alternative (the action
of one regulator is enough to give eﬀects to a regulatory act).
The two dimensions are summarized in table 7.1. Parisi et al. (2006)
use this setup to look at the implications in further detail and discuss
the eﬀects of externalities in regulatory competition.
Alternative Concurrent
(substitutes) (complements)
Positive Any regulator can permit Every regulator should
permit
Negative Any regulator can prohibit Every regulator should
prohibit
Table 7.1: Two dimensions of regulation - Depoorter and Parisi (2005)
If the jurisdiction of regulators overlap (as it is for instance the case
with the WTO rules on subsidies and European state aid control), then
the decision of one regulator will aﬀect the rent that the other regulator
can reap – a typical externality. The term “rent” here is used in a wider
sense. It can indeed represent regulatory capture, but can also stand
for the goals or mission of regulators on a more general basis. These
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goals can for instance be the reaching of eﬃciency or the improvement
of equity. Table 7.2 summarizes regulatory activity under diﬀerent allo-
cations of competence. If the regulators choose independently from each
other, the resulting level of the regulated activity will always be diﬀerent
from the level they would choose if the two agencies were to work as a
single authority. This is due to the externalities created between regula-
tors. Therefore, the way how regulation is allocated will determine the
regulatory outcome.
Alternative
competence
(regulatory
substitutes)
Unified com-
petence
Concurrent
competence
(regulatory
complements)
Positive com-
petence
Activity over-
permitted
Rent-maxi-
mizing level
Activity
under-
permitted
Negative com-
petence
Activity over-
restricted
Rent-maxi-
mizing level
Activity
under-
restricted
Table 7.2: Regulatory activity under diﬀerent allocations of competence
- Parisi et al. (2006)
The task is therefore not only to design optimal policy rules, but also
to allocate powers to diﬀerent levels of government optimally and define
how these diﬀerent layers interact. In that sense, the WTO rules are not
eﬀective because they primarily address the top layers of government.
At the same time, EU state aid control is limited because EU rules only
apply to a subset of states (namely European countries), although they
reach the bottom layer better than the WTO rules.
7.2 Reform at the aid-granting level of gov-
ernment
If we assume that there are possible majorities for state aids and that
there is nothing particularly ineﬃcient about that, then the obvious
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policy implication is to make sure that those democratic decisions accu-
rately reflect the will of the electorate. For instance, governments could
be required to precisely state why they awarded an aid and what the
benefits (in the model: change in prices and wages, in practice: number
of jobs created, eﬀect on innovation, pro-competitive eﬀects, etc.) and
costs (taxpayers’ money to fund the aid, anti-competitive eﬀects, etc.)
are. This is basically tantamount to requiring a sort of “regulatory im-
pact assessment” instead of e.g. the current European state aid control
mechanism. This policy recommendation also applies for instance to the
United States, which is more liberal towards jurisdictions’ right to grant
subsidies, insofar as it would require (better) reporting and transparency
requirements.
Discussions about possible ways for reform in the United States have
led to several policy recommendations. While some are more specific
to the American system of public finance, others can and should be
transposed also for usage in a European setting.
Regulation of site consultants and defining them as lobbyists
Brokering deals that involve governmental support in exchange for in-
vestment is functionally not much diﬀerent than the real estate market.
Through intermediaries, a buyer and a seller get together and enter an
agreement. Site consultants usually operate on a commission, they there-
fore have high incentives to work for both sides – even though the firm
and the state are parties with conflicting interests – and to fuel subsidy
races (LeRoy, 2007). They contribute to the information asymmetry and
can help the firm conceal its true intentions from the state. At the same
time, the work of site location consultants is similar to that of lobby-
ists. Yet, both professions (real estate agents and lobbyists) are usually
highly regulated. Real estate agents usually have to acquire a license,
and many countries around the world maintaining a lobby register (see
e.g. the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 in the United States, the Lob-
byist Registration Act in Canada, or the recently implemented voluntary
transparency registers in the EU or the UK). Registering lobbyists seems
to be positively linked to reductions in corruption (Holmana and Luneb-
urg, 2012). More transparency in this field would help all parties better
understand the activities of site consultants. A further step might be to
separate the activities of site location consultants and change the game
234
212 Towards a better regulation of state aid to firms
into an “adversarial process in which the taxpayers benefit from a side of
the profession that specializes in aggressive bargaining, professional cost-
benefit analysis, and cold market judgments about corporate behavior”
(LeRoy, 2007, p. 194).
Improved transparency Many state aid deals lack transparency.
Some state aid measures have to be notified to the Commission and
in some countries freedom of information laws can lead to some disclo-
sure. Neither of these systems procudes an accessible and comprehen-
sive overview of state aid decisions. In fact, the scope of the information
on state aid expenditure collected from member states by the Commis-
sion, which is guided by Annex IIIA of Commission Regulation (EC)
794/2004 (OJ L 140, 30.4.2004), does not include detail down to the
level of the beneficiary. Only data on large regional aid projects and
R&D&I projects over e 3 million provides this kind of information. The
system gets more transparent once the Commission initiates an inves-
tigation and comes to a decision. Of course, all cases that go to the
European Court of Justice are also made public.
In the United States, some states implemented a transparent record-
keeping system with regard to subsidies. For example, the state of Min-
nesota requires all government agencies that provide assistance to busi-
nesses to fill in a so-called Minnesota Business Assistance Form (MBAF).
Therein, the firm and the aid-granting agency have to provide informa-
tion on the number of jobs created, the hourly wages paid, and whether
all goals agreed upon have been met.
A change in accounting rules could also alleviate the transparency
problem. Firms could be required to disclose all government loans and
subsidies they received. This would make it possible to assess how many
subsidies a given firm received in total, that is, from all places in the
world, in a given year. With transparency rules at the aid-granting
level alone, this would still not be possible, since states might follow
diﬀerent definitions of state aid and not all jurisdictions might implement
the same level of disclosure. International Accounting Standard (IAS)
20 “Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government
Assistance” set by the International Accounting Standards Board of the
IFRS Foundation, despite some limitations2, provides an ideal starting
2For example, it does not include infrastructure provisions from which the firm
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base for such a disclosure policy.
Better structured deals The regulatory body could also directly in-
tervene in the substance of the agreements. One possibility is to improve
the structure of the state aid deals. Ideally, any subsidy deal should be
scrutinized by an independent, non-interested third party. Again, a thor-
ough cost-benefit analysis should accompany any such agreement. States
could also be required to include in their contracts with the firms specific
goals and public benefits. Firms would then have to, for instance, com-
mit to staying in the jurisdiction for a clearly-defined period of time or to
create a certain number of jobs (the skill-level and salaries of these jobs
should also be made explicit). In order to rely less on promises, state
aid deals could be made performance-based. In such a deal structure,
subsidies would only be paid out once certain requirements have been
met (e.g. a certain number of workers have been hired). With such an
understanding, no party has to bear an excessive amount of risk (Weber,
2007).
Performance requirements and clawbacks for subsidized firms
The second interference with the contracting between the two parties
relates to the performance requirements and, most importantly, to the
sanctions in case of non-performance. This, of course, requires some
monitoring. The state-aid-granting entity could be required to inspect
whether the terms of the contract have been met, but the onus could
also lie on the recipient to provide adequate documentation. Ledebur
and Woodward (1990) identify four instruments through which nonper-
formance can be addressed:
• Recisions, that is, the outright cancellation of the contract
• Clawbacks, that is, the recovery of parts or the entire subsidy if
the firm does not meet its obligations
• Penalties, that is, special charges if the firm does not perform or
relocates
• Recalibrations, mean that the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment can be adjusted to reflect changing business conditions
benefits (IFRS, 2012).
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In the United States, there have been cases in which firms voluntar-
ily honored their clawback agreements to avoid legal enforcement (see
Weber, 2007).
Changes in company law The previous policy recommendations fo-
cused on the contracts between firms and the state. In light of the
problems that may exist within the firm, it might be worth discussing
whether a change in company law is warranted. For instance, such a
reform could grant automatic rights to the subsidizing jurisdiction. This
could include the obligation to appoint a “compliance oﬃcer” within the
firm who monitors the use of the state aid and liaises between the firm
and the state-aid-granting agency. The latter could also be entitled to
appoint a member to the supervisory board (if applicable) of the com-
pany. Such systems exist in other fields of regulation. For instance, the
Basel 3 accords (implemented in the EU by Directive 2013/36/EU of
26 June 2013) mandate (under certain circumstances) the appointment
of a Chief Risk Oﬃcer. The Directive also mandates so-called remu-
neration committees to oversee the bank’s remuneration policies. These
rules need to be designed in such a way that they also apply to foreign
firms and that domestic firms cannot circumvent them by e.g. creating
a foreign subsidiary acting as the beneficiary of the aid.
7.3 EU state aid control
The present analysis shows that the harmful eﬀects of state aids are not
as clear-cut as it might seem or as it is suggested in the EU treaty and
that many factors guide the political decision-making.
7.3.1 Setting incentives to comply with state aid law
In the current state aid control system, the incentives to comply with
the substantive and procedural rules set forth by Articles 107 to 109 and
specified by the various Commission guidelines are ill-developed. The
reason for that is relatively simply: the price of not doing so is low.
Failure to comply with the notification requirement, for instance, does
not entail any consequences. If a jurisdiction is caught handing out a
state aid that is deemed incompatible with the internal market, then
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it has to be repaid. Admittedly, there is a political cost involved for
the politician. This might be quite limited as well though. Once the
unlawful aid has been paid and the firm decided to relocate or expand
accordingly, repayment of the subsidy does not automatically undo the
benefits obtained from the subsidy. At best, the government gets its
money back and the firm does not alter its investment level. It there-
fore makes sense to discuss measures that would induce compliance with
state aid law proactively. One solution – the Danish model – is that
unlawful aid is not paid back to the authority that granted it, but to
the state’s treasury or to a special fund. Punitive damages to be paid
to the Commission would entail optimal enforcement, but might be po-
litically not marketable. These reforms must be supported by increased
monitoring and transparency though. Else, the consequence might be
that states put more eﬀort in hiding their state aid schemes from the
Commission.
7.3.2 Limitations of the Treaties
While European state aid control provides an order in which competition
among firms and jurisdictions takes place, its scope is at the same time
limited by this focus on competition. This book focused on two aspects
of state aid that are not addressed by the Treaties. One is rent-seeking,
the other is the internal structure of the recipient firm. Although Articles
107 to 109 do not give the Commission a mandate to reduce rent-seeking
and opportunistic behavior, it is nevertheless worthwhile to conduct a
thought exercise about what the Commission could be entrusted with
and what possible additional measures could be.
The Commission would be in an ideal place to monitor the state aid
contracting of the Member States. With the right mandate, it could
for instance impose an ex ante and ex post transparent procedure with
regard to state aid. It could require that aid can only be handed out
through transparent programs and bidding processes. It could make it
mandatory to notify the Commission about all subsidies given, in a dis-
aggregated manner at level of the beneficiary. Member States could be
forced to provide a precise report on their decisions – this report could
include the total (discounted) amount, the number of jobs created, the
expected spill-overs, etc. At the same time, an ex post analysis would
check whether the goals agreed upon by the aid-granting authority and
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the firm were met. Ideally, failure to meet these goals would entail
repayment of the state aid. All these measures could also be implemented
at the national level, but an independent supranational authority might
lead to better results.
One instrument to curb state aid are ceilings on so-called de minimis
aid. Apparently, raising these limits is a demand often heard from na-
tional authorities (Nicolaides, 2013b). While the Commission does not
seem to be inclined to meet those demands, its justification for maintain-
ing the threshold at a certain level is insofar weak as it does not have a
systematic procedure to the determine what the optimal amount might
be (ibid.). To the outside observer, the current amount of e 200.000 over
a three-year period appears rather random.
Nevertheless, the Commission has exerted a certain degree of discre-
tion in the interpretation of its mandate. This is for instance reflected in
the advent of the “more economic approach to state aid control,” which
– analogously to the developments in the law against the abuse of dom-
inant position – attempts to implement a more reason-based and less
rule-driven approach. It can exert some flexibility as it can change its
interpretation of Article 7, sections (2) and (3) and is not bound by its
previous decisions Freistaat Sachsen v Commission, C-57/00P; Regione
autonoma della Sardegna v. Commission, T-171/02, see (Nicolaides,
2013b)).
While at first, the ECJ rejected to introduce the kind of scrutiny
known from antitrust law (such as establishing a clear market definition
and assessing market shares) in cases such as Philip Morris (Case 730/79
Philip Morris [1980] ECR 2671), European State Aid control has moved
towards the kind of economic analysis required by Delimitis (Case C-
234/89, Stergios Dilimitis v. Henninger Bru AG of February 28, 1991).
The more economic approach requires some clear economic criteria in
order not to become arbitrary and suﬀers from the shortcomings of eco-
nomics, which, after all, is not an exact science. Some practitioners for
instance point out hat “Economics can only be an aid, but not a substi-
tute for the political decision of granting state aid” (Piﬀaut et al., 2009,
p. 11). They also issue a word of caution toward the possibility of wrong
decisions: “However, it might be possible that a wrong decision is made.
We have seen that the critical assessment is important at all stages to
limit the presence of type I and type II errors. The proper implemen-
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tation of State aid control would require having recourse to information
from various sources in order to be able to quantify the various elements
of the analysis but also to be able to cross-check the information that
has been provided. This is because Member States might have an incen-
tive to submit information in a biased manner, thereby increasing the
probability that the granted state aid will be approved, leading to type
I errors. The Commission currently lacks the investigative powers to
collect such information from parties distinct from the Member States.
This increases the risk that State aid procedures would lead to too many
(type I) errors and will be harmful for society as a whole” (Piﬀaut et al.,
2009, p. 12).
7.3.3 Ex post evaluation
Currently, there is no system in place for the ex post evaluation of state
aid. Instead, all assessments with relevance to the European state aid
regime, whether they are carried out in the member states or at the
Commission during the notification procedure, take place ex ante. Eval-
uations, if at all, are conducted ad hoc. The aid schemes are approved
ex ante based on pre-defined criteria, without evaluating properly their
impact on markets and over time (European Commission, 2013a).
The European Commission, through its state aid modernization agen-
da, is currently in a process of establishing a methodology for such eval-
uations (European Commission, 2013b). Ex post evaluations are not
very popular in the Member States. National authorities find it often
diﬃcult or even impossible to measure the eﬀects of state aid and oppose
making the process more bureaucratic (Nicolaides, 2013a). While it is
too early to comment on the outcome of this reform process (the first
reports by Member States are expected only within a few years), this is
a laudable step to take. Two things should be noted nevertheless: more
transparency in the state aid process is still necessary (e.g. regarding
the detailed list of all aid recipients), and evaluations do not automati-
cally alter behavior – this only happens if they are accessible to a wider
audience.
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7.3.4 Per se rules, rule of reason, and bounded ra-
tionality
The previous chapters emphasized the diﬃculty of setting boundaries
to state aid control, which can have the purpose of regulating inter-
firm competition, but also provide checks on governmental spending.
A fundamental problem for all regulation of state aid is the inherent
complexity of the matter. Even though the actors involved are not nec-
essarily irrational, their cognitive powers to monitor an overwhelming
amount of information are limited, nevertheless, meaning that they are
constrained by their memory size or computational capabilities (see e.g.
Haucap and Schwalbe (2011) for an overview of the literature and ap-
plication to competition policy). State aid involves a large number of
actors who might be aﬀected by this kind of problem: firms, politicians,
citizens, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and
other courts potentially dealing with state aid decisions (in some circum-
stances, these might be national courts). The task is therefore to design
a manageable regulatory regime.
In 1952, Stigler noted that “Economic policy must be contrived with
a view to the typical rather than the exceptional. That some drivers
can safely proceed at eighty miles per hour is no objection to a maxi-
mum speed law” (Stigler, 1952). He advocated for per se rules because
individualized rules (such as the example of speed rules tailor-made to
the capabilities of a driver) are too costly to enforce. In other words, as
soon as the transactions costs are non-negative and there is a possibil-
ity of error, there is a trade-oﬀ and a “more economic approach” is not
necessarily optimal. Similar arguments have been made in the field of
competition (anti-trust) policy. They are based on what can be referred
to as the “error cost-approach”. The idea is that rules and their enforce-
ment should be designed in such a way that it minimizes the sum of the
welfare costs due to decision errors of type I (false positives) and type II
(false negatives) plus information and other transaction costs (see e.g.
Haucap, 2011; Christiansen and Kerber, 2006). An important assump-
tion is that enforcement is always imperfect. The reasons might be that
the rules themselves could be underinclusive (not prohibiting harmful
behavior) or overinclusive (prohibiting beneficial behavior) because they
are not in line with economic analysis. This could happen due to lobby-
ing activities or the evolution of theories over time. Furthermore, there
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is incomplete information in the specific case due to incomplete disclo-
sure and the cost of collecting information (Christiansen and Kerber,
2006).
From a legal point of view, it is problematic that a case-by-case as-
sessment would cause a degree of legal uncertainty. Risk-averse parties
might end up not entering a contract for fear of having the aid agree-
ment annulled by the Commission. Although there are no fines or other
punishments in the case of unlawful state aid, there is a cost of recov-
ery. Firms might face sudden liquidity problems and politicians might
want to avoid the embarrassment and political repercussions a negative
decision might entail.
The current EU state aid regime is sometimes criticized for being un-
predictable. This problem will rather be reinforced by a more economic
approach. This was also brought up in the consultation process on the
State Aid Action Plan in 2005. For instance, the UK Federation of Small
Businesses notes that “The FSB believes that the state aid regime needs
simplicity and clarity. In its current form, it is complicated and mul-
tifarious. The regime should be flexible, but there must be safeguards
to ensure that competition amongst business is not distorted; for exam-
ple, looking at the economic impact of state aids”(Federation of Small
Businesses, 2005, p. 2).
Rules which restrict the discretion of governmental agencies can also
reduce problems due to rent-seeking and the negative welfare eﬀects it
entails. The more discretion a regulator has, the more its policies are
prone to influence from interest groups (Christiansen and Kerber, 2006)3.
The bottom line of this is that rules should to be diﬀerentiated opti-
mally. Depending on the possible types of errors, the information, and
the decision costs, the optimal degree of diﬀerentiation could be found.
Christiansen and Kerber (2006) steered away from what they considered
an “outdated dichotomy of ’per se rules vs. rule of reason’” (p. 3). In-
stead, they favor a continuum of intermediate solutions between these
two extremes and show that a rule (they apply this concept specifically
to competition rules) is optimally diﬀerentiated if the marginal reduction
of the sum error costs (that is, the marginal benefit of diﬀerentiation)
equals the marginal costs of diﬀerentiation.
Christiansen and Kerber (2006), Kerber et al. (2008), and Haucap
3This argument dates back to Eucken (1952) and Brennan and Buchanan (1985).
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and Schwalbe (2011) discuss this with an application to competition
policy, and distinguish e.g. between horizontal price cartels, predatory
pricing allegations, or bundling practices of dominant firms. Also, they
argue in favor of de minimis rules, that is, rules where certain anti-
competitive practices would be acceptable if the small size of the market
did not warrant a full-scale investigation by the competent competition
authority. Christiansen and Kerber (2006) note that “From this law
and economics perspective, competition policy should consist mainly of
(more or less diﬀerentiated) rules and should only rarely rely on case-by-
case analysis. Therefore the main task of a ‘more economic approach’ is
to use economics for the formulation of appropriate competition rules”
(p. 2).
Similar arguments can be (and have been) made for state aid control.
The European Commission follows several approaches to curb down the
administrative burden.
Generally, all aid below the threshold of e 200,000 granted over a
period of three years is not regarded as state aid in the sense of Article
107(1) TFEU with a reduced ceiling of e 100,000 applying to aid in the
field of road transport (Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98). This rule
only applies to so-called “transparent aid”, that is, aid where the amount
can be calculated exactly in advance without the need to carry out a risk
assessment. As of the time of writing, the Commission is currently in
the process of revising these rules and issue new guidelines by the end
of 2013. A positive step (in light of the analysis in this book) is the
introduction of a mandatory de minimis register, which would gather
data on the use of de minimis aid, subject to a transition period4.
Furthermore, the Commission issued an intricate set of guidelines
pertaining to various kinds of aids. It declared certain aids as compatible
with the common market (Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of
6 August 2008), thus giving block exemptions for the kinds of aid listed
in table 7.3.4. It is clear from this list that the Commission made a
conscious choice as to which aids are beneficial (or at least unproblematic
if compared to the cost and benefit of assessing each aid individually)
and which not, even though an aid not on the block exemptions list is
not automatically denied.
4http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-699_en.htm
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SME investment and employ-
ment
small enterprises newly created
by female entrepreneurs
consultancy in favour of SMEs SME participation in fairs
provision of risk capital research and development
technical feasibility studies industrial property rights costs
for SMEs
research and development in the
agricultural and fisheries sectors
young innovative enterprises
innovation advisory services and
for innovation support services
the loan of highly qualified per-
sonnel
the environment, in the form of
tax reductions
recruitment of disadvantaged
workers in the form of wage
subsidies
employment of disabled workers
in the form of wage subsidies
compensating the additional
costs of employing disabled
workers
regional investment and employ-
ment
newly created small enterprises
in assisted regions
investment to go beyond Com-
munity standards for environ-
mental protection
acquisition of transport vehicles
which go beyond
Community environmental pro-
tection standards
early adaptation to future envi-
ronmental standards for SMEs
investment in energy saving mea-
sures
investment in high eﬃciency co-
generation
investment in the promotion of
energy from renewable energy
environmental studies
training
Table 7.3: General Block Exemption Regulation,
Sources: Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008, Press release
IP/08/1110
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7.3.5 Towards a European industrial policy?
The models in the previous chapters left out the possibility that main-
taining competition per se might be a primary policy goal. In fact, this
is reflected in EU law on state aid. In its statement of principles for
an economic assessment of state aids, the Commission opens by stating
“State aid control is an essential component of competition policy and
a necessary safeguard to preserve eﬀective competition and free trade in
the single market” (DG Competition, 2009, p. 1).
The point here is that EU law emphasizes the competition between
firms, but an integrated competition order which also takes into account
the competition between jurisdictions would require a diﬀerent kind of
legislation.
European State Aid Law, as it was originally designed, followed the
logic of negative integration. It prohibited states from doing something,
namely awarding state aids, while allowing for some less problematic ex-
ceptions. The idea was to reign in the possibility for EU member states
to cause distortions of competition among each other by subsidizing
industry. In an integrated market, state aid had become the only instru-
ment to favor and protect national industries (Lavdas and Mendrinou,
1999). Yet, the rules established in the Treaty are ambiguous, while
the individual member states exhibit heterogeneous preferences. As a
result, the European Commission started to act as a “supranational en-
trepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibition of distortive aids, but also
partially creating positive integration ‘from above’” (Blauberger, 2008,
p. 5). Since the Treaty leaves some leeway in the interpretation of its
rules, the Commission has the central role of assessing state aids granted
by the member states. As this might cause political conflict about in-
dividual state aid decisions, the Commission sought to formulate more
general guidelines for state aid measures it deems or deems not compat-
ible with the common market. Initially, this constituted a body of soft
law, but developed into hard law. By doing so – mainly to shield itself
from political pressure in individual cases and to reduce its workload –
it had to come up with a notion of what it considers to be desirable state
aid policy (Blauberger, 2008). Go´mez-Barroso and Feijo´o (2012) observe
a paradigm shift as well. Taking the example of the EU Commission’s
guidelines on state aid for broadband network expansion, they argue that
the 2009 revision of these rules reveal a shift from a corrective approach
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to state aid to a more driving conception of state aid. State aid is not
used anymore only to facilitate the catching-up process of rural areas,
but also to accelerate the emerging of completely new markets (as only
few European countries had access to so-called Next-Generation Access
Networks).
There is a dilemma that the European Commission is caught in. The
TFEU’s Article 107 gives the Commission a great deal of discretion in
establishing the precise rules applicable to state aid to enterprises. It
has to act wisely nevertheless: if it goes to far in one direction, conflict
with some member governments might ensue. If it acts too harshly
against anti-competitive measures, national authorities might challenge,
circumvent, or even ignore its eﬀorts (Doleys, 2013). State aid policy is
therefore more than just a technical exercise – “state aid control is, at its
heart, a profoundly political enterprise” (ibid., p. 24, referring to Wilks
(1993)). The provisions of Article 107 TFEU can be interpreted as an
incomplete contract (Doleys, 2013). The Commission serves as a third
party administering, enforcing, and generally filling-in the agreement
made by the member states in the sense of Williamson (1985) and North
(1988). Article 108 TFEU gives the contours of how the Commission
can “interpret, apply, monitor and enforce the provisions contained in
Article 107” (Doleys, 2013, p. 26). This makes the the Commission
an agent of the member states. But the principals took care to limit
the possibilities of agent opportunism. Article 263 TFEU, by subjecting
EU legislation to judicial review by the CJEU, provides a check against
the potential misuse of power on the part of the Commission. Similarly,
Article 108(2) allows the Council to “decide that aid which that State is
granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with
the internal market” (Art. 108(2) TFEU). This step requires unanimity
and the article states that such a step has to be justified by “exceptional
circumstances” (ibid.). Furthermore, the Commission needs to rely on
the compliance of the member states, as it has no ability to enforce
decisions directly without their assistance. A threat of non-compliance
can therefore be a powerful tool (Doleys, 2013).
If the goal is indeed a European industrial policy, then several ques-
tions need to be addressed to define what the goal of such an industrial
policy might be. Is it to pick winners or to support losers? Is it to main-
tain or to boost competition? Foreman-Peck (2007) sees a divergence
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between what is taking place and what is optimal: while the Commis-
sion’s goal might be to improve productivity of the manufacturing in-
dustry, encouraging eﬃcient innovation should be the real target. Since
productivity is slowing down (especially relatively to Asia), and Europe
is lagging behind the United States especially in the high-tech sectors
(Cincera and Veugelers, 2013), a European industrial policy might in-
deed be necessary. The answers to these questions are still pending and
are still being discussed in the industrial and competition policy liter-
ature. The definite economic order also still needs to be determined
through a larger political process.
European state aid control, just like the state aid decisions at the
national level, does not take place in a political vacuum. Instead, the
European Commission is subjected to political processes taking place
among the Member States. In the game of rent-seeking, the Commis-
sion is not only in the position of the referee. It is also an integrated
part of the game. Although individual state aid decisions usually do not
entail open political conflict (even during the crisis, the Commission was
successful in safeguarding its rule-based approach, see Ahlborn and Pic-
cinin (2011)), state aid control is a political process for two reasons. For
one, state aid control is a policy that touches upon a large variety of goals
besides competition: innovation, environmental protection, regional de-
velopment, employment, and others. How those sometimes conflicting
targets are balanced against each other is often a value judgment (e.g.:
Should greater inter-regional cohesion be endeavored at the cost of higher
tax rates and therefore the loss in attractiveness for new investments in
the country?). Secondly, the member states have to accept the general
thrust of EU state aid policy in order to make its enforcement eﬀective
and politically viable Blauberger (2011). Representing a more critical
perspective, Zahariadis (2013), using a database of state aid decisions
between 1992 and 2007, shows that state aid decisions are an outcome
of power politics between Member States and the Commission. He finds
that larger Member States find it easier to have their state aid decisions
approved by the Commission. At the same time, the data also shows
that the propensity to award state aid is highly dependent on domestic
factors.
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7.3.6 The European Union in a global economy
The European Union operates in and is an integral part of a global econ-
omy. This poses a fundamental problem to European State Aid control.
The EU’s state aid rules limit the subsidies that European jurisdictions
can grant to firms within their territory. Obviously, this means that Eu-
ropean firms are in a disadvantage vis-a`-vis non-European firms. There
have been requests by representatives of national governments to soften
EU state aid rules in order to keep European companies competitive
against those that are not subject to state aid control. The Commis-
sion, not eager to give up its important role, rejected these claims arguing
that it is not in its power to do so (Smith, 2001).
This problem surfaced for instance in the year 2009, when the crisis
hit the automobile sector in the EU and the U.S. The United States fed-
eral government put in place a multi-billion dollar package of subsidies,
while the European Parliament passed a resolution pleading the Coun-
cil and the Commission “to accelerate, simplify and increase financial
support for the automotive industry” (resolution 2010/C 117 E/26).
As a result, the European Commission has sought to promote the
adoption of European-style state aid and public procurement rules out-
side the Union. It did so by pressuring third countries as well as by cam-
paigning within the framework of the WTO. The Commission’s strategy
thus does not seem to be a relaxation of state aid regulation in favor of
European firms’ competitiveness, but rather to extend the “level playing
field”. It does so both horizontally, that is, by inducing other countries
to adopt state aid rules, and vertically, that is, to the WTO level. The
mechanism through which it can do the former is the accession process.
Countries endeavoring to join the Union have to comply with the acquis
communitaire already years before actually becoming a member. At the
WTO level, the EU can not exert the same amount of leverage and has
to seek consensus instead, mostly with the U.S. government (Blauberger
and Kra¨mer, 2013). Blauberger and Kra¨mer (2013) also speculate that
this regulatory export, which is bound to be an important topic in the
future given the growing competitive pressures from emerging markets
and the increasing legalization of international trade, can benefit Eu-
ropean firms even beyond the removal of disadvantages. These firms
could benefit from lower transaction costs as they are familiar with the
workings of state aid rules and now face fewer diverging rules.
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The eﬀectiveness of any European state aid control will always de-
pend on its place in the global economy. The EU can be an important
source for impulses to curb subsidy wars. By exporting its regulatory
regime, it can contribute to prevent wasteful spending by its trading
partners. As a consequence, the EU could consider applying its state
aid rules not only to subsidies given by EU member states, but also aid
given by non-EU countries to firms that operate inside the EU. This
would require a change in the EU Treaties, as Article 107 only applies
to “aid granted by a Member State or through State resources”.
7.4 Overcoming the market failure - prob-
lems of collective decision-making
If we now take it for granted that lower level jurisdictions should be
regulated in their ability to award subsidies and engage in a competition
for capital – and there is ample evidence that we should do so – then the
focus is now on the ability of either a higher-level government (e.g. a
federal structure, such as Germany or the United States) or an interna-
tional organization (e.g. the EU or the WTO) to regulate this market for
firms. The previous section discussed EU state aid policy. The follow-
ing sections are more of relevance to countries or groupings of countries
which are not part of the EU and its state aid control mechanism.
7.4.1 The monopoly on regulatory power
The increase in international activity and technological progress have
had an eﬀect on how subsidies should be regulated. Firms have in-
creasingly become subject to the laws of several countries in which they
operate. This insight links the topic to the theories of choice-of-law
and international cooperation. Guzman (2002a) notes that in order to
achieve an eﬃcient result at the global level, the national interests need
to be aligned with those of the global community. A global lawmaker
would allow all activities that have a positive net eﬀect on total world
welfare, which is the sum of the direct eﬀects on a country and the ex-
ternalities produced. But this global lawmaker would not care about the
distribution of costs and benefits between jurisdictions. This policy of
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the global lawmaker can not only produce welfare increases according to
the Kaldor-Hicks eﬃciency-criterion, but also a Pareto-improvement if
we allow for compensating lump-sum transfers. In reality though, those
transfers are hard to achieve.
The problem becomes more complicated once the government is not
modeled as a black box anymore. Additionally, the term “national inter-
est” used in the previous paragraph is very vague, to say the least. The
public choice view sees regulators as individuals pursuing their own ob-
jectives. The government, which possesses the monopoly on regulatory
power, can “sell” its power to design rules to special interest groups. The
result is regulation that mainly pursues a regulated industry’s benefit,
creating barriers to entry and limiting competition. The chief reason
why this can happen is the degree of organization of actors. Firms are
highly organized (because their whole profits are at stake), whereas con-
sumers in a particular industry do not bother to organize themselves (as
they would bear the full costs of organization, but only a small part of
their income is aﬀected by prices and quantities in a specific industry5)
(ibid.).
The outcome of interest group politics is very diﬃcult to predict,
even in a narrow field of law as the one relating to the granting of public
subsidies to firms. It becomes even more so if an international dimension
is added to the problem.
Guzman (2002a) suggests addressing issues of public choice theory
in three ways. The first way is to ignore them and just assume that
governments always act in the national interest. This approach is the
dominant one, especially in the field of international law, which is mostly
due to the fact that there is no consensus about the role of public choice
on decision-making. Secondly, interests (be they national or particular)
could be weighed, with particular interests given a less dominant role
than the national interest. The analysis would then parallel the first
approach, with comparable conclusions. The weighing of diﬀerent inter-
ests is done arbitrarily, which is a disadvantage of this method. Thirdly,
the assumption that governments follow a “national interest” could be
relaxed and more general assumptions be made instead. The weighing
5As an example, manufacturers of toothpaste might be well-organized, whereas
toothpaste consumers do not care enough about the toothpaste industry to engage in
political activism with the aim of changing the regulation of the toothpaste industry.
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of variables could be done according to their influence on the political
process. The conclusions will be less forceful, though.
7.4.2 On the creation of international organizations
dealing with subsidies
A key question from what has been said so far is: What are the condi-
tions that have to be met in order for states to create an international
organization regulating the awarding of subsidies to firms? A similar
question and debate has recently emerged in the field of competition
law. At an international level, antitrust is very much characterized by
the extraterritoriality of the European and American antitrust regimes.
According to Guzman (2002a), the extraterritorial application of an-
titrust laws will lead to over-regulation, while a ban on extraterritori-
ality will lead to under-regulation. Countries might also have diﬀerent
approaches towards international antitrust. For instance, developing
countries are less likely to have firms with international market power,
but there consumers might be aﬀected by the adverse eﬀects of inter-
national cartels. Conversely, developed countries might want to protect
their internationally powerful firms. Thus, the only way of achieving a
worldwide antitrust regime might be through transfer payments. Nego-
tiations therefore need an environment that allows for those transfers,
such as a reformed WTO (Guzman, 2002a).
When it comes to subsidies, the international problem is not solved
by a choice-of-law rule. Instead, there has to be a forum for the negoti-
ation of substantive issues, which also facilitates transfer payments (or
compensations of other kinds). This has also implications for the breadth
of international organizations. If we think of a framework where coun-
tries compensate other countries in exchange for their subsidy regimes
and we want to allow for compensations other than lump-sum transfers,
then the scope of the international forum has to be broad enough to
accommodate for that need6. This forum must for instance allow for
deals including e.g. tariﬀs or trade concessions (note for instance the lit-
6As an example, compare the Universal Postal Union, an international organiza-
tion dealing exclusively with matters postal policy, to the UN Oﬃce on Drugs and
Crime, which encompasses the topics money laundering, terrorism, human traﬃck-
ing, corruption, drug traﬃcking, drug prevention, treatment and care, HIV/AIDS,
piracy, wildlife and forest crime, and others.
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erature on why the intellectual property agreements were linked to the
WTO7, e.g. Guzman (2003) or Guzman (2004)). This might (a) explain
why the European Union is so successful in implementing its state aid
control, and (b) tell us that also the WTO could be the appropriate
forum for subsidies agreements. There are other public choice scholars
who have some concerns about Guzman’s view that enabling transfers
will increase world welfare. Stephan (2002) for instance notes that those
transfers might as well increase the probability that an international
agreement might reduce world welfare (see also Guzman (2002b)).
The crucial point is whether countries are aﬀected equally by subsi-
dies given to firms. Just like polluting countries have less of an interest
in international environmental agreements than non-polluting countries,
countries that are not as much aﬀected by subsidies have fewer incen-
tives to agree to an international regulatory regime than countries which
are aﬀected. Under the current regiment, the WTO agreements prohibit
subsidies regardless of which country grants them. If we compare this
setting to the EU state aid control mechanism, a flaw becomes apparent.
The EU explicitly encourages aids in and to (relatively to the average)
under-developed regions. Following this reasoning, similar rules should
be implemented at the WTO level. In fact, currently, the opposite is
happening. According to WTO estimates (WTO, 2006), 21 developed
countries spent almost $250 million, which is equivalent to almost 85
percent of the world’s subsidies. Developing countries – despite a high
degree of variation among them – spend a considerably lower amount
of subsidies (in percent of GDP). Thus, it might be in the interest of
the developing, not the developed countries to enact and enforce tighter
rules.
7.4.3 State aid control without integration
The European state aid control mechanism operates at a very detailed
level and does so in a context of deep economic and political integra-
tion. Yet, it has been argued that a political system like the EU is not
necessarily a pre-requisite for a functioning subsidy control system or-
ganized by an independent authority (Sinnaeve, 2007). It is conceivable
7Basically, a deal was struck in which an intellectual property rights agreement
was found in exchange for concessions relating to agricultural subsidies and others.
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to implement for instance a EU-style state aid control mechanism that
focuses only on large cases. This would avoid micro-management and
discussions about the scope of national or sub-national sovereignty. The
eﬀect on preventing subsidy races could be substantial nevertheless. EU
state aid control is a system of a priori prohibition with the possibility
of exemptions and authorization. A system that works the other way
round, that is, one in which aid is generally allowed but jurisdictions
agree on certain aids that are prohibited. This might make it politically
easier to implement, as states do not have to agree to a general ban,
but can pick certain areas in which they want to curb down subsidies.
Another way forward is to not prohibit state aid, but to set certain cri-
teria that all states have to abide to. For instance, there could be limits
on the aid intensity, that is, the amounts given as a percentage of the
investment made by the private firm. The rules could be left vague for
broad kinds of aid (e.g. R&D aid), and made more detailed and stricter
for those programs that are usually deemed problematic (e.g. sectoral
aid).
The WTO system, which comes closest to a comprehensive interna-
tional subsidy control system beside the EU state aid control mechanism,
is severely limited by several factors. While it provides a mechanism to
interdict large subsidies, it does not provide an independent authority
monitoring states’ subsidy programs. Subsidies are only actionable by
other member states, meaning that there are no ways for private enforce-
ment. For political reasons, many subsidies do not see adverse action
(countries aﬀected by the subsidies might fear a tit-for-tat strategy on
the part of the subsidizing state). It also means that not only foreign
competitors of subsidized firms with too weak an influence on their own
government to start action, but also domestic competitors cannot make
use of the WTO system in their favor.
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Conclusion
This book revisited the question whether governments should be re-
stricted in the aid that they are giving to private firms. That some kind
of regulation is necessary, and be it only in the shape of mandatory dis-
closure rules, is widely considered a consensus, at least in the academic
literature.
Virtually all industrialized regions in the world are subject to state
aid regulation. Nevertheless, the rules diﬀer tremendously around the
globe. In many instances, the WTO rules on subsidies are the only
applicable law. The European Union with its State Aid Law sports a
truly unique mechanism, a sui generis institution controlling state aid.
The next question is how and to what extent this regulation should
take place. The conclusions from this book stem from the various ap-
proaches taken. The literature on state aid generally justifies control in
the presence of externalities. There is a wide scope of opinions though,
with proponents of unrestricted inter-jurisdictional competition on one
side, and advocates of a “level playing field” with undistorted competi-
tion among firms on the other extreme. In-between positions are com-
mon. State aid control establishes an order of competition that aﬀects
both inter-firm and inter-jurisdictional competition.
The intention of this book was to delve deeper into some of the
mechanisms in place and to formulate some novel insights. The spot
was mainly on the issue of incomplete contracts between the various
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stakeholders.
First, there is the side of the state. Here, politicians are supposed
to follow the will of a heterogeneous electorate. At the same time, they
face some uncertainty about the eventual outcome of their spending deci-
sions. The constitutional settings under which they are made determines
the outcome and the redistributive eﬀects. Most importantly, politicians
make these decisions in a competitive environment, in which other local-
ities’ politicians follow similar mandates to attract or rescue firms. The
result from this is that the main cause of concern is not necessarily the
distortion of competition, but rather the wasteful spending of taxpayers’
money, which is a result of rent-seeking and of the dilemma that the
participants in firm location races are in.
Secondly, the principal-agent problems on the side of the firm should
be taken into account. The agency approach to corporate governance
shows that state aids do not always end up where they are supposed
to and - in extreme cases - might not even benefit anybody other than
the managers of the firm. The state might not receive what it paid for,
while, even though there is a transfer from the state to the firm, the
actual owners of the firm might not benefit entirely from this transfer.
Furthermore, firms might also engage in state aid deals which are not
in the interest of the minority shareholders, meaning that, in the course
of a state aid transaction, there might be a redistribution from the firm
outsiders to the insiders.
Finding an optimal level of regulation can be a two-edged sword. The
public choice and corporate governance aspects lead to the conclusion
that (a) state aid control is necessary – not to avoid distortions of com-
petition, but to avoid wasting resources, and (b) state aid control should
take into account the local specifics of the locality which grants the aid
and of the aid recipient. The ambivalence originates in the practicalities.
The transaction costs of such a regime would be prohibitively high as
it would put all interactions between the state and the economy up for
scrutiny. Some solutions exist nevertheless. Only large subsidies should
be assessed. There could be penalty payments in the case of unlaw-
ful aid, which could be realistically implemented at the national level.
Clear, pre-defined procedures should apply when giving aid to a firm,
such as limitations on bonus payments or designating a dedicated oﬃcer
responsible for monitoring the aid. All these suggestions, of course, need
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to be translated into the specifics of the regulatory regime in place.
The considerations made in this book also lead to a series of ques-
tions for further research. The logical next step is to produce empirically
testable hypotheses (e.g. about firm characteristics, firm value, institu-
tional variables, jurisdictional characteristics, and others). As already
mentioned in the introductory chapter, a lot of “creativity” is needed in
order to obtain a useful dataset. European data is limited due to the
fact that the notification requirements are not comprehensive and that
non-aggregated, firm-level data is diﬃcult to obtain. American data is
not reported systematically, leading to very incomplete data sets.
This book focused on issues of contracting between the state and
the firm, giving special attention to the nexus of public choice on the
side of the state, and corporate governance on the side of the firm. The
considerations made give way to the bigger policy question of how to
design industrial policy in Europe and elsewhere. The answer to this
question is subject to a political process, of which the outcome has yet
to be determined.
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TFEU
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contains the legal
framework for European State Aid Law:
SECTION 2
AIDS GRANTED BY STATES
Article 107
(ex Article 87 TEC)
1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted
by a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods shall, in so far as it aﬀects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the internal market.
2. The following shall be compatible with the internal mar-
ket:
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual con-
sumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimi-
nation related to the origin of the products concerned;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters
or exceptional occurrences;
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal
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Republic of Germany aﬀected by the division of Germany, in
so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the
economic disadvantages caused by that division. Five years
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Coun-
cil, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a
decision repealing this point.
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with
the internal market: (a) aid to promote the economic devel-
opment of areas where the standard of living is abnormally
low or where there is serious underemployment, and of the
regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural,
economic and social situation; (b) aid to promote the execu-
tion of an important project of common European interest or
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member
State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic ac-
tivities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not
adversely aﬀect trading conditions to an extent contrary to
the common interest;
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where
such aid does not aﬀect trading conditions and competition
in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common
interest;
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by deci-
sion of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.
Article 108
(ex Article 88 TEC)
1. The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States,
keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those
States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate mea-
sures required by the progressive development or by the func-
tioning of the internal market.
2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit
their comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a
State or through State resources is not compatible with the
internal market having regard to Article 107, or that such
259
237
aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State concerned
shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be
determined by the Commission.
If the State concerned does not comply with this decision
within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other
interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of
Articles 258 and 259, refer the matter to the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union direct.
On application by a Member State, the Council may, acting
unanimously, decide that aid which that State is granting or
intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with
the internal market, in derogation from the provisions of Ar-
ticle 107 or from the regulations provided for in Article 109,
if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances. If,
as regards the aid in question, the Commission has already
initiated the procedure provided for in the first subparagraph
of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has made
its application to the Council shall have the eﬀect of suspend-
ing that procedure until the Council has made its attitude
known.
If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known
within three months of the said application being made, the
Commission shall give its decision on the case.
3. The Commission shall be informed, in suﬃcient time to
enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or
alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compat-
ible with the internal market having regard to Article 107,
it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in
paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put
its proposed measures into eﬀect until this procedure has re-
sulted in a final decision.
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4. The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the
categories of State aid that the Council has, pursuant to Ar-
ticle 109, determined may be exempted from the procedure
provided for by paragraph 3 of this Article.
Article 109
(ex Article 89 TEC)
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, may make any appro-
priate regulations for the application of Articles 107 and 108
and may in particular determine the conditions in which Ar-
ticle 108(3) shall apply and the categories of aid exempted
from this procedure.
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